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Abstract 
This project examines ecological change in Lake Huron during the nineteenth and 
twentieth century and investigates the causative role of the commercial fisheries in that change.  
The repeated failures of various regional and international efforts designed to improve 
management of the lake‟s fisheries are also examined.  The fundamental argument is that 
economic considerations were the primary motivations for policy development related to the 
Great Lakes fisheries.  Historically management programs and legislation were shaped by local 
and regional economic interests. 
The central focus of this project is Lake Huron.  Anthropogenic changes in that lake‟s 
environment dramatically affected the lives and relationships of its non-human inhabitants.  The 
same changes also transformed relationships among human beings who relied on the lake‟s 
resources.  Commercial fishermen who operated in the waters of both the United States and 
Canada relied on the lake for their livelihood, but as the twentieth century commenced the supply 
of marketable fishes decreased.  Competition accelerated and fishermen introduced new 
technologies and increased their quantity of fishing gear in an effort to maximize their catches in 
response to fluctuating returns.  Economic considerations were of primary concern to both 
fishermen and government bureaucrats.  Lake Huron‟s status as an international borderland 
further complicated the situation.  Analysts in both the United States and Canada recognized the 
dramatically changing conditions of the lakes as reflected through the woes of the commercial 
fishery.  Nonetheless, the germane state, provincial and national governments repeatedly failed 
in their attempts to develop a cooperative management plan.  By the second half of the twentieth 
  
century Lake Huron‟s embattled biome stood in stark contrast to the once seemingly endless 
numbers of fishes and flora that sustained the lake‟s web of life for hundreds of years. 
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This project examines ecological change in Lake Huron during the nineteenth and 
twentieth century and investigates the causative role of the commercial fisheries in that change.  
The repeated failures of various regional and international efforts designed to improve the 
management of the lake‟s fisheries are also examined.  The fundamental argument is that 
economic considerations were the primary motivations for policy development related to the 
Great Lakes fisheries.  Historically management programs and legislation were shaped by local 
and regional economic interests. 
The central focus of this project is Lake Huron.  Anthropogenic changes in that lake‟s 
environment dramatically affected the lives and relationships of its non-human inhabitants.  The 
same changes also transformed relationships among human beings who relied on the lake‟s 
resources.  Commercial fishermen who operated in the waters of both the United States and 
Canada relied on the lake for their livelihood, but as the twentieth century commenced the supply 
of marketable fishes decreased.  Competition accelerated and fishermen introduced new 
technologies and increased their quantity of fishing gear in an effort to maximize their catches in 
response to fluctuating returns.  Economic considerations were of primary concern to both 
fishermen and government bureaucrats.  Lake Huron‟s status as an international borderland 
further complicated the situation.  Analysts in both the United States and Canada recognized the 
dramatically changing conditions of the lakes as reflected through the woes of the commercial 
fishery.  Nonetheless, the germane state, provincial and national governments repeatedly failed 
in their attempts to develop a cooperative management plan.  By the second half of the twentieth 
  
century Lake Huron‟s embattled biome stood in stark contrast to the once seemingly endless 
numbers of fishes and flora that sustained the lake‟s web of life for hundreds of years. 
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Preface 
Nothing is more important to life on Earth than water.  Fresh water is critical to human 
life.  The Great Lakes contain more readily available freshwater than anywhere else on the 
Earth‟s surface.1  Collectively the lakes hold approximately eighty-four percent of North 
America‟s surface freshwater.  The Great Lakes are a critical integrated ecosystem populated by 
a vast variety of living organisms and marked by diverse landscapes.  As an ecosystem the lakes 
have a long natural history of interrelations among the thousands of plants and animals that 
inhabited the lakes‟ long shorelines and swam in their vast bodies.  What follows is a slice of that 
region‟s ecological story.   
This project examines ecological change in Lake Huron during the nineteenth and 
twentieth century and investigates the causative role of the commercial fisheries in that change.  
The failures of various efforts, both regional and international, to maintain the lake‟s 
environmental stability are examined.  The central argument here is that economic considerations 
were the primary motivators for policy development on the lakes.  Regional interests dominated 
lake management in the nineteenth and twentieth century.  Religiously inspired ideas of human 
dominion over the earth and anthropocentric conceptions of human progress and recreation 
historically justified policies aimed at maximizing human use and consumption of environmental 
resources.
2
  Over the second half of the twentieth century environmental theories evolved that 
suggested very different models of ecological stewardship.  Newer theoretical models grounded 
in environmental thought and sciences range from human centered ideas regarding wise use to 
holistic models that seek to balance the needs of all living creatures.
3
  Many new theories of 
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environmental management contrasted sharply with Great Lakes fisheries management of the 
nineteenth and most of the twentieth century.   
This is one piece of an ongoing interconnected Great Lakes research puzzle worked on by 
a variety of scientists and scholars, past and present, intended to assist in forming a foundation 
for better understanding and managing our complex freshwater ecosystems.  The central focus of 
this project is Lake Huron.  Anthropogenic changes in that lake‟s environment dramatically 
affected the lives and relationships of its non-human inhabitants.  The same changes also 
transformed relationships among human beings who relied on the lake‟s resources.   
This project examines the changing historical conditions in and around the lake through 
the spectrum of the numerous commercial fishing operations that existed on Lake Huron in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Commercial fishermen who worked the waters of both the 
United States and Canada relied on the lake for their livelihood.  As the twentieth century 
dawned the supply of marketable fishes declined.  Canadian authorities responded with 
legislative controls that were poorly enforced and regularly violated.  In the United States 
fisheries experts initially believed hatcheries could restore and maintain the commercialized 
species.  Within the industry competition accelerated and fishermen introduced new technologies 
to maximize their catch in the face of fluctuating returns.  They concurrently increased the 
amount of gear they were fishing in the lake.  Analysts in both the United States and Canada 
recognized the dramatically changing conditions of the lakes as reflected through the woes of the 
commercial fishery.  They realized regulations were a necessity and that the various conflicting 
codes of the various states and the Province of Ontario were counterproductive.  Nonetheless, the 
U.S. and Canadian governments repeatedly failed in their attempts to develop a cooperative 
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management plan.  While economic considerations were of primary concern to both fishermen 
and fisheries conservationists their priorities clashed and prevented real progress.   
Environmental historian Donald Worster theorized that economic motivations inform 
decision making and cooperation in the modern industrial system.  In his book Nature’s 
Economy (1977) Worster stated industrial systems are fully interdependent, but that in the 
modern world interdependency “almost always gets reduced to economic terms.”4  Worster 
further argued that the environmental manager of the modern economic age often believes nature 
can be improved through intervention “for the sake of ever higher economic achievements.”5  
Late nineteenth and twentieth century fisheries biologists often communicated similar economic 
goals.  Efforts to restrain the fisheries were not designed to save fish for any reasons intrinsic to 
the fish themselves.  Conservationists sought to preserve and enhance fisheries profits through 
restoration and protection of marketable fish stocks.  However, the economic goals of 
conservationists were focused on future longevity while individual fishermen were almost 
always motivated by immediate profits.  Thus their objectives clashed, and efforts to protect 
dwindling resources ran afoul of politically active commercial fishermen.  When Lake Trout 
populations crashed in the middle of the twentieth century the governments undertook their 
largest cooperative fact finding mission to date, but translating the information they compiled 
into concerted legislative action became a slow and ultimately ineffectual affair.  The depleted 
Great Lakes ecosystems of the late twentieth century stood in stark contrast to the seemingly 
endless numbers of fishes and flora that had lived in and sustained the web of life in the region 
for hundreds of years. 
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This project is divided into five chapters.  Chapter one includes a brief discussion of the 
formation of the Great Lakes, a description of species that became important to commercial 
fishermen, a consideration of pre-contact use of lake resources by Great Lakes Indian peoples 
and a brief synopsis of the first commercial fishing enterprises in the region.  The purpose of this 
chapter is to both provide an overview of Lake Huron‟s geologic history and ecology as well as 
illustrate the ethical frameworks certain Indian nations developed to guide resource use in order 
to compare and contrast their pre-contact models to the for profit market systems that developed 
later.   
In chapter one I introduce the Great Lakes region with a brief discussion of its geologic 
evolution followed by an overview of several of the species of fishes that were among the most 
prized by the commercial fisheries.  The life cycles of the various species are presented alongside 
the ecological niche they played within the lake‟s ecosystem.  The use of lake resources by pre-
contact Great Lakes Indian peoples is then discussed.  I specifically consider the fishing practices 
and related cultural ceremonies of Wendats and Anishinabeks.  I further consider the ethical 
dimensions of indigenous behavior alongside the modern stereotype of North American Indians 
as natural environmentalists.  I reflect on The Ecological Indian (1999) by Shepard Krech III and 
his effort to challenge that stereotype.  While I agree that the “ecological Indian” stereotype 
criticized by Krech III and his supporters is inaccurate and dehumanizing, I argue the individual 
ethical proscriptions of specific Indian nations are often lost in the rush to recast Indian peoples 
as ultimately just like everyone else.  The use of lake resources by Wendats, Anishinabeks and 
other unique Great Lakes nations bore little resemblance to introduced Western conceptions of 
resource use.  Because of this, I argue they deserve consideration. 
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While the focal point of this project is not the indigenous fisheries, the pre-contact 
worldviews and practices of Great Lakes Indian peoples are offered in contrast to the market 
systems that came later.  In the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century the various 
Indian nations faced their own individual struggles to fish on ceded lands and retain their treaty 
guaranteed rights to resource access. Their stories are not well documented in the records of the 
commercial fisheries and the resultant management schemes examined for this project.  Until 
very recently Great Lakes Indian peoples were routinely left out of the policy making and 
legislative processes.  A large component of this paper is focused on the history of fisheries 
management and the recurrent population failures that occurred in the fisheries as a result.  Thus 
it is appropriate to consider the pre-contact fishing practices and ceremonies that were ignored by 
nineteenth and twentieth century policy makers – practices that utilized Great Lakes fishes in a 
sustainable fashion for centuries. 
Chapter one concludes with a consideration of the early commercial fishery on Lake 
Ontario and the problems that fishery foreshadowed for Lake Huron.  The destruction of Lake 
Ontario‟s fishery resources is described through transcripts of interviews with fishermen during 
the era, many of whom relocated to Lake Huron following the collapse of Lake Ontario‟s 
fishery.  The settlement and growth of early lakeside communities around Lake Huron are also 
considered. 
In chapter two I consider the evolution of technologies utilized by the commercial 
fisheries, consider Lake Huron in its context as an international borderland and finally provide an 
examination of the data compiled by the International Joint Commission of 1892.  The purpose 
of the chapter is threefold.  I provide an overview of the technological workings of the 
commercial fishery in order to better understand the industry‟s day to day functionality.  The 
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chapter additionally offers a framework for envisioning the lake as a borderland.  Finally I 
provide documentation of how quickly the intensive use of new technologies fostered declines of 
marketable species on both sides of the international border, changes that generated cooperative 
investigations of the fishery.  The decline led to the creation of the Joint Commission of 1892.  
Various types of fishing vessels and gear are discussed.  The mechanization of vessels and 
modernization of netting materials are considered in conjunction with the growing concerns early 
conservation officials expressed regarding some of the new technologies.   
I discuss the International Joint Commission of 1892.  The commissioners created a rich 
repository of information related to the Great Lakes fisheries when they completed an ambitious 
tour of the region and interviewed a large number of commercial fishermen.  Selections from a 
variety of interviews from both the American and Canadian sides of Lake Huron are included.  
The interviews provide a better understanding of issues of widespread concern and of the 
regional problems that afflicted the industry in the 1890s.  The interviewees often expressed a 
frustration with lake conditions coupled with an unwillingness to embrace changes that might 
impede their own profitability.  The political influence of more powerful fishing operations is 
also apparent from the interviews.   
Other problematic divisions within the fishery are presented.  Commercial fishermen 
using one specific type of technology often blamed fishermen relying on a different technology 
for the fishery‟s growing problems.  Few were willing to fault their own activities.  Regional and 
personal interests influenced individual perspectives.  Mutual suspicion soured relations between 
the Canadian and American fisheries.  The records of the 1892 Joint Commission are a window 
into a commercial fishery that was rife with internal divisions, struggling to maintain its 
xxi 
 
profitability and resistant to the idea of increased regulations.  As a result the commission‟s 
recommendations for increased cooperative management were not followed. 
Chapter three includes an examination of the 1908 International Fisheries Commission 
followed by a brief consideration of the day to day operations of the commercial fisheries and the 
difficulty inherent in enforcing early regulations. The chapter concludes with an overview of 
several failed efforts to create a cooperative management scheme for the Great Lakes in the years 
leading up to World War II.  The purpose of the chapter is to illustrate the efforts of various 
administrators to address declines in commercialized fish species and the continued resistance of 
fishermen to anything that might jeopardize their profits, including new laws or existing 
enforcement.  The 1908 International Fisheries Commission represented the second major push 
to develop a broad set of legislative controls for conserving the embattled Great Lakes fisheries.  
The story of its formation, research and recommendations followed by the failure of the United 
States Government to adopt its legislative plan exemplified the continued power and influence of 
the commercial fishing industry and its ability to protect its economic interests.  The account of 
the plan‟s failure also underscores the lack of knowledge shared by respected fisheries biologists 
and their willingness to accept dubious information from commercial fishermen at face value.  
The successful political revolt of Saginaw Bay fishermen against the commission demonstrated 
that fact and is considered.   
Canada had both the earliest and strongest restrictions applied to the commercial fishing 
industry.  However, the lakes were vast and enforcement was insufficient.  The day to day 
problems enforcement officers faced in Ontario are illuminated through the records of Neil 
MacNaughtan.  MacNaughtan worked as the game and fishery overseer for Ontario‟s Parry 
Sound District from 1920 until 1946.  The records of his employment provide a fascinating 
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historical account of a fishery that was rife with abuses.  Chapter three concludes with a 
consideration of various efforts to create consistent regulations for the Great Lakes prior to 
World War II.   
Chapter four opens with a discussion of the expanding Great Lakes market system.  The 
chapter includes a discussion of industrial development, species introductions, canal construction 
and the efforts of conservation officials to create a more efficient and effective managerial 
framework for the lakes from the 1930s through 1950.  The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate 
the accelerated industrialization of the Great Lakes Basin, the overall ramifications of that 
development for the aquatic ecosystems of the lakes and the effects of development on the 
conservation efforts of lake biologists.  From my initial consideration of industrial impacts in the 
basin, I move to a related discussion of nonindigenous species in the lakes.  Certain 
nonindigenous species, such as the common carp, were introduced as a means of creating a ready 
and profitable food source.  However, the planting of carp backfired and the fish became a 
nuisance.  Other species, such as smelt, were introduced accidentally.  I then consider the 
building and modernization of the Welland Canal and the convenient entry point it created for a 
variety of marine species.  Perhaps most significant among those species were sea lampreys.  
Their subsequent effects on the fisheries are considered.  I further discuss the increasing 
complexity of lake management and the efforts of biologists to address those changes, using the 
example of John Van Oosten, Head of Great Lakes Fisheries Investigations from the late 1920s 
until 1949.  Van Oosten believed the commercial fisheries were responsible for the population 
declines of several species and supported the concept of an international regulatory body.  His 
fisheries work contributed to the eventual formation of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission in 
1955, a policy advisory and sea lamprey control organization. 
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In chapter five I examine postwar management of Lake Huron through the year 1978.  
The purpose of this chapter is both to bring the continuing chronological story of managing the 
lake‟s troubled ecology into the 1970s while providing a contrasting example of environmental 
management through the history of the retention of the Big Chute Marine Railway at the western 
end of Ontario‟s Trent-Severn Waterway.  Lamprey control dominated the work of lake 
conservationists during this period.  The decision to focus on chemical controls and the regional 
results of that decision, both pro and con, are discussed.  The chapter then considers the creation 
of the United States Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (BCF) and its emphasis on maximum 
production.  The BCF‟s focus on increased production came at a time when both marine and 
freshwater commercial fisheries in the United States were struggling with resource depletion.   
I then discuss the Michigan Department of Conservation‟s embrace of recreational 
fishing interests at the expense of its longstanding commitment to commercial fisheries.  The 
State of Michigan and the Province of Ontario followed divergent paths to lake rehabilitation.  
Ontario attempted to balance its focus between the commercial and sport fisheries while 
Michigan concentrated on building a thriving recreational fishery.  I include a consideration of 
the State of Michigan‟s planting of several exotic species while Ontario officials adopted a 
hybrid splake program.   
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the Province of Ontario‟s plan to demolish the 
Big Chute Marine Railway at the western end of the Trent-Severn Waterway and replace it with 
a more profitable and efficient lock system.  In contrast to the earlier drive to modernize the 
Welland Canal, Big Chute planners carefully considered the possible ecological ramifications of 
tearing down the marine railway.  While economic considerations played a role, the story of the 
marine railway‟s retention demonstrates the possibilities of moving beyond simple economic 
xxiv 
 
considerations and managing for ecosystem health.  Finally, in the Afterword I conclude this 
project with a consideration of the continuing ecological issues that plague Lake Huron and the 
ongoing efforts of a variety of scientists and other aquatic specialists to manage its changing 
ecosystem. 
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2
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River: A Brief History of the U.S. Environmental Movement (Lanham: Acada Books, 2000), 3-
12. 
3
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Fig. 1 The Lake Huron Basin.  Map courtesy of Lacey Mason, Great lakes GIS Project.
1 
  
 
Chapter 1 - Reaping La Mer Douce:  Lake Huron’s ecosystem and 
human utilization through the centuries 
 Lake Huron and its fishes 
 
The region that became host to the world‟s largest commercial freshwater fishery came 
into existence thousands of years before the first fish dealer set up shop in the area.  The Great 
Lakes Basin was formed during the last major ice age.  The final glaciers of the ice age receded 
from the area approximately six thousand years ago.  The glaciers had further depressed existing 
valleys in the basin and as they receded filled the ravines with their melt water.  The lakes 
reached their present day levels roughly 2,500 years ago.  The fishes and faunas of the region 
remained relatively stable for over two thousand years.
1
   
Lake Huron occupies the middle of the Great Lakes Basin, and is often referred to as the 
lake in the middle.  It is the third largest of the Great Lakes by volume, after Lakes Superior and 
Michigan, respectively.  Huron‟s average depth is one hundred and ninety-five feet.  At its 
deepest point it reaches seven hundred fifty feet.  Huron‟s drainage area is more than twice the 
size of its actual surface waters.  Its drainage encompasses a variety of wetland areas and more 
recently supported intensive agriculture in certain regions.
2
  In the nineteenth century researchers 
mistakenly labeled Huron as the deepest of the Great Lakes because of its sprawling size.  Its 
waters were known for their clarity and perceived purity.
3
  There are over thirty thousand islands 
in Lake Huron.  Manitoulin is the largest.  It is the largest island located within a fresh water 
body in the world.  Lake Huron shares a hydrological connection to Lake Michigan via the 
Straits of Mackinaw.  The largest urban area on Lake Huron is Sarnia, Canada on its extreme 
2 
  
southern end.
4
  Because of the growth in human populations and industry around the lake, 
anthropogenic influences led to dramatic changes in the chemical and biological content of the 
lake over the last century and a half, especially within Saginaw Bay.
5
 
The fishing industry that thrived on Lake Huron in the nineteenth and twentieth century 
would never have existed without the various species of fishes that came to be highly prized by 
the commercial netters.  Of the more than one hundred fifty species of fish inhabiting the waters 
of Lake Huron, several species were highly influential in the growth of the intensive commercial 
and recreational fisheries.  Perhaps no Great Lakes fish garnered more human interest nor played 
a more central role in the history of the lake fisheries than the freshwater whitefish.  Whitefish 
inhabited the Great Lakes for centuries.  Present day researchers often regard whitefish as 
barometers of the overall health of the lakes.
6
  While their numbers fluctuated wildly due to 
increased exploitation and predation over the previous two centuries, they long played an 
important part in the ecology of the lakes.  Members of the salmon family, whitefish are most 
common in the pelagic and benthipelagic zones away from shore in cohesive groups.
7
  Within 
Lake Huron‟s diverse web of life whitefishes are a larger predatory fish that is reliant on a 
number of other species for sustenance.  Whitefish will feed on insects, zooplankton, amphipods, 
mollusks and smaller fishes.  They will also eat eggs of fishes, including their own.
8
  Whitefish 
are typically classified as benthivores meaning they feed primarily in the benthipelagic zone – 
the area of the lake near the bottom.  They move energy reserves from the benthipelagic region 
of the lake to other pelagic areas through their feeding and digestive processes.
9
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Many of the food sources that are important to whitefish changed dramatically as a result 
of human development.  For example, the invertebrate amphipod Diporeia provided a 
historically important source of nutrition for whitefishes.  Populations of Diporeia accounted for 
over seventy percent of the benthic biomass at lake depths beyond thirty meters.
10
   After the 
introduction of zebra mussels to the interior Great Lakes in the 1980s populations of Diporeia 
declined.  Diporeia rely on suspended organic materials in the water for their sustenance, but 
zebra mussels filter the water and remove the compounds Diporeia rely on.  That population 
change in turn affected whitefish that depend on Diporeia as part of their diet.  Researchers 
predicted a loss of overall energy consumption in the fishes‟ diets, which can affect growth, 
spawning, population densities and the health of individual fishes.
 11
  Other species of fishes are 
also affected and “cascading impacts” across various depths are predicted.12 
Whitefish typically have a greenish brown or olive gray coloration fading into silver 
along their sides leading into pale white on their underbelly.
13
 In the Great Lakes the fins of the 
whitefish are clear or lightly pigmented.  The average length of an adult whitefish taken by the 
commercial fishery averaged from fifteen to twenty-two inches, but they can reach lengths of 
forty inches and likely grew even larger prior to the development of an intensive fishery and the 
increased environmental stresses of the twentieth century. 
14
  One of the largest recorded was a 
forty-two pound specimen caught near Isle Royale in Lake Superior.
15
  Whitefish spawn late in 
the year, usually in November and December.  During spawning they travel from the deeper 
waters of Lake Huron to shallower areas where they deposit their eggs on the bottom of the lake 
or connected rivers.  The farther north in the lakes the fish reside, the earlier they tend to spawn.  
Twentieth century calculations placed the number of eggs produced per pound of adult female 
whitefish in Lake Huron at 8,200.  It is improbable we will ever know the productivity of 
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whitefishes prior to the industrialization of the basin.  The eggs hatch the following April or 
May.  Young whitefish fry are susceptible to predation by adult whitefish, lake trout, northern 
pike and other fishes.  As the whitefish grow they also have to contend with freshwater eels, 
birds, otters and bears.  They are highly susceptible to parasite infestations.
16
 
Adult whitefish generally travel from deeper water to shallower areas in the spring.  
During the summer when the water temperatures are warming, whitefish return to the deeper 
waters of the lake.  During their spawning period in the fall and winter they again travel to 
shallower waters.  Whitefish often travel extensively throughout the lakes, but they appear to 
have a definite purpose to their movements.  Various tagged stocks of whitefishes moved in very 
different patterns and distances depending on the environment they inhabit.  However, despite 
displaying a variety of migratory routes, individual whitefishes seem to move with purpose and 
demonstrate a strong preference for spawning areas specific to their individual groups.  They 
return to the spawning grounds that are familiar to them.
17
  Whitefish provided a critical link in 
Lake Huron‟s interdependent web of life.  They were arguably the most influential species in the 
growth of an intensive commercial fishery in the Great Lakes during the nineteenth century, 
followed closely by lake trout.  
Lake trout similarly share a long history in Lake Huron.  Adult lengths average fifteen to 
twenty inches, but they can grow to over three feet in length.
18
  Their bodies are usually light 
hues of green or gray to darker hues of brown to almost black.  Overlay on their body color are 
hundreds of small light spots which give the lake trout a speckled appearance.  Some lake trout 
have a lighter background color making the speckles difficult to see.  Lake trout spawn in the fall 
and early winter.  Typically they move into waters of less than 120 feet in depth and seek out 
formations of rubble or large boulders.  Sometimes lake trout travel repeatedly to the same 
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spawning areas, while at other times they do not.  The fish rub the spawning area with their 
bodies or sometimes with just their fins or snout in order to clean and prepare it.  They typically 
spawn at night.  A single female can produce 400-1200 eggs per pound of body weight.  The 
eggs hatch four to five months later.
19
 
Like whitefish, lake trout can range hundreds of miles around the lake although tagging 
experiments varied in the breadth of movements they recorded.
20
  Lake trout prefer deep, cold 
water.  Historically lake trout were a key predator within the ecological networks of the lakes.  
Young trout feed on plankton, insects and their larvae and various small crustaceans and fishes.  
Adult trout feed primarily on other fishes.  While they will eat whitefish, perch, smelt, sculpins, 
other trout and numerous other small fishes, ciscoes seem to be particularly favored when 
available.  Sometimes lake trout will even eat mice and other small mammals that venture into 
the water.
21
  Ontario fisherman David Belrose said he caught a seventy five pound trout with a 
muskrat inside.
22
  Commercial fisherman also caught trout that had consumed rocks and one 
fisherman even claimed he found a discarded jackknife inside a trout‟s stomach.23  Like 
whitefish, lake trout suffer from a variety of lake parasites.
24
 
Besides whitefish and lake trout, a number of other species played important roles in the 
early fisheries.  Lake sturgeons are the largest native species of fish in the lakes.  Sturgeons are 
an ancient species.  The fossil record indicates that sturgeons existed for some 100 to 200 million 
years.  Sturgeons are bottom feeders, eating molluscs, crustaceans, insect larva and small fishes.  
Their mouths are set back beneath and behind their eyes.  Their bodies are typically shades of 
brown or grey, with dark blotches and rows of bony plates running along their sides and back. 
The largest sturgeons reach nine feet in length.  They are the largest fish in the Great Lakes. 
While today adult sturgeons usually average between 43 to 71 inches, the largest on record was 
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caught in Lake Michigan in 1943 and had a length of 95 inches.  The fish weighed just over 309 
pounds.  Historically very large sturgeons were much more common.  Enormous individuals 
were probably widespread before the advent of commercial fisheries.  A sturgeon can take 
fifteen to twenty-five years to reach sexual maturity.  Males live about fifty-five years while 
females can live from eighty to as much as one hundred and fifty years.  
25
  Sturgeons spawn at 
varying intervals depending on the sex of the fish and their location.  Pauses between spawning 
cycles can run several years for both males and females in some regions.  Spawning females 
produce from four to seven thousand eggs for every pound of their body weight.  While Native 
American fishermen prized sturgeon as a source of food, oil and leather, early commercial 
fishermen regarded them as a nuisance because of their large size and ability to damage netting.
26
   
Many fishermen erroneously labeled sturgeons as major destroyers of the spawn of other 
marketable fishes and in turn destroyed them when they found them.  These magnificent fish 
were slaughtered in spawning schools by fishermen wielding axes, caught and thrown to pigs 
and even dried and burned for fuel in nineteenth century steamboat boilers.
27
  Other factors that 
affected sturgeon populations included barriers to spawning areas, pollutants and waste from the 
timber industry.
28
  Because of their large sizes, slow maturity, intermittent spawning and a high 
susceptibility to population depressions in the face of habitat change and loss, sturgeons were an 
early casualty in the growth of lakeshore industries and the intensive commercial fisheries of the 
nineteenth century. 
Walleyes are another important lake species.  They typically inhabit waters nearer the 
Lake Huron shoreline as well as adjoining lakes and streams.  They range in color from light 
browns to yellow with darker bands across their back and sides.   Great Lakes walleyes typically 
spawn in the spring.  They usually spawn at night.
29
  Walleyes grow quickly, reaching three to 
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eight inches in length their first year of life in Lake Erie.  They grow somewhat slower in the 
northern Great Lakes.  They often reach two feet in length.
30
  While they frequently inhabit 
shallow waters, they are sensitive to bright light and will often feed in twilight or nighttime hours 
unless the water is cloudy.  Their range is typically not as vast as some other Great Lakes fishes, 
though some tagged walleyes traveled over one hundred miles.
31
  Adult walleyes feed primarily 
on other smaller fishes.  Walleyes are in turn an important food source for Northern Pikes and 
Muskellunges.
32
  Walleyes were often shipped whole (referred to as “in the round”), and became 
a popular food with Jewish people following a kosher diet.  The practice became so common that 
some Great Lakes commercial fishermen took to referring to walleyes with the prejudicial name 
“Jew fish.”33  Blue walleye were a distinct sub-species.  They were called blue walleyes due to 
their bodies ranging in color from slate to ice blue.  Their pelvic fins were a distinctive white 
color.  The pelvic fins of other walleyes are typically yellowish.  Blue walleyes inhabited lakes 
Erie and Ontario.  They were overexploited by the commercial fishery and went extinct in the 
1980s.
34
   
Pikes are one of the larger species of Great Lakes fishes.  Pikes have a more slender body 
shape than trout or whitefish.  The fossil record indicates that while pikes experienced some 
microevolution, their skeletal characteristics remained essentially the same for sixty million 
years.  They have been called “living fossils.”35  Northern Pikes average eighteen to thirty inches 
in length, although records exist of some approaching sixty inches.  Northern Pikes have a lower 
jaw that extends slightly past the upper.  Like lake trout, they have lighter colored spots on a 
darker undercoating.  Unlike most other large freshwater fishes, their dorsal fin is set much 
farther back toward the caudal (tail) fin.
36
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Pikes typically spawn in the spring, from April to May, usually during daylight.  A 
mature female averages 32,000 eggs when spawning.  The largest females produce much higher 
numbers.  The male and female fish swim freely in shallower waters, often rolling while 
releasing milt and eggs into the water.  Pike eggs usually hatch after twelve to fourteen days and 
the fry grow quickly thereafter.  A relative of northern pike, the muskellunge, has a body shape 
similar to a northern pike. However, instead of light spots on a dark background, the 
muskellunge has dark markings on a light background.  The muskellunge‟s markings are not as 
defined as the pike‟s, varying in appearance between spots, splotches and stripes.  Muskellunge 
average 28-48 inches, although they may grow as long as six feet. They spawn in the spring, in 
late April or early May.  Muskellunge inspired early protective legislation in Canada.  In 1904 
Ontario‟s commercial fishermen were barred from catching them due to the growing popularity 
of Muskellunges as a sport fish.
 37
 
Ciscoes are smaller than most of the other fishes outlined here.  Commercial fishermen 
usually referred to ciscoes as lake herring.
38
  Pound net fishermen initially regarded them as a 
nuisance species because of the difficulty associated with cleaning them out of their nets.  Once a 
market developed for ciscoes they became a prized species.
 39
  Ciscoes average eight to twelve 
inches in length.  Ciscoes in the Great Lakes are silvery in appearance, with darker coloration 
along their back.  They typically have traces of purple or pink iridescence.  They spawn in 
November and December.  They prefer shallow waters of three to ten feet in depth, often 
spawning above gravel or other rock formations.  Females produce eggs based on size and 
environmental conditions.  Ciscoes in Lake Erie averaged 29,000 eggs, while those in Lake 
Superior only produced 6,000.  While their primary food source is plankton, ciscoes eat a variety 
of insects as well as smaller fishes and fish eggs, including their own.  Ciscoes play an important 
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role in the diets of lake trout, pikes, walleyes and other fishes.  Like many other Great Lakes 
fishes, ciscoes host a variety of parasitic organisms in their bodies.
40
 
Numerous other species of fishes and aquatic and terrestrial life filled important niches in 
the environmental history of Lake Huron.  Chubs, suckers, perch, catfish, American eels, bass, 
crappies, drums and others have deep roots in the history of the lake‟s ecosystem.  They existed 
in a relatively young ecosystem that lacked a long gestation period that could foster greater 
stability and resilience.
41
    Many of the species targeted by the fisheries were predators who 
filled important niches in controlling populations of smaller fishes.   They carried critical 
nutrients and energy throughout various aquatic zones through eating, excretion and other life 
processes.  Similarly, their eventual death and decomposition contributed to the overall biotic 
health of the aquatic ecosystem they inhabited.
42
  They provided important sources of food for 
other animals and birds living around the lakes.  Each of these species also played their own 
respective roles in the growth of an intensive fisheries market in, on and around the lake.  The 
commercial fisheries and the human development that accompanied it took a staggering toll on 
the Lake Huron ecosystem.  Yet prior to the growth of for profit fisheries human beings had 
successfully utilized lake resources in a sustainable fashion.  Long before the rise of industrial 
capitalism and commercial fisheries many of these same species sustained human populations on 
a subsistence level for centuries. 
 
 
 
 
10 
  
 Indigenous history and environmental resources 
 
Pre-contact Indian peoples relied on the lakes for subsistence.  Fish were a source of 
sustenance.  They were incorporated into a variety of social and spiritual practices.  They were 
traded for other necessities.  The use and management of environments by Indian peoples is a 
source of intense debate among anthropologists, historians and other scholars of indigenous 
cultures and histories.  Since first contact European immigrants and later white Americans cast 
North American Indian peoples into a variety of stereotypical roles.  Often portrayed as 
handmaidens of the Christian devil by early English settlers, Indian peoples were subjected to an 
imposed cultural evolution in the history books of the United States.  Described as everything 
from fallen souls to romanticized noble savages, they were routinely denied the ability to define 
themselves.   
One of the more recent stereotypes directed at North American Indian peoples is the idea 
of indigenous peoples as the first environmentalists.  Native peoples are often portrayed as 
especially attuned to the “natural” world.  In this stereotype they function as an extension of 
wilderness while other human societies do not.  This stereotype has been challenged, as in 
Shephard Krech‟s The Ecological Indian (1999).43  Krech challenged what he termed the “Noble 
Indian/Ecological Indian stereotype.”44  He pointed to various instances of indigenous resource 
use, from pre-contact bison kills to contemporary oil and gas development and confronted the 
idea of American Indians as consistent environmental stewards.  However, Krech‟s work and 
others like it too often evaluate Indian peoples according to western constructs and erode the vast 
cultural differences existent between Westerners and Native Americans, to say nothing of the 
significant differences between the practices of individual Indian nations.  When considering 
post-contact environmental use, they fail to sufficiently account for the systemic genocide and 
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abuses that forced Indian peoples to make tough choices and cultural accommodations to survive 
in the dominant society‟s cultural and economic systems.  Indians are placed into a new 
stereotype where they act the same as the majority culture, with the same propensity to act in an 
unethical manner.   
The problem is compounded when the decisions of Indian peoples are evaluated by 
Western society and its ingrained dualist thinking.  Western traditions of duality tend to view the 
world in an either or context.  Simple concepts of good and evil, black and white, left and right 
replace the inherent multifaceted realities of the everyday world and ignore the kaleidoscope of 
different cultural models.  Thus efforts to reform the stereotype of what has come to be called the 
“ecological Indian” can fuel another extreme.  Indians become just as wasteful, inept and greedy 
as colonizing Europeans.  They cease to be one thing and become another, as defined by western 
scholars.  Instances of effective resource management in their ancestral past become wholly 
accidental while excess and waste are the norm.  Modern day efforts at resource access and use – 
whether to spear fish, hunt whales or build a casino – can then be attributed to Western ideas and 
experiences with economics, greed and wastefulness.  Despite the altogether different economic, 
cultural and social systems of Westerners, the hundreds of unique North American Indian nations 
are lumped into the shared human experience under the guise of making them more human 
through making them more like the majority.  Neither model is correct.  Both are stereotypes. 
Indian peoples created methods of interaction with their surroundings that mirrored their 
social and cultural understandings and needs.  They learned from their mistakes.  In many oral 
traditions temptations, poor choices and bad behaviors are represented by “Trickster.”  As 
Anishinabek /Métis scholar Melissa Nelson stated; 
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For many indigenous cultures, this learning happens through teachings in 
the oral tradition that warn of humans' baser urges and tendencies for 
misjudgment and error.  Greed, envy, arrogance, fear, self-centeredness, and other 
human traits are represented in the dark side of Trickster-the Tlingit Raven, the 
Kumeyaay Coyote, the Ojibwe Rabbit, the Iroquois Twins, and the Hopi Clown, 
to name a few.  Indian peoples are explicitly aware of this dark side of human 
nature and incorporate it into the oral tradition, education, daily life, and religion.  
It is not a coincidence that most indigenous cultures' religious traditions and 
environmental knowledge and practices are intimately entwined.  It's a matter of 
life and death.  It's a matter of ethics, values, lessons.  It is about kinship and 
relations.
45
 
 Indigenous life and Lake Huron 
 
On the earliest maps drawn up by later Europeans Lake Huron is titled “Lac des Huron,” 
or Lake of the Huron Indians.  The Hurons, or Wendats as they refer to themselves, lived 
primarily along the Eastern shoreline of Lake Huron.  Fish were a crucial component of Wendat 
subsistence, second only to agriculture.  Wendats used spears and nets to take fishes.  They also 
sometimes constructed weirs across rivers and streams as a method of capturing fishes.  In the 
autumn Wendat fishermen traveled to the islands of Georgian Bay and constructed small round 
fishing cabins.  From there they would travel as much as a mile from the shore and set their nets 
in an effort to catch spawning whitefish.  Whitefishes were usually caught in the fall and 
sturgeons in the spring.
46
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For the Wendats everything possessed a manitou (spirit being), including all living and 
nonliving things.  This fact troubled the Jesuit missionaries who sought to convert their allies to 
Christianity.  “They hold that fish are possessed of reason” complained Jean de Brébeuf.47  
Wendats followed elaborate rituals to honor and thank the spirits of fishes that they caught for 
food or trade.  A fishing priest was usually present in their seasonal fishing lodges.  The priest 
gave a sermon to the fish, asking them to come and allow themselves to be caught.  The priest 
reminded fish of the friendship between the Wendats and the fishes.  Offerings of tobacco were 
made to the fishes and to the spirit of the water.
48
  The remains of fishes and other animals were 
treated with great respect.  French Jesuits recorded these practices with disdain. 
They believe that many kinds of animals have reasonable souls; they have 
an insane superstition against profaning certain bones of elk, beaver, and other 
beasts, or letting their dogs into a river. They pretend that the souls of these 
animals come to see how their bodies are treated, and go and tell the living beasts 
and those that are dead; so that if they are illtreated the beasts of the same kind 
will no longer allow themselves to be taken either in this world or the next.
49
 
Wendats did not burn the bones of the fishes they caught.  Nor did they feed them to 
village dogs.  They believed showing a lack of respect toward the remains of their catch risked 
angering the fishes‟ spirits.  Bones were returned to the waters in order to honor and care for the 
fishes‟ spirits.  They extended their belief system to everyday life, even when not in the presence 
of their quarry.  They thought their fishing nets were allied to fishes.  Wendats believed their nets 
would warn the fish of destructive acts against the manitous of fishes or other animals.
50
  Their 
various proscriptions worked against the wanton, wasteful destruction of fishes and unnecessary 
disturbance of their living and spawning areas. 
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In 1636 Wendats adapted a marriage ceremony from their Algonkian allies that 
demonstrated the integral importance of the lake and its fishes within Wendat culture.  Some 
years prior Algonkian fishing fortunes had declined.  Shortly thereafter the Algonkians were 
approached by the spirit of a seine net.
51
   The spirit net expressed its dissatisfaction with being 
unable to find a virgin woman among the Algonkians to take as a wife.  Jesuit missionaries 
observed the ceremonies that resulted from the story.  The missionaries viewed it as an 
opportunity to inject their own teachings.  “The ceremony of these espousals takes place at a fine 
feast, where the Seine is placed between the two virgins;” related Jean de Brébeuf,  
this is to render them fortunate in catching fish. Still, I am very glad that virginity 
receives among them this kind of honor; it will help us some day to make them 
understand the value of it.
52
 
During the year long marriage the families of the girls would receive a special share of 
the fishing catch.  According to the oral tradition, fishing fortunes improved for the Algonkians 
after they began this elaborate ceremony.
53
  Thus Indian fisherfolk around Lake Huron 
incorporated the other species sharing their living spaces into indigenous sacred traditions and by 
doing so created a system that strove to maintain respectful relationships with the other 
inhabitants of their environments.  Historian Bruce Trigger noted; 
These rituals illustrate very clearly the difference between the Huron‟s view of 
himself as a part of nature and the traditional European concept of man as having 
dominion over his environment.
54
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When the Wendats faced massive social and cultural upheaval during their wars with the 
Iroquois Confederacy in the Seventeenth Century, access to fish became critical.  In competition 
for control of the burgeoning fur trade introduced by Europeans, the Iroquois made substantial 
inroads into Wendat territory.  For the Wendats the situation was catastrophic by 1649.  During 
the harsh winter of that year ice fishing on Georgian Bay was unproductive.  A lack of sufficient 
foodstuffs led to widespread starvation and desperation.  Wendats increasingly turned to the 
Jesuits for help.  Unfortunately the Jesuits were one component of a European colonial network 
that had fomented the tragic fur trade wars in the first place.
55
  Displacement from their 
homeland ecosystem and a concurrent slump in adequate lake resources led to increased 
dependence on their French allies.   
The incursions of Europeans into North America brought sustained warfare over a new 
and growing market system with beaver furs at its center.  Beaver furs were highly prized by 
white merchants due to their popularity in Europe.  In an effort to survive in the changing 
environment Indian peoples adapted by trying to work within the frameworks of the European 
market system and concurrently manage alliances with the various European powers in addition 
to addressing their responsibilities to allied and competing tribes.  While the breadth of these 
events are beyond the scope of this research, the important component is that traditional beliefs 
and ceremonies that worked to curb overuse and waste through reciprocity and respect were 
modified as Indian peoples struggled to survive in a rapidly changing environment.  The fact that 
they chose to modify their varied lifeways as acts of survival does not negate the ethical 
foundations of their cultural practices prior to the rise of European markets in North America.  In 
their book American Indian Environmental Ethics: An Ojibwa Case Study, J. Baird Callicott and 
Michael P. Nelson argued that Krech III and his supporters tend to focus on the individual 
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actions of Indian peoples, while ignoring the cultural ethics that underpin many of their cultural 
practices. 
56
  The ethical models developed by various Indian nations remain valid regardless of 
individual or tribal acculturation.  One does not negate the other. 
Anishinabeks (Ojibwes, Odawas) also fished the waters of Lake Huron.  Young Odawa 
girls learned to make small fishing nets with their mothers and grandmothers.
57
  Ojibwe women 
fished with nets fashioned from the fibers of Wood Nettle stalks.  After the arrival of Europeans 
Nettle fibers were replaced with twine obtained through trade.  Women also processed fish.  
They roasted or dried it for consumption or storage.
58
  Pivotal celebrations that marked 
community milestones or observed important events often included fishing or incorporated 
actions designed to show respect to fishes.   
One of the largest Anishinabek festivals, the Feast of the Dead, was a large celebration 
that took place in the spring and early summer.  The feast may have developed as an effort to 
enhance Anishinabek cooperation and sustain indigenous distinctiveness after the incursion of 
French explorers into the area.  It fostered community identity and reciprocity.  It included a 
variety of gift and food exchanges and ritual celebrations.  Rites were performed whereby it was 
believed that the spirits of deceased community leaders passed into the bodies of the next 
generation.  During the main ceremony from which the feast gained its title, the bones of peoples 
from participating groups were interred together with various important foodstuffs in a 
celebration of community.  In addition to these events, the feast included communal fishing and 
agriculture.
59
  Wendats also celebrated their own adaptation of the Feast of the Dead.  They 
believed that fish disliked the dead.  During their version of the feast they removed their nets 
from the area of the celebration so the nets would not be desecrated.
60
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These and other rituals demonstrated the holistic perspective these Great Lakes Indian 
peoples shared regarding the world around them.  Nature did not exist as a separate entity in their 
oral traditions.  Everything was viewed as part of the same whole.  While they were not 
conservationists or preservationists in any modern Western definition of those words, they 
created social practices, taboos and rituals that demonstrated a respect for their world and a 
desire to maintain reciprocal relationships within it.  Reciprocity was an overarching core value 
among most North American Indian nations.
61
  Historically this reciprocity extended beyond 
human relationships into a perceived kinship with all inhabitants of their world.  It fostered 
bonds of deep respect for resource sources and led to the creation of rituals and behavioral 
modifications that in many cases worked to maintain those resources through a minimization of 
needless waste.  And while there were undoubtedly individual violations of community 
proscriptions, those violations do not negate the fact that this is a fundamentally different 
organizing construct than the utilitarian approaches to resource management and use followed by 
later European settlers and eventually the governments of Canada and the United States.  That 
some Indian nations chose to adapt to a changed political and economic landscape does not 
somehow make them less Indian, but neither does it render their traditional worldviews less 
valid. 
In the seventeenth century North America became host to a very different human cultural 
model.  In 1615 Europeans sailed into Georgian Bay via what came to be known as the French 
River.  They were under the command of Samuel de Champlain.  Champlain and his men were 
likely the first Europeans to ever see the Great Lakes.
62
  Champlain named the body of water la 
Mer Douce, meaning freshwater sea.  His memoirs speak to the awe the sprawling freshwater 
body instilled in the first European explorers.  Champlain recorded that the waters were rich and 
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abundant with large trout, pike and sturgeon.  He claimed to see trout over four feet in length.  
He also recorded that the lake‟s southern coast was “more agreeable” than the rockier north 
coast.
63
  The northern coast was a prolific fishing area for area Indian peoples.  The region of the 
St. Marys River, which connects Lake Superior to Northern Lake Huron was especially 
productive.  Despite that fact, as late as 1670 the French had failed to adapt to the fishing 
conditions of the northern waters, yet area Ojibwes were very successful at catching large 
numbers of the whitefishes that teemed in the river system.  The expertise they had developed 
over centuries of fishing was not easily duplicated by the relative newcomers.  A French 
observer estimated that fish caught in the area averaged six or seven pounds.
64
  Ojibwe fishermen 
traversed the rapids of the river in canoes and fished with long dip nets.  They would firmly 
thrust the nets into the water to catch whitefishes making their way through the river system.  
Fishing was likely the primary form of subsistence for many Indian peoples in the region.  They 
fished in the rushing river from the spring until winter.
65
  Fishing was important across North 
America‟s lake and river systems.  In the Saint Lawrence River system Indian peoples would 
sometimes take several hundred eels in their weirs.  Once caught the eels were removed and 
carefully smoked and stored.  They provided food for the Indian communities during the cold 
winters.
66
 
With the arrival of Europeans, new fishing methods were on the horizon.  European 
technology and market systems soon transformed the inland lakes.  On the Saint Lawrence River 
system French settlers were introducing more efficient methods of fishing motivated by 
something other than community subsistence and survival.  A dramatic rise in the catch and use 
of aforementioned eels provides a good example.  As Jerome Lallemant recorded  
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One Fisherman was found to have caught in a single day, in his weir, five 
thousand Eels, which are very excellent when salted, and keep extremely well. 
That makes ten casks in a day, selling on the spot at twenty-five francs a cask. . .
67
 
Europeans introduced an economic system based on currency exchange.  French and later 
British markets penetrated into the interior of the continent around the Great Lakes Basin.  A 
spreading profit based European market system gradually overshadowed the subsistence and 
reciprocity that characterized indigenous life and trade for centuries.  By the late eighteenth 
century a commercial fishery operated in Lake Ontario.  Because of its location and the strength 
and resistance of area Indian nations, Lake Huron escaped the introduction of an intensive 
commercial fishery until after American Independence. 
Great Lakes Indian peoples adapted to changed circumstances as best they could.  
Traditional alliances and patterns of trade were disrupted.  Access to resources was often 
difficult.  As Robert Doherty pointed out in his book Disputed Waters: Native Americans and the 
Great Lakes Fishery (1990), the European market system endangered the ability of area 
indigenous communities to continue their own systems of trade that incorporated generosity and 
reciprocity.  Ojibwes and Odawas “had not suddenly become thick skinned and selfish” Doherty 
said.  “They merely wished to survive.”68   
During the colonial and post-Revolutionary period Great Lakes Indian peoples were 
gradually stripped of the vast majority of their tribal lands, exchanging physical control of 
various landscapes in exchange for critical resource access through guaranteed treaty rights. The 
Treaty of Washington signed in 1836 protected the fishing rights of Ojibwes and Odawas in 
Michigan.  Despite that treaty and others, Indian peoples soon found themselves the target of 
determined assimilation programs in both the United States and Canada.  In the United States 
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during the twentieth century Indian fishing and hunting rights were further subordinated to state 
conservation laws in violation of earlier Federal treaties.  In the second half of the twentieth 
century Indian nations across the U.S. fought to reestablish the authority of numerous 
contravened Federal treaties.  It was not until 1976 that the fishing rights guaranteed by the 1836 
Treaty of Washington were upheld by the Michigan Supreme Court.
69
 
 The first commercial fisheries 
 
Great Britain acquired the whole of the Great Lakes Basin from France following 
Britain‟s victory in the Seven Years War.  Most English settlement was east of the Appalachians 
and following the war the crown discouraged colonial migration into the interior of the continent.  
Great Britain‟s coffers were depleted from its world-wide war with France.  Protecting settlers 
from powerful and defiant Indian peoples within the continental interior was a costly endeavor 
England wished to avoid.  The American Revolution dramatically changed settlement patterns.  
Following the United States‟ Independence from England in 1783 the migration of whites into 
the interior of the continent accelerated.  Because of the region‟s potential for agriculture, 
forestry and fishing as well as its many navigable waterways, the interior Great Lakes were of 
special interest.   
Fort Ponchartrain du Détroit just south of Lake Huron‟s southern shore was established in 
1701 by the French.  In 1760 it fell into British hands and was renamed Detroit.  In 1796 
Americans gained control of the settlement.
70
  Detroit grew rapidly around a salt fish market 
after 1812.
71
  The city served as Michigan‟s state capitol until 1847 when the seat of state 
government was transferred to Lansing.
 72
  Lake Huron hosted other early settlements on the 
American side of its shoreline.  In 1686 the French established Fort St. Joseph at Southern tip of 
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Lake Huron.  Following American Independence Fort Gratiot was built near the same site.  In 
1857 the city of Port Huron was incorporated near the site of that fort.  Anamickee (later Alpena) 
County was officially established in 1840, although the region was sparsely populated until after 
1856.  The village of Alpena (known as Fremont from 1856-59), became the county seat in 
1857.
73
  American settlement also spread to the other interior lakes.  For example, Chicago was 
founded on the southern shoreline of Lake Michigan in 1833.  Chicago was subsequently 
incorporated as a city in 1837.
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The area of modern day Canada experienced its own population growth in the nineteenth 
century.  In 1791 there were approximately fifty thousand people living in the area currently 
encompassed by Ontario.  In 1851 that number had grown to 952,004.
75
  In 1871 the total had 
climbed to 1,620,851 and in 1901 reached 2,183,000.
76
  A French agricultural settlement was 
established directly across the river from Detroit as early as 1749.  That settlement grew into the 
village of Windsor and was officially incorporated in 1854.  Port Sarnia (later City of Sarnia), 
was established in 1836, although European settlers were in the region since at least the start of 
the 1830s.  The town of Parry Sound was surveyed in 1869 and subsequently incorporated in 
1887.
77
 
In Canada commercial fishing in Lake Huron dates back to at least the 1830s when the 
region was divided between Upper and Lower Canada.
78
  Captain Alexander McGregor of 
Goderich operated commercially around the Fishing Islands on the East side of the Bruce 
Peninsula.  In 1834 he contracted to ship 3,000 barrels of whitefish and ciscoes to Detroit each 
year.  The fish were shipped to the city via schooner.  The company in Detroit paid him one 
dollar a barrel.  The fisheries off of the Bruce Peninsula were incredibly productive.  A visiting 
minister commented that it was “a fine fishery” producing as much as four hundred barrels of 
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ciscoes in “one single haul of the seine.”  McGregor would post a lookout, often up in a tree.  
The lookout watched for shining schools of fishes.  Once spotted, the men would rush to the site 
with their seine nets.  In order to better manage his successful venture, McGregor erected a large 
stone headquarters known as “The Fort” on Main Station Island off of the Bruce Peninsula.  The 
fishery headquarters was the first Canadian building erected in Bruce County.  McGregor was 
eventually displaced.  Envious onlookers eventually wrestled control of the area‟s fisheries from 
him through political maneuvering.
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As the Lake Huron fisheries developed, fresh shipments replaced salted fishes.  By 1856 
fresh fish packed in ice was shipped by railroad from Goderich and Collingwood to Toronto.  By 
the 1880s fisheries icehouses were common around Northern Georgian Bay.  Shipping fish fresh 
became the norm.  By the end of the nineteenth century salted fish were uncommon, except for 
salted ciscoes.  In Detroit a freezing method was patented in 1869 and 1875 by W. and S.H. 
Davis.  Freezing allowed marketers to sell fish during times of scarcity in the market.
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Improved processing methods combined with growing numbers of shipping opportunities via 
increased lake traffic as well as inland roads and railroad lines.  The numbers of fishermen on the 
Great Lakes multiplied in response to the growing demand for Great Lakes fishes. 
Intensive commercial fishing quickly took a toll on the fisheries of Lakes Ontario and 
eventually Erie.  Those two lakes hosted the earliest large commercial fishing operations.  As the 
numbers of fishermen grew so too did American and Canadian migration into the continent. 
Commercial fishing followed settlement into the interior Great Lakes Basin during the nineteenth 
century.  By the latter half of the nineteenth century Lake Huron hosted a growing commercial 
fishery.  Fishermen in Canada and the United States did not have to look very far to find 
examples of what lay in store for Lake Huron.   
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Lake Ontario was the first of the Great Lakes to develop a large commercial fishery.  The 
principal targets of that early fishery were salmons which teemed beneath the lake‟s surface.  
Atlantic salmon were trapped in the lake following the glacial retreat at the end of the last great 
ice age.  They adapted to the freshwater environment, but remained taxonomically the same as 
the Atlantic variety.
81
  Whitefishes were also prized by Lake Ontario‟s commercial fishermen.  
Both fishes were caught and marketed as early as the 1790s.  In the nineteenth century 
commercial fishing operations grew rapidly on Lake Ontario.  As the lake furthest East, Ontario 
also faced earlier shoreline development, dam building and forestry operations.   
John Varret Van Vlack spent much of his life as a commercial fishermen living in 
Collingwood on the shores of Georgian Bay.  However, as a child Van Vlack lived in Whitby 
near Lake Ontario.  He remembered a conversation he had in his youth with an aging community 
member named Mr. Farewell.  Farewell told the boy stories about the early fisheries on the lake.  
He said that Indian fishermen used to fish the waters around the lake and catch hundreds of 
thousands of salmons for their own uses.  The waters had once abounded with fish.  However, as 
Canadian development moved into the area the number of fishes in the lake quickly declined.  
Forests were cleared and streams were dammed.
82
  Damming streams meant that fish were 
prevented from swimming upstream to spawn.  Over the subsequent years the rich fishery 
deteriorated.  By the second half of the nineteenth century the lake‟s salmon catch was in 
decline.   
Samuel Wilmot of Newcastle, Ontario spearheaded efforts to restore salmon in the lake.  
A tributary on Wilmot‟s own farm supported salmon and he worked directly with the Canadian 
Government to establish an elaborate hatchery there.  Wilmot‟s hatchery work eventually 
secured his appointment as Dominion Superintendent of Fish Culture.
83
  Pacific salmon were 
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raised at the hatchery and planted in Lake Ontario, but they failed to establish self supporting 
populations.
84
  In 1892 Samuel Wilmot chaired a commission organized to investigate the 
Province of Ontario‟s fisheries, including Lake Ontario.  Fishing during the spawning season, the 
catch and destruction of undersized fishes in seine nets, traps and long gill nets with small mesh 
sizes were reported as primary catalysts in the collapse of the fishery.
85
   
Lake Ontario‟s whitefish fisheries joined salmon in their own decline in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century.  Fishermen provided numerous accounts of shocking waste in the 
fisheries.  Many fishermen relocated to Lake Huron following the collapse of the Lake Ontario 
fishery.  James A. Smith was one such fisherman.  Smith recalled witnessing tens of thousands 
of fishes drawn up in huge seine nets.  Countless numbers were wasted, rotting along Ontario‟s 
shorelines.  He said that one hundred fish could sometimes be had for as little as twenty-five 
cents.  Thousands of others decayed along the shore. Sometimes they were ground up for 
fertilizer.  Untold millions of juveniles were ensnared and killed in nets.  Smith said he observed 
a haul of twenty-five thousand whitefish in which over 95% were less than two pounds.  At the 
fishery‟s peak “whitefish were so plentiful” Smith recalled “that in hauling the seine they could 
not pull it in on the shore, they had to simply dip out what they wanted of the fish with small nets 
and let the rest go. . .when I left Lake Ontario some fifteen years ago whitefish were almost 
exterminated.”86   
Albert Hutchins also relocated to Lake Huron following the destruction of Lake Ontario‟s 
fishery.  In the 1890s he lived on the shore of Georgian Bay.  Hutchins recalled the collapse of 
Lake Ontario‟s fish populations with dismay.  “When I left Lake Ontario, some fourteen years 
ago, there were no whitefish to be had by the fishermen” he said.  The fishery “had ceased to 
exist, there was no more of it.”87  By 1899 Lake Ontario‟s salmon and whitefish populations had 
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been destroyed.  Despite Lake Ontario‟s startling evidence to the contrary, in 1899 Ontario‟s 
provincial government exclaimed that it 
remains true. . .there is no country in the world possessing finer fisheries than 
British North America. As a national possession they are inestimable; and as a 
field for industry and enterprise they are inexhaustible.”88 
Lake Erie also experienced a great deal of waste and abuse as commercial fisheries 
multiplied on its waters in the nineteenth century.  Blue walleyes and ciscoes were primary 
targets of the fishery in Erie‟s waters.  William Emery was a pound net fisherman out of Bayham 
on Erie‟s northern shoreline.  Emery said his largest catch of blue walleyes consisted of twelve 
tons in one day in 1892.  He estimated that one half to three quarters of a ton of some of his 
catches consisted of immature fishes.
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Lake Erie also hosted whitefish populations.  They were targeted during their spawning 
runs.  The Detroit River at Lake Erie‟s east end was an important spawning area for whitefish.  
Numerous seine net operations were active on both sides of the river during the spawning season.  
Temporary holding pens were constructed in the water to hold the massive catches of spawning 
fish.  Tens of thousands of spawning whitefish were crammed into pens that ranged anywhere 
from one hundred feet square to half an acre.  “We had 80,000 and 90,000 at one time in a single 
pen” claimed Canadian seine fisherman Joseph Maloche.90  Countless numbers of the penned 
fishes died in the cramped conditions.  Remi Laframboise also fished the Canadian side of the 
Detroit River.  Laframboise stated that whitefishes and ciscoes were both held together in penned 
areas in enormous numbers.  He said one year the pens were so crowded with hundreds of 
thousands of ciscoes and whitefishes that entire days consisted of “scooping dead ones out and 
throwing them into the river.”91   
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Lake Erie had some of the most productive waters for sturgeons.  However, throughout 
much of the nineteenth century they were regarded as a nuisance and of no value to the fishery.  
Because of their large size and tough exterior sturgeons could damage fishing equipment meant 
to target other fishes.  Fishermen also erroneously believed that sturgeons fed heavily on the 
spawn of marketable fishes.  When sturgeons were caught in nets meant for whitefishes or 
ciscoes they were often intentionally killed and dumped back in the water, removed and burned 
on the shore or killed and used as fertilizer.  However, in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
sturgeons were recognized as having flesh that when smoked tasted similar to the popular 
halibut, an oceanic species.  Sturgeon eggs faced a similar makeover.  For decades their eggs 
were fed to pigs.  They suddenly became a prized commodity when it was discovered they could 
serve as a delectable form of caviar.  An intensive sturgeon fishery quickly developed on the 
lake.  As a result, Lake Erie‟s sturgeon population plummeted by eighty percent between 1885 
and 1895.
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The waste of the early commercial fisheries gradually spread inexorably toward Lake 
Huron.  Early fisheries on the Detroit River just south of Lake Huron and adjacent the city of 
Detroit proved just as destructive.  One fisherman exclaimed “Close seasons were never obeyed 
here and we fished the whole month of November.”93  The commercial fishing operations that 
spread through the Lake Huron Basin often targeted whitefish and lake trout.  By the 1890s 
hatcheries were stocking fish fry in the lakes in an effort to maintain declining stocks of fishes.  
Michael Doyle, a fish dealer out of Toronto charged that Lake Huron fishermen were scooping 
young fry out of the lake as quickly as the hatcheries were putting them in.  He said there was 
widespread use of illegal, small meshed nets that prevented the young fish from escaping.  Doyle 
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was dismayed by the practice and urged the government to regulate and enforce strict net 
regulations.
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Lake trout were fished heavily in the fall as they moved into shallower waters in 
preparation to spawn.  Some fishermen believed trout were larger and of a better market quality 
during the spawning season in the fall.  They referred to them as “fall trout.”  Donald McCauley 
lived in Southampton just west of the Bruce Peninsula.  McCauley used a sailboat and gill nets to 
fish for lake trout and whitefish in the 1890s.  He believed lake trout were best when caught in 
the fall.  “They are fatter and better eating” he said.  McCauley did not regard fishermen as a 
serious threat to spawning fishes.  He believed “suckers are doing more harm to spawn than all 
the fishermen put together.” 95  H.W. Ball, the fishery overseer in nearby Goderich, Ontario had 
his own opinions regarding some of the lake‟s other species.  He said after examining the food 
consumption of various sturgeons under a microscope he was convinced they had all eaten fish 
spawn.  Because of this, he recommended there be “no close season whatever for sturgeon.”  
Like McCauley, he also pointed to suckers as a threat to the spawn of market species.  However, 
trout got a pass.  Ball stated he observed them eating “nothing but herring. . .small minnows or 
chub.”96 
Canadian fishermen sold most of their catches to companies that were either owned by 
Americans or shipped to American ports.  In 1893 Abraham King, a fishermen from Thessalon 
on Lake Huron‟s North Channel complained that a wealthier fisherman named Mr. Reeves was 
able to buy multiple licenses and fish intensively for “his American Company in Detroit. . .”97  
According to King, Reeves had significantly more equipment and multiple boats operating in the 
area.  King also claimed a large pound net company, Gauthier, was wasting numerous undersized 
whitefishes in its nets due to the small mesh sizes employed. He charged that fish catches had 
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dropped off by over half because of all the waste.  King believed that local fishermen could not 
compete with the highly capitalized operators.  He charged that poorer fishermen were restricted 
both in the numbers of nets they could license and by the closed seasons.  He also believed 
Canadian fishermen would be better off without closed seasons.  He claimed Michigan fishermen 
from Detour fished in Canadian waters during Ontario‟s closed season on whitefish while 
Canadian fishermen were barred from the lake.
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By the 1890s lake trout were widely perceived to be in decline in various parts of Lake 
Huron.  The Dominion Fishery Commission believed the closed season law did not adequately 
protect spawning trout.  The commission, headed by Samuel Wilmot, recommended lengthening 
the closed season to run from October 15
th
 through the end of November.
99
  The Canadian 
commission believed that without intervention the fisheries of Lake Huron and Georgian Bay 
would soon face conditions similar to those around Lake Ontario. 
On the U.S. side of the lakes there was a similar interest in maintaining the profitability 
of the commercial fishery.  During the year 1885 the United States Commissioner of Fish and 
Fisheries, Stephen F. Baird, initiated an inquiry into the health of the fisheries.  In 1885 more 
people and equipment were operating on and in the lakes than ever before.  While the 
investigation noted a marked decline in fishing fortunes around Lake Ontario and several other 
localized regions, overall the American fishery was believed to be in good health.  Improved 
fishing and processing methods as well as stocking programs were credited with the then record 
catches.  In the United States stocking was believed to be the best method for maintaining the 
fisheries.  The investigations did document concerns about the damage being done to the 
spawning beds of various fishes, though the causes of damage were disputed.  For example, at 
Thunder Bay near Alpena, Michigan there were declines in the catches of both whitefish and 
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lake trout.  Gill netters placed the blame on small pound net mesh while pound netters blamed 
pollution from sawmills and gill nets.
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Off the coast of Michigan‟s Lower Peninsula commercial fishing gradually spread 
northward in the 19
th
 century.  In 1835 John Muncy set up a small gill net fishery on Thunder 
Bay Island at the mouth of Thunder Bay near where the town of Alpena would eventually be 
established.  His nets incorporated board floats and stones, similar to those used by Indian 
peoples around the lakes for centuries, although the incorporation of twine netting increased the 
efficiency of Muncy‟s nets.  Other gill netters followed.  In 1858 the first pound net was 
introduced in the region and put into operation at Whitefish Point.  North of Alpena in 
Cheboygan County pound nets spread to Presque Isle by 1860.  The population of the region 
gradually grew and with it the commercial fishery.  By 1884 the state census recorded 9,210 
people residing in the town of Alpena.  In 1885 fifty-four fishermen were operating out of 
Alpena County, with twelve operating pound nets, twenty using gill nets and twenty-two using 
both.  Fishermen at Rogers City began employing gill nets in 1862.   The lines and webbing for 
the nets were purchased in Alpena by fishermen who then constructed the nets at home.   
Prior to 1872 the majority of the lake‟s commercial catch was salted, packed in one 
hundred pound barrels and sent south to Detroit.  After 1872 it was increasingly common for fish 
to be packed in ice and shipped fresh.  Alpena lacked railroad connections, so the fish were 
packed into four wheeled wooden cars in alternating rows of ice, then fish, then ice.  The cars 
typically held 2,000 pounds when fully loaded.  They were then loaded onto steam boats and 
shipped south on Lake Huron to Detroit or occasionally to Bay City.
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Fishing on the northern U.S. side of Lake Huron in the North Channel as well as around 
Mackinaw Island and St. Ignace was done almost exclusively by French Canadians and 
indigenous fishermen until the mid-19
th
 century.  As more U.S. citizens immigrated into the 
region, the fishery grew.  In approximately 1860 cork and lead rigged gill nets replaced the older 
style that used board floats and stone sinkers. Pound nets were introduced to Mackinaw Island 
around the same time.  The first steam powered fishing vessel also began operating in northern 
waters in 1860.
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Thomas Sims of Detour, Michigan claimed to be the first pound net fishermen in that 
area of the North Channel.  Sims relocated to the region from Glasgow.  He set his first pound 
net off Drummond Island East of Detour around 1864.  By 1894 Sims claimed there were twenty 
times as many pound nets fishing the area as there were in the fishery‟s early days.  Sims fished 
primarily for whitefish and walleye, but with the rise in the total number of fishermen and nets 
the walleyes were mostly gone by the 1890s.
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Fishermen working around the Straits of Mackinaw between lakes Michigan and Huron 
faced other challenges.  The Straits were known for their strong currents.  It was not uncommon 
for gill nets placed in the straits to drift away resulting in substantial material losses to fishermen 
operating in the region.
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  When one fisherman set two pound nets off Point Aux Pins on 
Southern Bois Blanc Island in 1893 the current rewarded his efforts by snapping off the net‟s 
stakes and pulling the netting down into a heap beneath the water.  By the late nineteenth century 
the productivity of fisheries around the straits was in decline.  Joseph Wilmot of Mackinaw 
Island blamed an influx of fishermen from Lake Erie.  “After they got through ruining the fish in 
Lake Erie” he charged “they came here with their pound nets.”105 
31 
  
  The nineteenth century was a time of rapid growth for Great Lakes commercial 
fisheries.  Lake Huron became host to profitable fisheries on both the Canadian and U.S. sides of 
the lake.  The latter half of that century brought the first warning signs that Lake Huron‟s supply 
of fishes was imperiled.  Evidence mounted that populations of marketable fishes were in 
decline.  Great Lakes fisheries technology was evolving as the nineteenth century waned.  In the 
ensuing years fishermen incorporated new net designs and larger amount of equipment to make 
up for the declining catch.  Canadian officials took an early lead in the creation of 
comprehensive fishery laws and enforcement bodies, but failed to invest the resources necessary 
to effect significant change.  Conflicting state, provincial and Dominion regulations made 
enforcement of local restrictions difficult.  Sensing a possible crisis on the horizon, the 
governments of the United States and Canada formed an international commission to investigate 
the overall health of the fisheries.  Whether or not the international commission could stem the 
tide of decline remained to be seen. 
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Chapter 2 - Fishing the lake in the middle: technology, exploitation 
and governmental intervention in the Lake Huron commercial 
fisheries 
Before man's interference nature had adjusted the reproduction of fish 
to their extermination by natural enemies. When man was added as an enemy 
he upset the balance and so nearly exterminated the fish.
1
 
 The evolving gear of the commercial fisheries 
 
As commercial fisheries spread through the Great Lakes Basin fishermen applied a 
variety of gear in their quest for commercialized species.  In order to successfully and 
consistently land large, profitable catches of fishes the industry developed an assortment of boat 
designs, net styles and other related equipment.  As the number of marketable fishes declined 
many of the instruments of the trade were further refined to help fishermen maximize their catch 
in the face of dwindling numbers.   
During most of the 19
th
 century, Great Lakes fishermen on both sides of the international 
border were fishing from small boats and sailing vessels.  Long gangs of nets were hauled by 
hand.  Mackinaw and Huron style boats were two of the most widely utilized types of watercraft.  
Mackinaw boats were relatively slender at each end and bulged slightly in the middle.  They 
were extensively used on Lake Huron and other lakes.  Mackinaws were regarded as sturdy craft 
in the unpredictable waters of the lakes.
2
  “They fish what they call the Mackinaw boats here” 
fish dealer W.E. Robinson said of gill net fishermen operating out of Mackinaw City in 1894.  
Robinson said most of the boats were made across the straits at the Upper Peninsula town of St. 
Ignace.
3
  A variation of the Mackinaw style known as the Collingwood Skiff became very 
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popular with fishermen operating in the Canadian waters of the lake.  They were also in wide use 
by the 1880s.
4
 
Another type of sailed vessel, the Huron (sometimes referred to as Hayward), was 
preferred by Lake Michigan‟s gill net fishermen.  It was also used on Lake Huron by both 
Americans and Canadians.  Unlike the narrow, sloped aft of the Mackinaws, Huron boats had a 
square stern.  This afforded fishermen a larger area in which to store their nets and catches.  On 
average the boats ranged from thirty to forty feet in length.  They were typically larger and were 
believed faster than Mackinaws.  The larger size and storage capacity of Huron boats made them 
attractive vessels for fishing in deeper waters, farther from shore.  Unfortunately for the 
fishermen who used them, Hurons had a reputation for frequently being lost in the lake with a 
corresponding great loss of life.  During the height of their popularity the reasons for the high 
losses were unknown, though longer trips into deeper waters were suspected due to the increased 
risk.
 5
  Subsequent investigations into the design demonstrated that the wide, weighted stern led 
to a dragging keel and made the boat especially susceptible to broaching in bad weather.
6
  In the 
unpredictable waters of the Great Lakes, such a deficiency was a dangerous Achilles heel. 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century the first steam tugs and steam driven gill net 
lifters began to appear.  The use of sailboats gradually waned and tugs became the norm.  As the 
twentieth century dawned mechanization of the industry increased.  The powered tugs were able 
to manage larger numbers of nets farther from shore.  In the race for dwindling numbers of fishes 
that was a huge advantage.  In the twentieth century semi-diesel Kahlenberg Oil Engines and 
gasoline engines gradually replaced steam power on tugs.
7
  It became common for tugs to have 
enclosed decks to protect the crews from the elements, giving the twentieth century fish tugs of 
the Great Lakes a distinctive and unique appearance.  New technologies were often readily 
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adopted and the amount of gear being fished by individuals rose dramatically in response to 
declining fishery fortunes.  Mechanization continued.  By 1936 only one commercial sailing 
vessel operated in Michigan waters.
8
 
In addition to the various types of watercraft a variety of nets were used in Lake Huron.  
Nets varied by size, both in the overall size of the net and the size of the mesh openings in 
individual nets.  Smaller mesh openings meant smaller fish were unable to escape.  Individual 
mesh openings were often measured according to bar size.  Bar size measurements refer to the 
length of netting from knot to knot inside the individual squares of nets within square fishing 
mesh.  This differs from stretched net measurements that measure the space diagonally across 
mesh openings from corner to corner.   
Seine nets were one of the oldest types of fishing apparatus used on the lakes.  They were 
limited to near-shore use.  Seines were an active technology.  Fishermen would grasp each end of 
the seine net and drag it through the water toward shore, sweeping up fishes and trapping them in 
the middle of the net.  Seines ranged in length from several yards to hundreds of feet.  Seines 
were often used around spawning areas and many immature fish were caught and destroyed in 
the bycatch.  Since the net was moving and often difficult to handle when full, it was easy to 
damage and kill fishes in the process.  Canadian seine fishermen were early lightening rods for 
criticism when questions arose about the health of the fishery.  By the 1890s the Canadian 
Government began limiting the numbers of seining licenses and the areas seine nets could be 
deployed.
9
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Gill nets were the primary type of net used by fishermen working far from shore.  The 
nets were hauled out into the lake by sailboats or fishing tugs and then strung along in the water 
in long lines.  The bottoms of the nets were weighted while floatation devices were attached to 
the top to keep the net vertical in the water.  The nets ranged in size in both length and height as 
well as in the size of their mesh openings.  Like seines, gill nets pre-dated the commercial 
fisheries.  They were used by pre-contact Indian peoples.  Gill net use by the commercial 
fisheries dated to at least the early 19
th
 century.  Gill nets evolved through time, as older twine 
nets were replaced by linen and eventually cotton.  Linen and cotton nets required frequent 
removal to treat and dry them to prevent rotting.   
As the fish catches fluctuated and began their decline in the twentieth century, new 
technologies were often looked at with suspicion by fishermen who were not using them.  The 
bull net fit that trend.  It was developed around 1905.  The bull net was a modified gill net that 
allowed fishing in great depths very near the bottom and was typically much taller than a 
standard gill net.  They proved especially effective in Lake Erie‟s cisco fishery.  Over the 
ensuing years their use spread.  By the 1920s cisco populations in Lake Erie were in a tailspin.  
Chief of Great Lakes Fishery Investigations Dr. John Van Oosten said fishermen often set bull 
nets from the top to the bottom of Lake Erie.  “The vast majority of Lake Erie fishermen 
condemn the bull net” he stated in 1928.  In fact Van Oosten claimed that even fishermen using 
the nets acknowledged them as “one factor in the apparent extermination of the herring.”  
Fishermen also blamed blue walleyes for cisco declines.
 10
   Blue walleyes were themselves 
overfished and driven to extinction a few decades later.  Ontario banned Bull nets in 1922 and 
they were prohibited in many U.S. states by the mid 1930s.
11
 
45 
  
In the 1940s fishermen began experimenting with and using nylon gill nets.  Again there 
was a jump in catch efficiency.  John Van Oosten contacted Fred Westerman, head of 
Michigan‟s Fish Division within the Michigan Department of Conservation in Lansing regarding 
the new netting material.  Van Oosten said reports conflicted “on their desirability and 
efficiency.”  While some fishermen said the nets tended to pick up more trash and waste 
materials, others claimed the nets increased “the catch of marketable fish from two to three 
times” beyond what cotton procured.  Van Oosten worried that nylon created a new problem for 
lake management and “a new threat to the stability of fisheries.”12  He recommended a general 
conference to discuss the possible impacts and regulation of the new technology.   
W.H.R. Werner in Ontario‟s Department of Lands and Forests said fishermen in Ontario 
claimed nylon nets were “three times as efficient as cotton or linen nets of the same mesh size” 
and many believed that was “a very conservative estimate.”  He said all the reports his 
department received verified the efficiency claims.
13
  The Detroit Free Press declared the nets 
“fiendishly efficient” and warned there would be no stopping their adoption if they were not 
swiftly outlawed.
14
  Some fishermen were worried about the same effort being expended using 
nylon as had been used when fishing with linen and cotton.  They feared nylon netting might 
drain the fishery due to the material‟s greater catch efficiency.  Despite their concerns, many 
fishermen still wanted to be able to use the new material.  In addition to the improved catch 
numbers, the nets were easier to use and care for, promised greater longevity and required less 
material expense.
15
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Pound nets were introduced into North America from Scotland in the 1830s.  Their use 
did not become widespread on Lake Huron‟s Canadian shoreline until after 1880.  Canadians 
primarily used them along the southeastern shore, on Manitoulin Island‟s south shore and in the 
North Channel.
16
  They were used to varying degrees around Michigan‟s side of Lake Huron.  
They were especially favored in the Saginaw Bay area.  Pound nets are held in place by stakes 
and usually limited to shallow water use.  Their maximum depths of utilization ranged between 
fifty to eighty feet.  The long stakes were driven in to the lake bed by pile drivers affixed to flat 
bottom boats.  The early pile drivers were hand driven, and setting pound net stakes was 
considered the most arduous process of the season.  Eventually some of the pile drivers were 
steam driven.
 17
   
In 1932 there were 796 known pound nets set in Michigan waters.
18
  The front end of 
pound nets consisted of one or more long leaders of netting stretching toward the shore.  Fishes 
encountered the leader and followed along its length.  The leader guided the fishes into a funnel 
shaped area of netting, sometimes called the heart.  The heart then channeled them toward a 
sharply funneled section of the netting, commonly referred to as the tunnel.  The tunnel led 
directly into the pound or pot.  There the fishes were held until retrieved by a fisherman.  Pound 
nets typically did not have any sort of covering over the top of the pound.
19
  The pots of early 
pound nets typically had a two inch mesh.  Fishermen believed the two inch mesh helped prevent 
larger fish from getting gilled.  However, it also prevented large numbers of small fishes from 
escaping.  Pound nets were used from late March until the summer.  During the summer they 
were dismantled, cleaned and tarred (a process intended to help preserve the netting), and then 
put back in the lake until early November.
 20
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Pound net fishermen typically used a flat bottom craft when managing their nets.  The 
boats often had masts affixed to them in a style similar to Mackinaw vessels.  Some had no masts 
and were simply rowed.  Pound net boats tapered at the bow, bulged in the middle and had a 
squared off stern.  Their steering rudders were large cuts of wood designed to provide maximum 
turning capabilities in the shallow waters they operated in.  The boats handled poorly in rough 
waters.  Like Hurons and Mackinaws, pound net boats were open craft.   Fishes extracted from 
pound nets were loaded into the body of the boat and then transported to shore.
21
 
Trap nets were another passive form of net consisting of a leader, a heart and a pot.  
However trap nets were held in place by moveable anchors instead of affixed stakes.  This 
allowed the nets to be completely submerged and also made it easier to relocate them.  In 1928 a 
modified form of trap net, the deep trap net, was introduced near Alpena in Lake Huron‟s 
Thunder Bay.  Trap nets captured fish alive.  They were especially effective at capturing 
whitefish.  Deep trap nets were taller than the standard trap net and were placed in much deeper 
waters.  The pot of the trap net was enclosed on all sides to prevent fishes from escaping.
 22
 
The deep trap net design proved very effective and popular.  By 1932 over 500 deep trap 
nets were being used in Lake Huron.
23
 The largest whitefish catch in Lake Huron prior to 1930 
occurred in 1880.  In that year approximately 2,701,000 pounds of whitefish were caught.  
Between 1889 and 1929 the total whitefish catch never reached two million pounds, and only 
once rose above 1,500,000.  That was in 1916, when the total catch reached 1,919,000.  In 1930, 
just over a year after the introduction of deep trap technology to the lake, the total catch rose to a 
startling 2,979,000.  The following year 4,140,000 pounds of whitefish were taken.  In 1932 
4,050,000 pounds were caught.  In 1933 3,334,000 were taken.
24
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Van Oosten compared the deep trap nets to bull nets.  “The supposed destruction of 
young fish by trap nets in general is tremendously increased with the introduction of deep trap 
nets” he said.  Because they were larger than regular trap nets and could be placed in much 
deeper waters, Van Oosten believed they were more likely to inflict damage on the existent 
fisheries.  “These deep trap nets. . .are practically equivalent to bull nets in that they fish the 
waters nearly from top to bottom and give the adult fish little chance to escape” he charged.25  
Deep trap nets produced an outcry from some fishermen who feared their efficiency would 
destroy whitefish populations.  Numerous fishermen wrote to their legislators asking for trap nets 
to be regulated or abolished.  However, some qualified their requests, perhaps out of fear that 
new regulations might also be aimed at their own activities.  Martin Mechalson, a steam tug 
operator out of St. Ignace near the straits of Mackinaw wrote that the nets “should not be allowed 
in water deeper than 65 ft.”  He added that other than the new depth regulation “present laws 
should not be changed.”26  Other fishermen adopted more direct methods of limiting the use of 
deep trap nets.  In 1934 a group of deep trap netters attempted to set up their equipment in the 
southern end of Lake Michigan.  When local gill net and pound net fishermen found out they 
drove the newcomers out of the area.
27
  Trap net fishermen often viewed their critics as jealous 
competitors out to serve their own interests. 
Some of our conservation officials would insist on every fisherman going 
back to the gill net or pound net. . .Most opposition to the submarine net comes 
from fishermen that have not got any of them, and are not in a position to speak in 
regard to their use. . .Most of the proposed legislation during the past 20 years has 
been started by men with selfish interests, or against some kind of gear being used 
by the other fellow.
28
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 The Bureau of Fisheries, then operating under the Department of Commerce, agreed 
with other critics that the nets were too effective.  They recommended the State of Michigan 
limit their use to waters eighty feet or less deep.  They believed the extreme depth of some of the 
nets placed them within refuges that were essential to the preservation for the whitefish.  The 
bureau also recommended enlarging the mesh size to ensure smaller fish including juvenile 
whitefish would not be caught.  Eventually deep trap nets were limited to depths of no more than 
eighty feet.
29
  Despite the chorus of accusations that often accompanied the introduction of new 
equipment, fishermen predictably tended to point at their neighbor‟s gear when asked what type 
of fishing was driving the erosion of fishing fortunes.  Gill netters claimed “the trap net is very 
destructive to the fisheries” while trap netters maintained that “gill nets are a ruination to the 
industry.”30 
There were other modified types of nets on the lakes.  The fyke net was primarily used by 
U.S. fishermen.  It typically consisted of a cylindrical pot formed by netting attached to a series 
of hoops or frames.  When round hoops were used the fyke net was sometimes called a hoop net.  
Two wings of netting extended from the mouth of the pot in a funnel shape.  Fyke nets, like 
pound nets and trap nets, had a leader extending from the front of the net that fish would 
encounter.  The fish then followed along the leader until they encountered the wings.  The wings 
acted as a funnel and the fish were guided into the pot.  In the 1930s Michigan regulations 
limited the leader of fyke nets to three hundred feet or less.  A funnel net was a simpler, but 
similar form of net.  Funnel nets were identical to fyke nets except that they lacked a leader and 
wings.
31
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Improved nets and boats were not the only new equipment drawing attention on the lakes.  
A variety of technologies were experimented with and incorporated into the lake fishery.  Gill 
nets were lifted by hand during much of the nineteenth century.  In the early 1890s steam gill net 
lifters were developed.  These typically wound the gill nets around a turning steam powered 
drum which usually had affixed teeth designed to catch the net and pull it on board.  The 
innovation saved considerable time and energy.  In 1913 the Crossley gill net lifter was 
introduced.  The Crossley lifter had two rows of powered teeth which alternately clamped and 
released the netting as it pulled it on board.  The Crossley lifter increased the amount of netting 
tugs could fish in a day.
32
   
Individual fishermen occasionally tried to improve their catch numbers through novel 
means.  In 1946 commercial fishermen Edward Landry and Lawrence Trombley constructed two 
mechanized lake tractors capable of traveling through the waters of Saginaw Bay at depths up to 
ten feet.  The unique vehicles were constructed out of various automobile and truck parts.  They 
were completed in time for the 1946 commercial fishing season.  Each man drove one tractor.  
Each tractor was attached to one end of a two thousand four hundred foot long seine net.  The 
tractors hauled the sprawling apparatus in a wide arc toward shore.  Large sections of Saginaw 
Bay were shallow enough to accommodate the ten foot depth limitations of the vehicles.  Using 
their large tractors and lengthy seine net, Landry and Trombley quickly eclipsed the harvests of 
their local commercial fishing competitors.  The partners said their lake tractors were developed 
as a response to the souring economic fortunes of the commercial fisheries.  “You have to find 
ways to cut corners these days or else you can‟t stay in business” Trombley explained.33  
Michigan Conservation Officer A.J. Neering claimed the Trombleys‟ operation had caught more 
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walleye than the entire Bay Port Fish Company.  At the time Bay Port Fish Company was 
operating approximately eight hundred trap nets in the bay.   
Despite the huge hauls Landry and Trombley were taking, their method proved 
problematic.  Sweeping up so many fish at once with their sea tractors took a tremendous toll on 
their catches.  After one five thousand pound haul of fish the partners received no pay.  The fish 
had been too badly injured during the seining operation.  In addition, the tractors likely inflicted 
significant damage on the lake bottom as they crisscrossed their fishing areas, crushing and 
uprooting aquatic plants, destroying underwater formations and disrupting spawning areas.  
Officer Neering recommended quick action be taken to outlaw the lake tractors.  He feared the 
Bay Port Fish Company would copy the partners and build their own version of the fishermen‟s 
tractors.  Neering said that without intervention even larger versions might appear and their use 
would spread.  “The outfit is a getter and destroyer” he charged.34 
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As the nineteenth century approached the twentieth, Canadian and United States policies 
reflected their regional interests.  Meaningful cooperation between the two nations seemed 
unlikely.  The development of America‟s railroad infrastructure had eroded the importance of 
earlier canal systems.  International trade via the shared lakes and rivers of the borderlands had 
slowed.
35
  Around the Great Lakes Basin eight U.S. states, the United States Federal 
Government, the Province of Ontario and the Dominion of Canada carved out their respective 
niches in freshwater management.  Individual states continued to operate under a myriad of local 
regulations, most of them poorly enforced.   
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Lake Huron reflected those divided and competitive interests.  Instead of a common 
resource, linkage and route of exchange, Lake Huron was a continuing source of conflict 
between regional interests.  Commercial catches began to fluctuate as more and more fishermen 
entered the trade.  Michigan‟s Lake Huron waters were essentially an open, unregulated fishery 
as the new century approached.  The focus on hatcheries continued.  During the summer of 1893 
a temporary research facility was established on the shores of Lake St. Clair just south of Lake 
Huron.  Professor Jacob Reighard investigated what areas of the lakes were suitable for planting 
whitefish fry.  The following year the investigation moved to Lake Michigan under the direction 
of Dr. Henry B. Ward of the University of Nebraska.  The surveys increased scientific 
knowledge of whitefish and their habitat.
36
  In Canada officials created a regulatory framework 
for their fishery.  However, Canada‟s regulations were poorly enforced.  Canadian fishermen 
were irritated by restrictions their U.S. competitors did not have to follow. 
As human population centers grew around the lakes so did commerce.  The abundant 
forests of the interior Great Lakes fueled a rapid growth in the timber industry during the mid-
nineteenth century.  With lumbering operations came roads, horses, wagons, lumber camps and 
sawmills.  Staggering amounts of cut timber were floated down rivers and streams in order to 
transport the material to sawmills.  Massive amounts of sawdust were deposited in the tributaries 
of the lake system.  The removal of trees from along rivers, streams and lakes led to increased 
soil erosion and runoff.  The total extent of the damage done to fish populations and their 
spawning habitats is impossible to know for certain.  Sport anglers complained about the harm 
done by logging, but the courts sided with logging interests.  Streams were considered public 
highways, with logs given as much right of way as any other water craft.
37
  Commercial 
fishermen complained about the substantial amounts of sawdust being deposited in the lake as 
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well as the tendency for cut logs to drift into their nets and ruin them.  Bark deposited from giant 
rafts of logs also found its way into fishermen‟s nets.  In 1894 Alpena commercial fisherman 
Casper Alpern said many of the mills operating in the vicinity of Thunder Bay did “not take care 
of their sawdust at all” and let it run into the lake despite recent regulations that were passed to 
curb the practice.  Alpern charged that sawmills around the neighboring town of Alcona had 
completely destroyed the fishery there.
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Thunder Bay just west of Alpena suffered from huge deposits of sawdust and other waste 
materials originating from the timber industry, including massive amounts of bark.  Alpena 
fisherman Captain James Cleary shared Alpern‟s opinions regarding the affects of the timber 
industry on the fisheries.  Cleary operated one of the largest fishing tugs on Lake Huron in 1894.  
He had lost nets due to damage from wood waste and chunks of bark.  Steamboats also discarded 
clinkers – lumps of leftover incombustible coal material – in the lakes.  Cleary stated that 
clinkers sometimes fouled the nets of fishermen.
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  The timber industry was not the only source 
of pollution around the lake.  Alpern said raw sewage was a factor in the decline of Thunder Bay 
area fish populations.
40
  These and other aspects of human development and resource 
exploitation combined with pressures from the commercial fisheries, creating mounting negative 
repercussions on the living communities of the lakes. 
The goal of the industries utilizing the lake‟s resources was to maximize the profits of 
their lake industries.  This included the fisheries.  Fishing for maximum yields in the commercial 
fisheries was a major contributing factor in the destabilization and eventual collapses of certain 
fish species.  The connections between profits, resource use and resource abuse were not 
unknown.  In 1912 R Malcolm Keir of the University of Pennsylvania‟s Department of Industry 
and Geography argued that humankind‟s relationship to environmental resources progressed 
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through four stages.  He argued that people initially looked at their resources as unlimited, 
particularly when human population density in a given region is low and the materials they are 
using seem unlimited.   At the second stage, people begin to lavishly exploit their available 
resources.  At stage three people begin to realize that the resources they are depending on are 
running out due to overuse and abuse. The final step, he argued, is an effort to replenish the 
vanishing resources.  With regard to fishing Keir argued “All thought has been on present gain 
without any regard for future supply.” 41  He charged that fishermen sought quick profits through 
maximum exploitation. 
Attention is centered on making money quickly. As the supply of fish 
begins to dwindle the price rises, so men become more and more eager for large 
catches. The difference in price offsets wastes, so no attention is paid to 
preventable losses until some outside force compels more careful methods. The 
outside force may be legal governmental restrictions or it may be the exhaustion 
of the supply of fish.
42
 
 Economic gain was a principle motivator behind the first efforts to harmonize resource 
use and trade laws between U.S. Federal, state and British Canadian interests in the Great Lakes 
Basin.  While other (often related), regional interests sometimes played a role, harmonizing 
relationships between the major political bodies was unlikely if everyone would not profit in a 
relatively equitable fashion.   
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 Managing the Borderlands 
 
Lake Huron is both a dynamic, interconnected lake ecosystem and a politically divided 
international borderland.  Its waters serve as a boundary between the State of Michigan and the 
Province of Ontario.  The lake is at once the divide between that state and province, as well as 
between the national governments of Canada and the United States.  However, even as it served 
as a barrier and dividing line, the lake (and indeed all of the Great Lakes except Lake Michigan 
which does not border Canada), concurrently fostered exchange and migration between the two 
nations. The international boundary between Canada and the United States is often referred to as 
a permeable border.  In the nineteenth century the lakes fueled increasing market linkages 
between the two nations.  Agricultural products, fishes and other goods were shipped across the 
Great Lakes.  Similarly, human migrations, particularly in the form of Canadians into the United 
States, were common.
 43
  Still, the ebb and flow of trade and immigration often reflected the day 
to day realities of Canadian/U.S. relations.  Indeed, even during the periods of extended 
collaboration national interests continued to dominate legislative decisions.  In their book 
Beyond Walls: Re-inventing the Canada-United States Borderlands (2008) Victor Conrad and 
Heather N. Nicol likened transnational perspectives in history to a two-legged being with one 
foot on each side of the border. They argued that the body and mind of the figure sway back and 
forth across borders through space and time.   
The forces of globalization, de-territorialization and re-territorialization buffet the 
body but each foot remains planted firmly in the nation-states divided by the 
boundary.  Nation-states continue to play a major role in defining the context in 
which transnational processes operate.
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Their model of international relations along the borderlands was writ large in the Great Lakes 
commercial fisheries, where regional and national interests both shaped legislative agendas and 
prevented meaningful cooperation for decades, even as the two countries cooperated in other 
spheres of commerce. 
One early attempt at improving cooperation and trade linkages between Canada and the 
United States occurred in the mid-19
th
 century.  In 1854 the two countries negotiated a treaty of 
reciprocity.  Two of the treaty‟s seven articles dealt specifically with fisheries.  Fishermen from 
the United States were granted access to Canada‟s Atlantic coastal waters in exchange for a 
favorable trade relationship.  The treaty was the result of a changing relationship between Great 
Britain and Canada, as well as the recent consolidation of Canada‟s North and South provinces 
under a single government in 1840.  The treaty removed duties that had been attached to 
international intercourse between the U.S. and Canada and eased travel and commerce 
restrictions on various shared water bodies.
45
  International tensions fueled by economic disputes 
over tariffs and the American Civil War led to the treaty‟s abrogation in 1865 and eventual 
termination in March of 1866.  Despite its abrogation, the treaty substantially fueled trade 
between the two nations, which continued at similar and growing levels even after its 
abrogation.
46
  Why was this treaty initially adopted by both nations while later attempts at 
cooperative resource management failed?  The 1854 treaty did not place limits on production.  
With little give and lots of take it was attractive to both sides.  It offered Canada the opportunity 
to strengthen its economic relationship with its fast growing neighbor to the south and American 
fishermen open access to rich North Atlantic waters.  It promised shared profits to its 
signatories.
47
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 The Joint Commission of 1892 
“There are lots of men I know, if they could save the fish, would not do it,  
as they are too darn mean.”48 
 
 
There were early attempts at developing an international management plan for the lakes.  
During the 19
th
 century Canadian and U.S. governmental organizations were slow to respond to 
the effects of the rapidly expanding commercial fisheries.  Canada took the lead in developing 
broad regulatory legislation.  The first comprehensive fisheries law for the Great Lakes was 
passed by the Canadian Parliament in 1868.  It sought to regulate fisheries through a series of 
restrictions on water impediments, net mesh sizes, species specific requirements and the 
establishment of closed seasons.  The government then appointed twenty-three officers to 
enforce the new law on the Great Lakes.  The Canadian position contrasted sharply with the 
United States, where the public favored an open access, unregulated fishery.  Public opinion 
usually shaped local and state regulations.
 49
  Regulations were sporadic, regional and often 
conflicted. 
The United States Commission of Fish and Fisheries was created in 1871.  Under the 
auspices of the new agency, Assistant Commissioner James W. Milner, a scientist from Kenosha, 
Wisconsin investigated the lake fisheries.  Milner concluded that while the fisheries needed 
management, new laws and regulations were not the way to do it.  He was critical of the 
Canadian system which he viewed as intrusive and expensive.  Instead, Milner recommended the 
states focus on restocking programs.  As a result of the focus on hatcheries as the answer to 
fluctuating catch numbers, an essentially open fishery existed in the Michigan waters of Lake 
Huron well into the twentieth century.  On both sides of the lake fishermen resisted regulations 
or ignored them completely.
50
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Those working within the fishing industry believed many species were in decline, even as 
the industry expanded and evolved.  Acting on the growing alarm expressed by both enforcement 
officers and fisheries experts, the Dominion Government in Canada and the United States 
Federal Government decided upon joint action to address the needs of the freshwater fisheries.  
On December 6
th
, 1892 the two national governments created a Joint Commission to investigate 
the lakes‟ fisheries and advise the respective governments as to the best methods for managing 
the living resources of their shared waters.  The British chose Dr. William Wakeham to act on 
behalf of the Dominion.  Wakeham was a medical doctor.  He commanded a fisheries 
enforcement vessel in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence.  The United States chose Richard Rathbun of 
the U.S. Commission of Fish and Fisheries.
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The commissioners embarked on an ambitious fact finding mission that took them around 
the ports of the Great Lakes where they completed extensive interviews with dozens of 
fishermen, fish processors and dealers.  They amassed a sprawling collection of field notes that 
contain a wealth of information related to the lakes, wildlife, pollution, shoreline industries and 
human inhabitants around the basin. The heart of their extensive work provided a rich written 
account of the lake fisheries. They investigated the various fishing technologies deployed in 
different locales.  They chronicled the use of pound nets, gill nets, fyke nets, trap nets, seines and 
other capture mechanisms.  They chronicled dramatic declines in populations of fishes, 
questioned the logic of disposing mill wastes into tributaries and tried to understand the effects 
of human activities on fish spawning.  Within their voluminous notes they catalogued the 
growing list of problems that were existent around the lakes.  They noted the complaints of area 
fishermen regarding the gradual decline of fish catches.  For example, whitefish were once the 
most heavily fished species targeted by the fisheries.  Area fishermen recounted stories about the 
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large numbers that had inhabited the Lake Huron.  During their investigations Wakeham and 
Rathbun found that “In all parts of the lake the fishermen are practically unanimous in the 
statement that the decrease has been very great.”52  Fishermen were increasingly turning to lake 
trout to fill the void.  However, testimonials from individual fishermen suggested that Huron‟s 
lake trout were also in decline.
53
  In 1894 the commissioners traveled around the perimeter of the 
lake from Detour near the North Channel to Mackinaw City at the straits between Lakes Huron 
and Michigan.  They went south along the coast to Port Huron, across to Sarnia, Ontario and then 
Northeast to the northern shores of the Bruce Peninsula.  The commission also interviewed 
fishermen around the coast of Georgian Bay and the North Channel.  As the commissioners 
wound their way through Lake Huron‟s fishing ports the list of problems they chronicled grew.    
On the Michigan side of Lake Huron, their southward journey along the lake‟s coast began at the 
Village of Detour on the extreme eastern end of Michigan‟s Upper Peninsula. 
Stationary pound nets and boat launched gill nets were heavily utilized around Detour, 
Michigan.  On August 18
th
 of 1894 the commissioners interviewed local fish warden Samuel 
Butterfield.  Butterfield was also a commercial fisherman.  He informed the commissioners that 
two sail boats and three fishing tugs operated gill nets in the waters around Detour in 1894.  
During the fall the gill netters focused on trout.  They would operate their nets until the first of 
November which included the spawning season.  They stopped fishing when the trout moved out 
to deeper waters.
 54
  The tugs typically operated an average of one hundred and twenty nets 
strung out in four long gangs.  Sailing vessels maxed out around sixty to eighty nets in three or 
four shorter gangs.
55
  While the ideal was to pull the nets every day, they were left in longer 
when bad weather or other factors interfered with fishing operations.
56
  Butterfield believed that 
the sizes of mesh openings in the nets were decreasing as the numbers of larger fish declined.  
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He said when he first began fishing in the area he had never used anything below a five inch 
mesh gill net.  In 1894 four and one quarter inches was the common size for gill nets in the 
area.
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Gill net fishermen shared space with pound net fishermen who worked along the 
shoreline.  Gill nets and pound nets were both typically put in place just after the ice receded in 
the latter half of April or early May.  Pound nets principally caught whitefishes, especially in the 
spring.  While some fishermen tried to fish during the winter, Butterfield guessed less than three 
tons total was caught by fishermen during the winter.  The winter catch was sold locally.
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Butterfield wished American fishermen could fish “a little” on the Canadian side, though he 
acknowledged that the strict Canadian Overseer in the region, Major Elliot, was the best “they 
ever had.”59  Across the channel in Thessalon, Ontario fishermen also recognized the dedication 
of Butterfield‟s Canadian counterpart.  However, Thessalon Fisherman David Belrose questioned 
the logic of Butterfield working as both a fisherman and an enforcement officer.  Belrose 
claimed there was widespread use of undersized nets and huge catches of juvenile fishes being 
hauled out of the waters around Detour.
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Thomas Sims was originally from Glasgow, England.  He lived for a time in Yarmouth, 
Massachusetts before coming to Detour around 1862 to fish in Lake Huron.
61
  Sims claimed he 
was the first pound net fisherman to work in the waters at Detour.
62
  He set his pound nets as 
early as April and ran them as late as July.  In September he usually deployed his nets again and 
left them in the water until ice began to form.  Sims fished primarily for whitefish and some lake 
trout.  He initially fished for walleyes but gave up due to a substantial decline in their numbers.  
He explained that the State of Michigan tried to limit the minimum mesh sizes for pound net pots 
used in the area to three and one half inches in order to let immature whitefishes escape.  Sims 
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pointed out that even if fishermen acquiesced to the rule it still allowed for wiggle room.  He 
pointed out that the mesh openings in nets shrank up to a half an inch after they were tarred - a 
process meant to better preserve the net when it was submerged in lake waters.  The law did not 
specify whether the mesh size had to be three and one half inches before or after fishermen tarred 
their nets.  Other fishermen chose to circumvent the rule entirely.  Sims stated that some 
commercial fishermen placed a mesh “apron” in front of the pot‟s main net to prevent smaller 
fish from escaping.  The apron was an even smaller mesh size, but one that could be easily 
removed and hidden away in the event of an inspection on board or at shore.  Sims called the 
practice cruel and said it was catching and wasting a lot of fish of no value.  He recommended 
the incorporation of stiff fines to deter such behavior.
63
  In addition to declines in the numbers of 
walleye, Sims said lake trout had also declined in the area.  He said sturgeon were almost gone.
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While interviewing fishermen around Detour Rathbun had occasion to watch one 
fisherman bring in a load of whitefishes from his pound nets.  Rathbun noted that the catch 
consisted of “very large numbers of small whitefish,” ranging from one half of a pound to one 
pound.
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  A pound net catch brought in from Thessalon, Ontario showed similar immature 
fishes.  Rathbun also witnessed a catch of lake trout brought in by the tug Little A.  Butterfield 
was part owner of the tug.  The tug had been fishing with sixty three hundred foot long gill nets 
at depths of forty to sixty fathoms.  The operators landed one hundred and fifty two lake trout.  
Rathbun described the total size of the catch as “very poor” considering the amount of netting 
deployed.
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W.E. Robinson of the firm D.A. Trumpour and Company in Mackinaw City argued that 
the three and one half inch mesh size was not large enough for pound nets.  He said the 
commercial company of McCloud and Pemble never used anything smaller that four inch mesh.  
Robinson believed that company‟s catches were larger and of superior quality to any of those 
using smaller fishing meshes.  He also pointed out that cisco fishermen from other regions would 
occasionally travel to Mackinaw to fish for ciscoes and take innumerable small whitefishes as a 
bycatch in the smaller mesh of their cisco nets.  Robinson suggested fishermen targeting ciscoes 
be limited to certain water depths where they would not be able to catch scores of small 
whitefishes.
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  Robinson charged that the regulations that existed were not sufficiently enforced 
by the State of Michigan.
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While pound net fishermen were especially vulnerable to harsh winter weather 
conditions, gill netters did not face the same limitations.  Robinson pointed out that many fished 
right through the winter season.  When ice covered the water, some fishermen cut a hole in the 
surface and pushed a net through on a long pole.  Robinson estimated between forty to fifty gill 
net boats operated in the Mackinaw City area.  He said area fishermen primarily used Mackinaw 
sailing vessels manufactured at St. Ignace, Michigan.  Each boat typically held two fishermen.  
They operated two gangs of nets in the water at a time, while a third gang was kept on shore.  
The nets were rotated through service in that manner.  During spawning season gill netters 
relocated their equipment closer to shore to catch adult fish that were moving into shallower 
waters.  Then in the winter they followed the fish back into deeper waters.
69
  Robinson said the 
spawning season in November was the best time to catch whitefishes around Mackinaw.  He said 
fish “full of spawn” were just as good as others and were readily marketed.70 
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North and slightly east of Mackinaw City in the open waters of Lake Huron sits 
Mackinaw Island.  Mackinaw Island grew into a popular tourist destination in the twentieth 
century.  In the nineteenth century it hosted a number of commercial fishermen.  Joe Wilmot 
moved to the island in 1854 and began fishing in 1858.
71
  He noticed a decline in the catch over 
subsequent years.  Wilmot said he used to get good hauls of fishes through the ice using three 
gill nets.  However in 1894 he claimed a fisherman could no longer catch comparable numbers 
through the ice even if they used twenty nets.
72
  Wilmot said November was the month 
fishermen made a lot of their income.  It was also the spawning season for targeted fish.  He 
believed a closed season was the only way to protect spawning grounds from being disrupted.  
He stated fishermen were using small mesh sizes and echoed Thomas Sims regarding the use of 
small meshed aprons in their nets.
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  According to Wilmot, Mackinaw Island had once served as 
a base of operations for approximately thirty fishing boats.  As the fisheries intensified Wilmot 
noted changes in the fishes.  He said whitefish were smaller than they used to be and concluded 
the fish being caught were most likely planted by the hatcheries.
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  Sturgeons were nearly wiped 
out in the area.  Much of their destruction had been intentional.  Wilmot said during the early 
years of the fishery Mackinaw Island fishermen often threw sturgeon carcasses into the woods.  
They were considered an undesirable fish.  Wilmot said around 1876 or 1878 a German named 
Bennet came to the area and began making caviar out of sturgeon eggs.  Suddenly sturgeons 
were worth money to Mackinaw Island fishermen, but by that time sturgeons were almost gone.  
Wilmot was not convinced they needed saving.  He believed sturgeons destroyed the spawn of 
other marketable fishes.
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  He said there used to be a lot of ciscoes in the waters as well.  He said 
after catching them area fishermen would salt them for shipping with their “guts and all.” In 
1894 Wilmot said they were also gone.
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  Most of the marketable fish populations had been on a 
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steady decline around the island.  Wilmot said the decline began as far back as 1865.  Since that 
time the island‟s fishermen had either passed away or taken up farming.  “No one fishes from 
here now” Wilmot said.  “I have not set a net in five or six years.”77 
Mackinaw Island was part of Mackinac County.  Mackinac County includes the island 
and a section of the South side of Michigan‟s Upper Peninsula.  In his book Disputed Waters 
Robert Doherty described the region‟s fishermen as extremely poor.  In the second half of the 
nineteenth century a significant percentage of local fishermen in the county were Native 
Americans.  However, they were consigned to the bottom of the economic system.  In 1870 all of 
the larger fishing boats were owned by non-indians.  Indigenous fishermen survived as paid 
laborers or worked from small rowboats.  Most of the county‟s fishermen were very poor.  
Doherty reported that fully 31% owned no property.  Thirteen percent of white fishermen owned 
no property, while 38% of Indian fishermen had none.  The largest fishing outfits in the region 
were owned by well-capitalized outsiders who came to the area in search of profits.  Many of the 
larger commercial enterprises brought hired help with them.
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South of Mackinaw Island on the Northeast side of Michigan‟s Lower Peninsula sits the 
town of Cheboygan, Michigan.  C. Corlett was a pound net fisherman living in Cheboygan at the 
time the commission completed its interviews.  Corlett claimed some cisco fishermen were using 
their nets to target whitefishes.  Corlett explained that some of them were doing so because they 
could not afford to invest in a proper whitefish net.  He said he favored enforcement of four inch 
mesh for whitefishes provided it was the same for everyone.  He said the four inch mesh would 
likely shrink to three and one half inches once tarred.  He expected the fishery to “play out” if 
something was not done to curb widespread use of small mesh sizes.
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  He believed the larger the 
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mesh, the larger the fish that would be caught and only large fish would be in danger of gilling 
(being caught in the mesh at their gills), in pound net pots.
80
 
Dan Corlett was another Cheboygan fisherman.  Corlett said that whitefishes were 
plentiful in the region in previous years, but they were fished out by tugs.  He blamed a tug 
operator from Detour for the decimation of both lake trout and whitefish populations in the 
Cheboygan area.  He said only the trout had recovered.
81
  He believed pound net mesh sizes 
needed regulated and wanted small mesh sizes banned from use around spawning whitefish.
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Overall he believed that populations of all the species of marketable fishes were in a downward 
spiral.  He blamed overfishing and specifically the small mesh sizes being used in pound nets. He 
lamented that “trout are decreasing and everything is decreasing, herring, trout, menominee, 
whitefish, and everything else.”83 
William Gill was a fish dealer in Cheboygan.  In contrast to the decline at Mackinaw 
Island, Gill claimed there were more fishermen operating in his region than ever before.
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However, while the numbers of fishermen were on the rise, Gill explained that the ability for an 
individual to bring in a good catch had declined dramatically.
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  He echoed the opinion of many 
fishermen when he stated that the average size of whitefish being caught had dropped. He said 
individual whitefish averaged at least four pounds when he began his business.  In 1894 Gill 
claimed the average had fallen to about two and one half pounds.
86
  Gill suggested the area was 
being overfished and said fishermen were catching large numbers of juvenile fishes.  He claimed 
there were hundreds of pound nets between Cheboygan and Thunder Bay at Alpena, a distance 
of less than one hundred miles.  He told the commissioners that one fisherman was operating 
seven pound nets along just one mile of shoreline.  He said he could show the commissioners 
where fishermen who claimed to be using large mesh sizes were mixing barrels of small fishes in 
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with larger ones.
87
  Gill said as recently as the previous fall fishermen were bringing two ton 
catches in to the market with eight hundred to one thousand pounds of immature fishes mixed in.  
Gill further charged that many fishermen claiming to target ciscoes with their smaller meshed 
nets were actually intentionally fishing for whitefish.  He believed pound net pots should have 
netting of at least three and one half or four inches, and that five inch mesh should be the 
minimum size for gill nets used for trout and whitefish.   
Gill acknowledged that fishermen were already supposed to be using three and one half 
inch mesh in their pound nets, but said that nearly all of the fishermen were using smaller mesh 
sizes.  He feared that the continued catches of juvenile fishes too young to spawn would ruin the 
fishery for everyone.
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  He said Canada‟s fishing regulations were the best on the lake.  Gill 
accused Michigan fishermen of doing whatever they wanted and regularly breaking what laws 
did exist.
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  Gill retrieved a sample of C. Corlett‟s recent catch and showed it to Rathbun during 
the commissioner‟s visit.  Rathbun noted that a large number in the sample were small.  He 
estimated that the smaller fishes were on average one third of a pound.  Gill said this was typical 
for Corlett.  He said Corlett used small mesh in his nets.
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The commissioners interviewed several fishermen operating in the Alpena area.  David 
Lincoln of Alpena claimed that some fishermen set their pound nets and then simply never 
removed them from the water.  He said undersized whitefishes were sometimes intentionally 
marketed as ciscoes.
91
  Lincoln said that while the facilities supporting fishing had steadily 
improved, total catches were on the decline for individual fishermen.  Fish populations near the 
shoreline had once supported a thriving, sailboat based gill net fishery. By 1894 there were less 
fishes in shallower waters.  Sailboats were scattered.  Tugs were by then the primary vessel used 
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in the area.  Tugs allowed fishermen to follow marketable fish species out into the deeper waters 
of Lake Huron.
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Lincoln believed the Canadian Government was doing a better job protecting its fisheries 
than Michigan‟s legislature was for the state.  He said mesh sizes needed to be larger so that 
smaller fishes could escape.  He also recommended that no fishing be allowed during spawning 
times.  He charged that state laws were ineffective and he believed it was time for the national 
government to take control of fisheries legislation.
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  “I think the United States and Canada ought 
to jointly form a law and pass it, and enforce it” he said.94  He was open to the idea of closed 
seasons, but recommended that if drafted, they address different times for different regions.  
Lincoln recognized that spawning times were not uniform across the Great Lakes.
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Interestingly, he disputed the notion that the nearby sawmills were polluting the area waterways 
or affecting the fishing.  In fact, he claimed they had never deliberately dumped sawdust and 
other waste in the Alpena area.
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Despite Lincoln‟s claims regarding the timber industry, the commissioners were not 
convinced.  Rathbun himself recorded heavy pollution in the Thunder Bay area that appeared to 
originate from logging.  The commissioners experienced the effects of the industry‟s waste 
firsthand during their initial approach into the Alpena harbor aboard the side-wheeled paddle 
ship City of Mackinaw. The vessel was forced to shut down its drive wheels on account of the 
large amount of driftwood, cut logs and other mill waste spilling into the lake from the Thunder 
Bay River.  Rathbun also recorded the deleterious affect huge rafts of pine logs floated from 
Georgian Bay, Canada were having on the lake.  The cut logs would shed their bark as they were 
floated to ports at Bay City and Alpena.  Numerous fishermen also reported the effects chunks of 
freed bark had on their fishing nets.   
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Additional sources of pollution raised concerns for the commissioners.  During a trip to 
the Alpena Sulphite Fibre Company mill owned by George N. Fletcher, Commissioner Rathbun 
recorded that the mill regularly dumped its waste acid used during the pulping process directly 
into the nearby river.  The river in turn flowed into Lake Huron a short distance away.  Rathbun 
recorded that the acid was released on a daily basis from tanks measuring twenty feet wide by 
seven and one-half feet deep.  There were four acid “digestor” tanks in the mill. Rathbun was 
told the tanks contained five percent acid, but mill operators were unable to tell him how strong 
the acid actually was.  Rathbun assumed it probably became too diluted in the water to harm the 
fishery.
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While visiting the pulp mill the commissioners interviewed S.H. Case.  Case was a 
former fisherman who worked for the mill.  Case had given up fishing entirely about eight years 
earlier.  He said that many fishermen believed the timber mills had destroyed the area fishery, 
but he thought fishermen played a significant role by fishing their nets during the spawning 
season.  He admitted to using mesh as small as one inch bar in size to catch ciscoes and said 
small whitefishes often became trapped in the nets.  Case believed fishing with the smaller nets 
“had a good deal to do with the decrease” in whitefishes.98  Case said it was possible to release 
some of the juvenile whitefishes if fishermen were very careful when lifting their nets, but he 
said most fishermen would not take the time to do it.
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At Saginaw Bay Michigan, two and a half inches was the required size for nets used in 
the bay‟s cisco fishery.  Bay City fisherman George Penniman said state authorities had recently 
confiscated numerous nets smaller than the required size.
100
  Saginaw Bay fishermen operated 
their nets during the spring and in the fall.  Nets were first distributed after winter‟s ice thawed.  
They were kept in the bay as late as July.    They were then removed until about September when 
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they were again returned to the water.  Fishermen typically did not remove their nets again until 
mid November when ice threatened to ensnare them.
101
  Thus, nets were in use during the 
spawning periods of both ciscoes and whitefishes in the bay.   
Robert Beutel was a commercial operator out of Bay City, Michigan.  Beutel estimated 
that at least one hundred and fifty pound nets were in operation in Saginaw Bay in 1894.  During 
fall fishing in Saginaw Bay he said that he usually removed his own nets by November 25
th
.
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Fishermen and fisheries officials offered various suggestions for minimizing the loss of spawn.  
One recommendation suggested fishermen mix eggs and milt on site while they fished.  Beutel 
did not think fishermen could be relied on to fertilize whitefish spawn and place it back in the 
lake.  He believed fishermen would look at it as extra unpaid work and neglect it in favor of 
maximizing their fishing efforts.
103
  In addition to whitefishes, Saginaw Bay fishermen targeted 
ciscoes.  Beutel said they caught ciscoes in November and also in the spring.  He claimed 
Saginaw Bay had larger ciscoes than Green Bay, but smaller than Lake Erie.  The claim that 
Saginaw Bay ciscoes were smaller than other ciscoes was echoed by fisherman H.A. Benson of 
Bay City.  Beutel said ciscoes spawned all over the bay and began spawning in early 
November.
104
  Beutel became well known to state and federal regulators in the following century 
when a second commission formed to devise an international regulatory system for the Great 
Lakes. 
Louis Dubey lived at Bay Port, west of Bay City on the East side of Saginaw Bay.  He 
had fished the bay since 1874.  Dubey said there were just as many pound nets in the bay as there 
had ever been and that the numbers were growing.  He believed the shallowness and warmth of 
the bay in the summer made it “poison” for the fishes and that the fishes correspondingly 
retreated to deeper waters.
105
  Dubey contradicted those who said ciscoes were smaller in the 
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region.  He said the ciscoes he caught averaged about twelve inches.  He said he had heard 
numerous Lake Erie fishermen state Lake Huron ciscoes were larger than those in Lake Erie.  He 
did not favor any new net regulations.  He feared new restrictions would mean fishermen would 
no longer be able to catch any fish.
106
  Rathbun noted that Saginaw Bay fishermen were strongly 
opposed to any new regulations in the ciscoe fishery.  Perhaps hoping to avoid any legal 
restrictions most of the bay‟s fishermen claimed that cisco populations were just as plentiful as 
ever.  Overall Rathbun found it difficult to obtain reliable information in the size ranges of 
ciscoes and questioned the accuracy of the data he was given.  
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South and east of Saginaw Bay lies Port Huron.  Avery Selkirk and other fishermen 
around Port Huron kept their nets in until about December 10
th
.  Port Huron sits at the base of 
Lake Huron where the lake drains, via the St. Clair River, into Lake St. Clair.  Because of the 
strong current ice did not form as early in the year as in other parts of the lake and thus fishermen 
could keep their nets in the water longer.
108
  Selkirk ran the Port Huron Fish Company and had 
been in the area for forty years.
109
  He said the Canadian Government recently outlawed fishing 
with seines along their shoreline.  The St. Clair River was less than a mile in width and Selkirk 
said the Canadians were able to watch the American fishermen using seine nets with impunity.  
Selkirk was not a fan of seining.  He said fishermen usually ordered nets of two and one-half 
inch mesh.  He suspected seining operations were destroying spawn.
110
   
In addition to pound nets, Selkirk operated gill net boats including one tug and one 
sailboat.  The tug worked three gangs in the water at one time.  A fourth gang was left onshore as 
part of the rotation.  Each gang consisted of thirty-six nets.  Each net measured two hundred and 
seventy eight feet in length, with each gang being approximately ten thousand feet long.  The 
sailboat worked primarily in the spring using the same netting, with three gangs of twenty nets 
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each in the water at once.  Selkirk targeted trout with his gill nets and said he opposed the taking 
of undersized fish.  He told the commissioners he would support a five inch minimum mesh for 
gill nets.
111
  He said Michigan‟s poorer fishermen had a hard time competing with wealthy 
operators.  He suggested the governments of Canada and the United States “get their heads 
together and make their laws exactly alike. . .and fix them so that the small man can live as well 
as a rich man. . .I do not know why it would not be a good thing.”112  Selkirk‟s frustration 
reflected the reality of the commercial fishery.  Modernized equipment and larger numbers of 
nets were necessary in order to keep up with declining numbers of fishes.  The ability of 
individuals to make a living working in the fisheries depended on their access to capital to invest 
in fishing gear. Poor fishermen could not compete with wealthy operators. 
Selkirk claimed commercial fishermen were having little effect on the overall populations 
of fishes.  He said he was not completely in favor of a closed season.  While he was of the 
opinion that the growing numbers of tugs were running too many long nets and taking an 
inordinate amount of fish out of the lake, he said fishermen could “never fish these upper lakes 
out as long as we live.”113  In fact, Selkirk believed some commercial activities helped certain 
species of fishes.  He suggested his trout fishing helped to protect whitefish.  He charged that 
large numbers of trout regularly visited nearby waters where whitefish eggs were planted in 
order to feed on the eggs and young whitefish.  He stated that “wherever you have planted those 
fish you will find the best trout fishing in the world.”114 
Local interests typically determined what meager regulatory policies existed on the 
United States‟ side of the lake.  The new effort at international cooperation and legislation faced 
a gauntlet of entrenched interests and Constitutional tradition that favored local control.  Local 
fishermen were prepared to resist any changes that might negatively affect the profitability of 
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their trade.  The commissioners recognized the influence of entrenched commercial interests 
during their investigations.  Perhaps no Lake Huron fisherman better personified that willingness 
to fight for an open fishery better than Casper Alpern of Alpena, Michigan.   
Alpern had come to the states from Germany in 1857.  In 1858 he moved from New York 
to Texas, where he worked as a clerk. From 1861 until 1865 Alpern served in the Confederate 
Army during the American Civil War.  Following the end of that war he worked as a grocer in 
Mobile, Alabama.  In 1871 he moved to Alpena, Michigan.  In Alpena he started a clothing store 
which he operated until 1873.  In 1873 Alpern switched to commercial fishing.  In 1885 he 
started the Alpena Fish Company.
115
  By 1894 Alpern was head of the influential Michigan 
Fishermen‟s Association.  He operated both gill nets and pound nets and among his vessels was 
the tug Maxwell A, one of the largest fishing tugs on the Great Lakes at the time.
116
  Alpern said 
his tugs pulled gangs of nets measuring approximately eight miles.  The nets were pulled by 
hand.  It took about four hours to pull all eight miles of netting onto a boat.  Normally Alpern‟s 
gill net operations fished into late December.  Steam net lifters were available by 1894, but 
Alpern still relied on human power.  He favored pulling nets by hand over a mechanized lift 
because he said the netting often became fouled on the bottom.
117
  Alpern pointed to increasing 
amounts of refuse around the lakes, as well as the buildup of slime on the lake bottom, as 
primary causes of a decline in fishing fortunes.
118
  The timber industry was thriving in the 
Alpena area during the latter portion of the nineteenth century.  Tributaries were disrupted with 
long log runs, with a resulting stir up of sediments as well as erosion of shorelines from tree 
removals.  Sawdust from area mills seeped in from waste piles or was dumped directly into Lake 
Huron‟s tributaries.  Alpern‟s concerns in regard to the timber industry echoed those of other 
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fishermen and the commissioner‟s own observations.  While Alpern readily blamed the timber 
industry for affecting fishing, he gave commercial fishermen a pass. 
Unlike many other fishermen, Alpern claimed lake trout were “increasing steadily in 
abundance.”119  While Alpern operated both gill nets and pound nets, he admitted he had “not 
made any money out of pound net fishing for the last seven or eight years.”120  He said he had 
previously planted some German carp in a nearby lake.  The lake connected with Lake Huron 
and Alpern said he suspected that the carp had migrated into the big lake because he caught two 
German carp the previous year.   Rathbun concluded Alpern was a poor business manager who 
was prone to extravagant expenditures designed to perfect his fishing apparatus.  His investments 
failed to foster profitable returns.  Rathbun also questioned Alpern‟s standing in the Alpena area.  
Despite those factors, the commission acknowledged that Alpern was very influential within the 
fishery.    
In addition to his work fishing, Alpern was active in the political defense of his 
profession.  Rathbun believed Alpern would oppose any regulations that threatened his business.  
Rathbun noted that the Michigan Fishermen‟s Association had been organized primarily to 
defeat “all State legislation that did not meet with their approval.”121  In his notes Rathbun 
referred to Alpern as a “very shrewd, active, German Jew” who blamed the timber industry and 
pollution for the declining catches.
122
  The Alpena fisherman‟s ability to coalesce the state‟s 
fishermen into organized resistance was a major obstacle facing any effort to pass 
comprehensive fisheries legislation.   
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C.S. Hampton, the Michigan State Fish and Game Warden at Petosky, Michigan attested 
to Alpern‟s influence.  Hampton told the commissioners that overfishing “beyond all question, 
has caused the main destruction of the fish.”123  Hampton believed gill nets were the most 
destructive form of fishing because of the sheer numbers and lengths fishing tugs could operate.  
He lamented the fact that fish tugs could lay miles of nets across spawning grounds.  Hampton 
said the state‟s fish commissioners had recently tried to get the legislature to pass a new set of 
stricter regulations.  The bill had generated fierce resistance from members of the commercial 
fishing industry.  The bill failed to pass.  Hampton said Casper Alpern of Alpena was one of the 
most outspoken critics of the defeated proposal.
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Other U.S. fisheries officials adopted a more defensive stance toward fishermen and 
believed in a free market approach.  S. P. Wires was the Superintendent of the Federal Fish 
Hatchery in Duluth, Minnesota.  Although he was stationed in Duluth, Wires had experience 
with Lake Huron‟s fisheries and shared his opinions with the commissioners.  He mentioned the 
use of small aprons over the larger mesh in some of the pound nets pots.  Wires claimed that the 
application of an apron was done as a way of modifying larger whitefish nets so they could be 
used to fish for ciscoes.  He opposed the enforcement of larger mesh sizes on pound net pots.  He 
claimed that enforcing enlarged mesh sizes on pound nets would be a mistake as more fish would 
get gilled in the nets and subsequently die than with a smaller mesh size.
125
  He suggested that 
fishermen be allowed to regulate their respective net sizes on their own.
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While Wires acknowledged there were a large number of pound nets operating along the 
shoreline between Bay City and Mackinaw, he said the numbers peaked around 1882 and were in 
decline.  He believed the high numbers of nets both removed the fishes and broke up their runs.  
Wires said the pound net fishery was largely fished out.  He said gill netting was now the 
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preferred fishing method in the region since gill netters could follow the fish into deeper 
waters.
127
  Wires said gill net fishing on Huron started as soon as the lake opened to navigation 
during the spring thaw and ended with the onset of winter in late November.  While fishermen 
sometimes were able to get their nets in as early as March, he said April was more common.  He 
lamented that winter prevented vessels from heading out to their fishing grounds due to ice and 
storms.  He speculated that the fishing would continue to be very good if commercial fishermen 
were able to work past November.
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Wires confirmed that spawning grounds were a favored fishing area.  He said it was 
commonplace for commercial gill net fishing vessels to entangle or tear their nets when they 
fished the rocky areas lake trout preferred to use for spawning.
129
  He opposed the incorporation 
of any closed season and like many fishermen believed the industry could regulate itself.  He 
assumed if fish populations collapsed fishing would stop and eventually the fish would recover.  
He believed spawning operations could replace the fisheries by planting fish fry.  He said the 
only regulation that should be considered was a limit on the amount of gear fishermen could use.  
Wires believed there were too many people in the fishing business and too much gear in the 
lakes.
130
  He painted a different picture of whitefish declines than many fishermen.  He said he 
did not think the decrease in whitefish numbers had been very great.  He considered the reports 
of dramatic declines in the Lake Huron fishery to be exaggerations.  Wires said if any restriction 
was placed on the size of whitefish sold it should not require anything larger than three quarters 
of one pound.
131
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While fishermen around Port Huron on the United States‟ side of the lake claimed to be 
sheltered from Northwest winds in the late fall the Canadian shoreline felt the brunt of oncoming 
winter.
132
  Across from Port Huron on the Canadian side of Lake Huron‟s main basin rests the 
town of Sarnia.  Milton and David Wees of Sarnia were primarily seine net fishermen.  They 
claimed pound nets and gill nets destroyed more fish than seine nets.  They said if seining were 
the primary means of fishing the fish populations would quickly recover.  They operated two 
pound nets and claimed the pound nets destroyed more small fish in one season than they would 
in three seasons using seine nets.
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Canadian pound net fishermen targeted a variety of species including cisco, whitefish, 
walleye, sturgeon, pike and a few other species.  Pound nets were very rare north of Goderich 
and south of Manitoulin Island.  Most of the fishing in the Goderich region was done by gill 
netters.  A. McClean was a fisherman out of Goderich.  McClean fished with pound nets.  He 
said fishermen on the Canadian side seldom left fixed nets placed into November because of the 
danger of storms destroying the gear.  He thought that if the weather would cooperate November 
would be the best month for cisco fishing.
134
  McClean ranked seine nets as the most 
indiscriminate and destructive equipment used in the fishery.
135
  He was one of several fishermen 
who still argued for the destruction of sturgeons.  He believed fishermen should “kill them off” 
as fast as they could because he believed they ate the spawn of other marketable species.  He said 
if he caught undersized sturgeons he would “not throw the small ones overboard.”136  
Captain John Cragie had fished the area around Goderich for twenty three years.  He said 
half of his catch had at one time consisted of whitefishes, but by 1894 the fishery was “almost 
entirely trout.”137  He estimated the dramatic decline in whitefish had started around 1878.  
Despite the shift in fish populations, he speculated that overall catches were about as good as 
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they had ever been.  Cragie also said fishery sailboats were being replaced by more efficient 
tugs.  He said that while the sailing vessels required a three man crew, tugs needed six.  Five men 
worked to haul the nets.  Cragie was one of multiple commercial fishermen who stated fishes 
found dead in nets and decomposing were still utilized.  Salt curing was used to make the rotting 
fish market ready.  He claimed if the net sizes were regulated any larger the fishermen in his 
region would be compelled to quit fishing because the fish would simply go through their nets.  
The largest nets he reported using had mesh sizes of 4 
5
/8 inches.
138
   While he opposed 
regulating the size of mesh, he did not support fishing with seines.  Cragie, a gill netter, believed 
seines were too destructive to the fishery.
139
  In fact, he blamed seining operations for the 
whitefish decline in his region.
140
   
According to Cragie, most of the region‟s fishes were marketed abroad.  He said that 
outside of a small amount that was sold locally, most of the fish were sold to the Buffalo Fish 
Company out of New York and shipped via railroad.  Cragie expressed a competitive spirit 
toward American fishermen across the border.  He was of the opinion that he and his Canadian 
neighbors were better fishermen than the Americans they observed across the lake.
141
  He singled 
out Casper Alpern of Alpena for specific criticism.  He said Alpern repeatedly caught undersized 
fishes.  He claimed that the Buffalo Fish Company had refused Alpern‟s fish in 1894 because 
they were so small.
142
  Cragie was also upset by the disparity between Canadian and U.S. fishing 
laws.  He was frustrated by the failure of U.S. States to pass closed season laws.  He said he 
supported having a closed season, but he believed the legislation needed to be in place on both 
sides of the border for it to be fair and have the desired effect.
143
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Captain James Eingster of Goderich shared Cragie‟s opinion regarding the closed season.  
He did not think the current system did much good.  He believed the Canadians were protecting 
the fisheries for their American competitors.  He said the closed season “should be the same on 
both sides.”144  Rafts of cut logs were floated across Georgian Bay from Canadian forests, often 
routed to markets on the Michigan side of the shore.  Eingster complained of slime and bark 
deposited in his nets from the rafts.  The waste material dislodged from the logs as they crossed 
the lakes.
145
  Eingster also noted the advancements in net technologies over the preceding years.  
He remembered the days of improvised floats along the tops of gill nets and stones to weight the 
bottom.  In 1894 fishermen used cork floats and lead weights.  He said the nets were made of 
finer twine than in past decades.  Eingster blamed technological innovations for the declines in 
the catch.  He pointed to the growing adoption of fishing tugs as detrimental to the supply of 
fishes.  He believed the same limitations of sailing vessels that kept them operating a maximum 
of fifteen to twenty miles from shore also allowed marketable fishes safe harbor in the deepest 
waters of the lake.  However, fishing tugs faced no such limitations and were able to steam their 
way almost anywhere on Lake Huron.  He said the tugs in the area typically operated with four 
gangs of nets in the water with a fifth gang left on shore.  Each gang measured approximately 
five miles in length. He did not favor enforcing a larger mesh size.  He did not think a larger 
mesh would be profitable.
 146
  Rathbun noted that the Canadian fishermen operating around 
Goderich did not report much change in the lake trout populations.  However, whitefish had once 
been caught in high numbers.  By 1894 the whitefish were almost gone.
147
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Donald McCauley fished the waters around Southampton, Ontario following his arrival in 
1855.
148
  McCauley believed trout populations were cut in half by 1894.
149
  He also said that 
whitefish populations declined significantly.  McCauley claimed that in the early years of the 
fishery the whitefish he caught near the shores of the Fishing Islands north of Southampton 
averaged between five and ten pounds.  In 1894 the average was much less.
 150
   McCauley 
blamed the accumulation of debris on the lakebed from rafts of cut logs as well as overfishing for 
the decline. He suspected some of the area sawmills were dumping waste directly in the lake.  He 
wondered if they might be covering up spawning beds with their sawdust.  McCauley also said 
that the log rafts floated across the lake to the United States were a problem.  He lost nets to the 
bark sheared off from floating log rafts.
151
  The logs rubbed together as they crossed the lake and 
much of their bark was released into the water.   
McCauley believed there were too many men engaged in the fishing trade.  He also said 
seine fishing had a destructive effect on the fisheries.
152
  He said area fishermen sold their 
catches to both the Buffalo Fish Company and the firm Long and McCauley.  Most of the fish 
were shipped out via railroad.
153
  He thought the fish periodically traveled from one side of the 
lake to the other.  McCauley was not opposed to having a closed season.  Like many other 
Canadian fishermen he believed that both sides of the lake needed to adopt a closed season for it 
to be effective.
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Other fishermen opposed the closed season and opposed the incorporation of new 
restrictions.  George McCauley of Southampton did not support any regulations at all.  He felt 
the winter weather already limited fishing in his area more than enough.  He said he “would not 
limit the fishermen, but would let everybody go in who wanted to.”155  He said ciscoes in the 
Southampton region were “about like” those in Lake Erie, “but might be a little longer.”156  
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George McCauley was one of several fishermen who said they often captured suckers as a 
bycatch in their nets.  He said he had thrown many tons of them overboard.  He apparently hated 
having to deal with them and said he wished “they were all killed out of the lake.”157 
Captain John Dobson of Southampton had fished the area for thirty-five years.  Dobson 
gill netted from a sailed vessel.  He noted that Indian fishermen used to use seines at the nearby 
Fishing Islands.  He said they would sell their catch in an effort to make “a living out of it.”  
However, Dobson believed seine fishing damaged the fishery.
158
  Like some of his other 
contemporaries, he noted the advent of new technologies including fishing tugs.  He claimed the 
use of sailing vessels had peaked about fifteen years prior.  He believed sailboats had declined as 
a growing percentage of the fishing was handled by the more efficient tugs.  Dobson said 
sailboats typically stayed within twenty to twenty five miles of shore, although he claimed he 
took considerably greater risks in past years.  He said at one time he would have “gone as far as 
45 miles” from shore in a sailboat.159  Rathbun himself noted that while the number of sailing 
vessels around Southampton had “greatly lessened” the number of tugs were on the rise.  He 
recorded that five tugs operated in the Southampton area during the 1894 investigations.
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Dobson tried to support the Canadian market when possible.  He marketed his fish locally 
through Canadian channels and avoided using the Buffalo Fish Company.  He voiced his anger 
about the imposition of a Canadian closed season while the Michigan side had none.  He 
believed Americans were responsible for the depletion of fishes in the lake.  “The Americans 
have drained the fish out pretty well” he said, though he did credit the American market for 
providing Canadians with economic outlets.  Still, the lack of a closed season on the American 
side incensed the aging fisherman.  He thought it a “very unjust thing” that Canadian fishermen 
sat idle while Michigan fishermen continued to fish.
161
  Dobson said whitefish had declined 
81 
  
dramatically, but he did not know why.  He doubted that timber refuse was a factor.  He admitted 
that fishermen likely killed them off and suspected seining operations of playing a role.  Despite 
the decrease in whitefishes he scoffed at the notion that lake trout would ever experience a 
similar decrease.
162
   
Canadian fishermen around the North Channel and Georgian Bay had their own share of 
concerns.  The bay was fished primarily with gill nets as pound nets were prohibited within the 
bay east of a line that extended from Cape Hurd at the tip of the Bruce Peninsula to the Eastern 
end of the North Channel.
163
  However, west of the boundary in the North Channel pound net 
operators were more common than gill netters.  Fishermen around the bay complained of a 
decline in both whitefish and lake trout.  Rathbun concluded the declines in the bay were due to 
overfishing. He noted that the North Channel region provided a “striking illustration of the waste 
of immature whitefish” due to the widespread use of small mesh sizes and marketing of small 
fish.
164
   
Major Elliot was the overseer in Sault Ste. Marie, Canada.  He claimed that walleye 
populations in the bay had dropped dramatically.  Elliot stated that over the previous five years 
the number of walleyes along Georgian Bay‟s North shore had dropped by over half.  Despite 
Canada‟s recent legislation against seining, Elliot said he had caught seine fishermen operating 
around Burnt Island in Georgian Bay.  Their catch contained many undersized fishes.  Elliot said 
seine nets made “some terrible hauls.”165  Elliot said area Indian fishermen operated successful 
trolling operations in the bay.  They caught “a great many lake trout” that they then sold.166   
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At the South end of Georgian Bay on the East side of the Bruce Peninsula sits the town of 
Wiarton, Ontario.  S.T. Reeves was a commercial fisherman from the area who operated gill 
nets.  Reeves echoed many of his Canadian contemporaries regarding Canada‟s closed season.  
He said it was unfair for Canadians to sit idle during their closed season while American 
fishermen continued to operate without seasonal restrictions.  He believed the closed season had 
to be in effect for everyone for the fish to truly benefit and the fishery to operate fairly for all 
participants.  Like other fishermen, he was skeptical of the idea of having fishermen try to mix 
milt and eggs and return them to the lake.  He did not believe fishermen would take the time to 
do so.  He said fishermen typical just threw spawn overboard when they caught it.  He said the 
waters around fishing tugs resembled bee hives as minnows fought to eat the spawn.  He said he 
often threw spawn overboard to watch the small fish fight over them.  Reeves said he typically 
dumped offal (consisting of butchered fish remains and unmarketable fishes), about one hundred 
feet from the water.  He said shore birds typically cleaned up the remains.  He declared that area 
Indians were “very greedy” in their quest for sturgeon heads among the remains and as a 
consequence the birds had taken to hiding those pieces in the surrounding shrubbery where they 
would return for them later.
167
  Numerous fishermen reported that offal was not returned to the 
water for fear it would pollute fish habitats and become ensnared in their nets.  David Baker of 
Midland echoed Reeves on that point.  However, where Reeve‟s response to the Canadian closed 
season was qualified, Baker was a conscientious supporter.  He said it did “not seem right though 
that fish should be caught in the close season when they are spawning any more than you should 
shoot deer when they are breeding.  You not only destroy the fish but you destroy all the 
eggs.”168 
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The interviews chronicled the growing friction between commercial fishermen and sport 
fishermen.  “One sportsman requires about as much room as ten other men” reported John Barret 
Van Vlack, a commercial operator in Collingwood, Ontario.
169
  Henry Yates, a fisherman in 
Midland, Ontario reported that sport fishing was typically done during the summer months.  He 
said he and other commercial operators spent that time “shaking in our shoes every minute” for 
fear the government would restrict commercial fishermen to deeper waters in an effort to protect 
sport fishing.  He said sportsmen were “trying their best” to drive out commercial operators.170  
“The majority of those people come from the American side” reported Midland‟s David 
Baker.
171
 
Georgian Bay had its share of nets lost due to bark and waste released in the lake.  
Captain Alexander Clark, a fisherman operating out of Collingwood, Ontario observed hundreds 
of dollars worth of nets in Georgian Bay discarded after being destroyed by bark deposits.  He 
said he stripped five hundred dollars worth of his own nets of bark and was only able to save the 
leads (the line the mesh of the net connects to along the bottom of the net) and the cork floats.  
He estimated five thousand dollars worth of damage had been done to nets in Byng Inlet, located 
near Parry Sound and at that time host to a thriving lumber business.  Clark further stated that the 
buildup of bark along the bottom of the lake covered food sources that fishes depended on.
172
  
Clark complained of dramatic declines in the numbers of fishes.  However, while he 
believed timber interests were causing some damage he principally blamed overfishing.  He 
estimated that the total number of whitefish in the North Channel had dropped by at least 
seventy-five percent over the preceding twenty years.  He recommended enforcement of larger 
mesh sizes on netting and reducing the amount of equipment allowed in the lake.  He said the 
decline in Georgian Bay was similar to that within the North Channel.  Clark further stated that 
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he believed lake trout numbers dropped as much as whitefish.  As in other areas of the lake, gill 
net operations were divided between fishing tugs and sail boats.  Clark said sailboats usually 
operated three gangs of nets totaling about eight miles of netting, while the average tug operated 
four longer gangs of nets which totaled approximately twenty miles of netting.  He believed the  
closed season interfered with the best time for fishing.  Despite the poorer and often dangerous 
weather in November, Clark said he wished the closed season ran from September to October.  
He said he would take his chances with the weather in November because the fishing was better.  
He said he used to fish right through into January, but with the Canadian closed season in 
November it took too much time and money to set his nets back up again in December.
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Collingwood was home to several other fishermen the commissioners interviewed.  The 
lakeside community on the Southern shore of Georgian Bay was host to both a sizable 
commercial fishery as well as boat manufacturing.  Collingwood fisherman Charles Duffey said 
while fishermen might “do a little ship carpentering or boat building,” they were usually fishing, 
readying nets or “doing nothing.”174  Collingwood fishermen offered a variety of opinions as to 
why certain lake species were in decline.  Collingwood‟s Samuel Corson placed poachers high 
on his list.  Corson said poachers were especially prevalent and were taking a toll on the fishery.  
He claimed he could show the commissioners twenty to thirty boats that had never purchased a 
license and that fished during the closed season in November.  He believed lake trout numbers 
had declined even more than whitefish.  Corson also added his voice to the complaints of 
lumbering refuse in the water.  He stated that huge rafts of logs were floated over area spawning 
grounds.  He said in some regions the lake bottom had been completely covered by bark.  
Corson, like many other fishermen, had lost nets due to bark getting caught in them.  A gill netter 
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by trade, Corson supported the abolition of pound nets from Georgian Bay.  He thought they 
were more destructive to fish because they caught fish at a faster rate.
175
 
Fish were not the only animals being ensnared in nets around the lake.  Other animals 
often turned up as a bycatch in the equipment of commercial fishermen.  For example, waterfowl 
frequently turned up in their nets.  Various avian species around the lakes dive under the water in 
search of fish to eat.  Collingwood fisherman John Barret Van Vlack reported that ducks were a 
common bycatch.  He said during the month of June he usually pulled one or two from his nets 
every time he went out to retrieve his catch.   Sometimes the bycatch was much larger.  Van 
Vlack said he knew one fisherman who caught fifteen hundred ducks in gill nets set below 
waters near the shoreline.
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On the North coast of Georgian Bay is the lakeside town of Killarney.  John Noble was a 
well known fisherman in the region.  He fished in Georgian Bay for forty years and in Killarney 
for twenty.  Noble claimed the abolition of pound nets from Georgian Bay proper was passed 
due to pressure from a commercial fisherman named Gautier who fished pound nets just west of 
the restriction line.  He charged that Gautier had a license for ten pound nets but was fishing 
forty.  Noble claimed he had never made money faster than when he could use pound nets.  
However, he said his operations were repeatedly driven out of the choicest fishing areas by other 
interested parties.  He agreed with other fishermen with the belief that the numbers of fish were 
down.  He said the fish were “decreasing every year.”177  He said fishermen compensated for the 
decreasing numbers of trout by increasing the numbers of nets they deployed.  Noble also lost 
nets to bark deposits from the large flotillas of cut logs being rafted across the bay.  He claimed 
the bark was covering spawning beds wherever the huge rafts went.  He charged that the log 
flotillas would eventually ruin the fishery.
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Killarney fisherman Donald Cameron placed the blame elsewhere.  He said gill netters 
caused the declines in populations of marketable fishes.  He said they left their nets in the water 
far too long without checking them and retrieving their catches.  Often huge numbers of fish 
were rotted beyond use by the time the nets were retrieved.  He claimed that recently a fisherman 
came in with half a day‟s catch that was deemed worthless. It was left to rot along the 
shoreline.
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Captain Joseph King fished the waters outside Thessalon, Ontario on the northern 
Shoreline of the North Channel.  King was one of the first white fishermen in the region.  His 
father had worked as a trader and lived in the region years before any large white settlements 
developed.  King said the area‟s very first commercial fishing began around 1836.  He said fishes 
had been in decline for the last thirty years.  He placed the blame on pound nets.  “Those pound 
nets were the ruination of our country” he said.  Like Noble, King accused Gautier of abusing the 
fishery.  King believed Gautier played a role in the decline of marketable species by using more 
pound nets than he was authorized to and by catching juvenile fishes.  King charged that Gautier 
had single-handedly destroyed sturgeon spawning runs in the nearby Mississauga River by 
choking it with pound nets.  He also echoed the complaints of other fishermen regarding heavy 
deposits of bark and other waste from the timber industry.  “Between Gautier, sawdust and the 
bark the fish have gone” he said.180 
King considered the Canadian closed season unfair since it did not affect fishermen from 
the United States.  He said Americans came within half a mile of the Canadian shoreline during 
the closed season and caught fish.  King said he and other Canadian fishermen could only 
“smoke our pipe and look at them raise the fish.”181  He said Americans fished in Canadian 
waters, but if Canadians fished in American waters their nets would be seized.  He directed the 
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brunt of his hostility toward the American town across the North Channel from Thessalon.    
“Those fellows at Detour are a regular pack of scoundrels” he charged.182   
Despite his anger toward the fishermen at Detour, King did not believe his Canadian 
contemporaries were entirely innocent.  He said some fishermen used an apron over the larger 
mesh of their nets so that smaller fishes could not escape.  He said the only way to prevent taking 
undersized fishes was to fine both the guilty fisherman and the fish dealer when small fish found 
their way onto the market.
183
  Thessalon also produced additional criticism of sturgeons.  Captain 
Larry King of Thessalon said sturgeons were a destroyer of other marketable species.  He said he 
believed “sturgeon do more harm than they do good by destroying the spawn.”184  The 
misinformed assumption that sturgeons were major spawn destroyers was widespread around the 
entire lake basin.  Like Joseph King, he advocated fining dealers as a way to close the market to 
undersized fishes.  He believed fishermen were more likely to release small fish if they knew 
they could not sell them.
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Captain E. Dunn worked on the front lines of enforcement within the Canadian fishery.  
He captained the vessel D.S.S. Petrel and worked enforcing Canadian fishing regulations around 
Georgian Bay.  Dunn stated that violators of Canadian regulations were numerous and 
sophisticated in their methods.  Unlicensed use of trap nets was common around the islands of 
the bay.  Dunn believed one could distinguish illegal trap netters because they would use small 
rowboats to work their nets.  Dunn believed anyone in a rowboat with tar on his hands or tar 
where they held on to the oars was likely a trap net fisherman.  The tar was deposited on their 
hands when they placed their nets in the water or later checked them.  Dunn said he had 
confiscated many illegal nets around the bay.  He admitted trap nets were one of the most 
difficult to control because they were usually set completely below the water and impossible to 
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see.
186
  Many of the region‟s poor fishermen could only afford rowboats to work their nets.  
Unfortunately for them, Dunn‟s comments suggested their meager equipment would predispose 
them to extra scrutiny from authorities. 
Dunn said fishermen supposedly fishing for ciscoes in November would sometimes 
illegally fish for trout and whitefish.  While the net closest to the buoy (marking the net‟s 
location), would be a ciscoe net, the subsequent attached nets in the line would be trout nets.  He 
believed the best way to curb the decline of marketable fishes was to limit the number of licenses 
being granted to fishermen.   
Dunn felt that the Canadian enforcement system was a hardship on all participants.  
Overseers were assigned to enforcement areas that were often not logical in their size or layout.  
Some officers were expected to travel great distances for meager pay.  Dunn stated that one 
officer located at Midland, Ontario was responsible for more coastline than ten others in similar 
positions.  Dunn pointed out that licensed fishermen were assigned areas to fish that fell within a 
designated overseer‟s enforcement area.  If a fisherman strayed outside of the allocated area, 
knowingly or otherwise, they were considered poachers and risked confiscation of their gear.
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Despite the Canadian government‟s early lead in resource conservation, Dunn‟s experiences 
demonstrated the enforcement and effectiveness of the Dominion‟s legislation remained a 
problematic affair. 
Numerous fishermen operating around Lake Huron reported great decreases in both 
whitefish and trout.  However some fishermen reported that their overall catches remained just as 
large, or minimized the extent of the decrease.  It is unlikely that decreases numerous fishermen 
claimed occurred over decades were overlooked by others.  It is likely that at least some of the 
fishermen who claimed there was no change in the numbers of fishes wished to avoid 
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encouraging any new regulatory scheme.  Fishermen developed their own methods of addressing 
the loss of fishing resources.  As the numbers of fishes dropped precipitously, commercial 
operators increased the amount of gear they used to catch them.  The increases in gear and effort 
depressed populations of marketable species still further. 
After completing its exhaustive survey of the commercial fisheries operating in the 
waters shared by Canada and the United States, the Joint Commission recommended a 
comprehensive new set of regulations based on feedback gathered from fisheries participants and 
experts, as well as from their personal observations.  The commission‟s recommendations 
included the incorporation of closed seasons, regulation of lakeside industries to prevent further 
pollution of the lake, limits on obstructions on tributaries that could affect the fisheries, further 
efforts to prevent abuses by the fishing industries themselves and creating and maintaining 
stocking programs that would ideally increase existing populations of lake fish.  Part of the 
commissioners‟ efforts to limit the deleterious effects of the commercial fishing industry 
included recommendations for limiting the use of certain technologies in the lakes.  For example, 
they recommended restricting the number of pound nets in certain areas and regulating the mesh 
openings on various nets.  Wakeham and Rathbun further argued for pollution controls on 
sewage facilities and other industries.
188
 
It was a bold cooperative plan designed to address an abused and embattled water 
resource.  However, its comprehensive nature probably ensured it would not come to fruition.  
The commission faced entrenched and powerful fishery adversaries on both sides of the border.  
They attempted to construct legislation for marine fisheries on two oceans as well as for the 
largest freshwater fishery in the world.  In the United States the commission faced fishermen 
who operated under Constitutional traditions that favored local and state management of fishing 
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resources.  As author Margaret Beattie Bogue pointed out in her book Fishing the Great Lakes 
(2000), adoption would have meant Federal seizure of the power to regulate fisheries in the 
United States, a power not enumerated in the Constitution.
189
  The subsequent election of 
Republican President William McKinley and an end to the years of serious depression that had 
accompanied the Panic of 1893 only served to further erode interest in regulating the markets of 
the Great Lakes.  Their report was referred to the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries in 1897 where it languished into political oblivion.  In Canada the Liberal Party became 
the majority in 1896.  They allied with the commercial fishing industry which favored no new 
regulations.
190
 
Despite the cries of many individual fishermen that declines of numerous species of 
marketable fishes needed addressed, few were willing to sacrifice any of their personal profits to 
affect any change.  Instead, fishermen chose to invest in more apparatus to offset the dwindling 
numbers, a move many of them recognized was detrimental to the fishes they depended on.  As 
the nineteenth century drew to a close the future of Lake Huron‟s aquatic ecosystem appeared 
grim. 
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Chapter 3 - A failed mandate: The 1908 International Fisheries 
Commission, its aftermath and the continuing problem of Great 
Lakes fisheries management 
 Limiting the competition 
 
Despite their success using increased amounts of modernized fishing gear to generally 
keep pace with depleted numbers of fishes, commercial operators were anxious about the 
fisheries.  Heightened anxieties tended to increase the focus on perceived competition.  White 
commercial fishermen and government regulators disproportionately blamed Indian fishermen 
for endangering the catch.  Indigenous subsistence patterns were completely disrupted by 
relocation as well as intensive lumbering and commercial fishing operations.  Indian fishermen 
did their best to adapt to the new system, often working in the employ of American and Canadian 
owned fishing operations.  Sometimes commercial outfits encouraged Indians to fish during the 
closed season and then bought their catch.  Margaret Beattie Bogue described such an 
arrangement between the Noble Brothers of Killarney, Ontario and the Indians of Manitoulin 
Island.
1
   
Lake Huron Ojibwes and other area nations negotiated treaties with both the United 
States and the Dominion of Canada to protect their rights to fish.   Some of the most significant 
included the aforementioned 1836 Treaty of Washington between the United States Government 
and Ojibwes and Odawas.  In Canada the Robinson Treaties of September 7
th
 and 9
th
, 1850 ceded 
most of the land around Lake Superior and much of the northern Lake Huron region. In 1854 
Ojibwes ceded a further 1.5 million acres of Southern Lake Huron lands known as the Saugeen 
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Tract.  In exchange the signatory Indian nations retained their right to hunt and fish on ceded 
lands.
2
 
In Canada the Dominion‟s Department of Marine and Fisheries adopted policies that 
interfered with indigenous fishermen and contravened earlier treaties.  For example, in 1894 the 
department accused Indians of Walpole Island of being unnecessarily cruel in their sturgeon 
fishing methods.  The Walpole Indians were using fishing methods identical to white fishermen 
and their gear belonged to an American company that employed them.  Officers raided the 
fishing site and confiscated the gear.  Samuel Wilmot and Edward Prince were among the 
Dominion‟s officials who opposed upholding treaty rights on the grounds that commercial 
fishing companies would just continue to employ Indian fishermen during the closed season.  
Conservation officers in the Dominion sought to subjugate Indians to the same conservation laws 
followed by other commercial operators regardless of treaty agreements.  When the Saugeen 
Reserve Ojibwes wished to fish for food in 1894 and 1895 the Department of Marine and 
Fisheries initially denied them access.  The department lifted the ban only when they decided the 
Ojibwes‟ seriously needed food and their fishing activities would not negatively affect the 
commercial industry.  In the United States Michigan officials followed a comparable course of 
enforcement toward indigenous fishermen in waters claimed by the state.
3
  Indians were 
expected to adhere to state conservation laws in clear violation of Federal treaty guarantees.  
While state, provincial and national government officials failed to implement a cooperative 
regulatory system, they followed remarkably similar courses in their enforcement of existent 
legislation on Indian peoples. 
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 Renewed hope in a new century 
 
The twentieth century started with promise.  The 1800s ended on a bright note for the 
commercial fisheries, with record total catch in 1899 of 146,617,000 pounds of fish.
4
  Despite 
Rathbun and Wakeham‟s failure to induce Canada and the United States to jointly regulate the 
embattled fisheries of the Great Lakes, support for an international compact continued to 
simmer.  In the United States various parties interested in curbing the widespread abuse of Great 
Lakes fish resources coalesced to push for change.  In April of 1905 the Minnesota State House 
of Representatives introduced a remarkable resolution that requested the United States 
government take “full control” over the Great Lakes and that the State of Minnesota cede “any 
jurisdiction claimed” over the lakes.5  The influential American Fisheries Society joined the call 
for action.  At its 1905 convention the society affirmed its support for Federal action and pledged 
“its membership individually and as a society, to get their respective Congressmen and Senators 
committed to the support of this measure.”6  The following year the society amplified its support, 
declaring the depletion of various fishes an “evil” and urging joint international control of “not 
only the stocking but the protection” of fishes.7   
A. Kelly Evans of the Ontario Fish and Game Protective Association urged Washington 
to act.  Kelly questioned whether the U.S. Federal Government had the ability to legislate over 
the sovereign control the states had on the lakes, but viewed some sort of cooperative effort with 
Canada as essential to better management.  The Ontario Fish and Game Protective Association 
waged its own regional effort at protecting sturgeon in the Lake Nipissing and French River 
regions in Ontario.  Local fishermen asked for netting privileges in specific areas of those water 
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bodies.  They alleged that the sturgeons inhabiting those areas were spawn eaters that 
disproportionately damaged other populations of fishes.  The association played an important 
role in blocking those efforts.
8
   “I would like to see the stable door locked before the horse is 
stolen” Evans said.  He charged that if the status quo remained in effect conditions “in our waters 
will be even more alarming than at present.”9   
Others continued to protect the status quo Evans critiqued.  Pennsylvania‟s commissioner 
of fisheries declared it would be a “national misfortune to have a close season during the 
spawning period” for catfish, herrings and walleyes - including the now extinct blue walleyes.10  
In the midst of the tug of war over regulations officials in Washington decided to act.  A renewed 
effort to establish international fishery regulations in the boundary waters between Canada and 
the United States came to fruition.  “We are taking up the work of the Joint High Commission” 
Elihu Root wrote to George M. Bowers, the Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries in January of 
1906.
11
  
On April 11
th
, 1908 the Boundary Waters Fisheries Treaty was signed by President 
Theodore Roosevelt.  Part of the treaty provided a framework for designing a new management 
scheme for fisheries in the boundary waters between Canada and the United States.  The treaty 
created a new international commission to again survey the fisheries in boundary waters and 
develop a set of recommendations for future management.  Dr. David Starr Jordan represented 
the United States. Canada initially chose former Ontario Deputy Commissioner of Fisheries 
Samuel Torel Bastedo.  Bastedo resigned in December 1908 in order to take another 
governmental position.  He was replaced by Dr. Edward Prince.  The commissioners were given 
six months to develop a series of recommendations for the joint management of fisheries 
resources.
 12
   The treaty was given a four year life span.  It would then expire one year after 
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either government called for revisions.   On July 12
th
of 1908 the Toronto Globe heralded the 
progress that had been made toward international regulation.  The Globe saw the treaty as the 
successful fruition of years of “persistent agitation by officials and private citizens interested in 
fish preservation on both sides of the line.”13  
The treaty represented a huge break with state rights precedent over the lakes.  The 
American Society of International Law devoted a special section of the July, 1908 issue of its 
journal to a consideration of the then new treaty.  In an editorial comment they declared: 
. . .on account of the division of powers between the Federal and State 
governments under the Constitution the regulation of the fisheries in these 
boundary waters within the territorial limits of the several States is a subject of 
State rather than of Federal jurisdiction, and that Congress has no authority, in the 
absence of a treaty giving such authority, to pass laws to regulate or protect the 
fisheries in such waters. Notwithstanding this exclusive jurisdiction of the several 
boundary States over these fisheries in the absence of a treaty, the right of the 
treaty-making power to take jurisdiction over these fisheries is recognized. . .and 
such power has been exercised in full measure in entering into the present treaty.
14
 
Not all legal theorists welcomed extending Federal power into the Great Lakes.  In a 
1910 essay in the American Journal of International Law Harry E. Hunt examined the 
application of U.S. Federal criminal law in the region through consideration of an 1890 act that 
gave Washington jurisdiction for various crimes.  Hunt discussed the Constitutional tradition of 
states rights and the erosion of those rights in ominous terms.  He warned; 
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While the states have adjusted themselves to changed conditions, and their 
loss of jurisdiction along certain lines is not being openly deplored, there will 
come a time when to stretch rather than to amend the Constitution, in matters 
which involve great losses of state jurisdiction, will mean national 
unpleasantness.
15
 
Others were elated with the renewed effort at joint management.  The American Fisheries 
Society expressed glowing optimism.  They claimed joint regulation would mark a “distinct 
epoch” in American fisheries history and they pledged their support to the new commission.16  
 The commissioners visited various fisheries located in shared boundary waters from the 
East Coast to the Pacific Northwest.  Their time was limited.  A number of associates assisted in 
compiling information.  Frank N. Clark was Superintendant of the United States hatchery at 
Northville, Michigan.  Clark was interviewed by Barton W. Evermann.  Evermann was head of 
the scientific division within the Bureau of Fisheries and assisted the commission in their 
accumulation of data.  Clark told Evermann that the fisheries around Alpena were no longer 
productive.  They had been destroyed, Clark argued, by Alpena‟s discharge of raw sewage, the 
accumulation of sawdust and other timber waste from area mills, and by the fishermen 
themselves.  Clark said too many juvenile fish were caught. Large hauls of logs were still towed 
out into the lake through the bay as they were transported to markets to the south.  They rolled 
and bumped together as they were towed, which continued to release large quantities of bark into 
the lake.  Area fishermen continued to find large pieces of bark and debris in their nets, 
sometimes as far as fifty miles out in the lake.  Clark favored increasing the minimum size 
restrictions on lake trout and whitefishes.
17
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A.B. Alexander, Chief of the Division of Statistics and Methods within the Bureau of 
Commercial Fisheries also assisted with interviews.  At Alpena, Michigan Alexander 
interviewed a Mr. I. Lincoln, who had worked both as a dealer and a fisherman.  Lincoln favored 
joint U.S. and Canadian control of the lakes.  He believed fishermen would respect international 
law once it was in place.  William Beebe was the manager for the commercial fishing business of 
A. Booth and Company in Alpena.  Beebe stated that whitefish were generally not caught in 
cisco gill nets which typically 2 ¾ inch mesh in the Thunder Bay area.
18
  This statement may 
have influenced the commission‟s eventual decision to legislate the size of cisco nets at 2 ¾ 
inches.   
Lincoln and some other Alpena area fishermen claimed Canadian tugs were regularly 
fishing in American waters.  The fishermen further alleged that A. Booth and Company was 
operating tugs under the auspices of the Dominion Fish Company and that the two shared fishing 
waters across the international border.  They charged that the American company actually owned 
the Dominion Fish Company.  They claimed that Booth affiliated tugs working for the Dominion 
Fish Company would transfer their catch to company tugs operating on the American side in 
order to avoid paying duty fees.  The company was accused of violating the laws in other ways.  
The twine used in Lake Huron was primarily of Scottish manufacture and carried a large import 
fee.  Some fishermen claimed A. Booth and Company was transferring twine from Canadian to 
American tugs.  “I am inclined to think that there is some truth to the above statements” 
Alexander wrote in his journal.  “The day I left Alpena a tug belonging to I. Lincoln brought in 
14 boxes of fish, and 2 tugs belonging to A. Booth and Co. brought in 67 boxes.”19  In fact, the 
Dominion Fish Company had been incorporated as a subsidiary of A. Booth and Company‟s 
Chicago based business in 1899.
20
   
110 
  
 
Fishermen continued to offer contradictory advice.  For example some fishermen wanted 
regulations on the size of fish that could be sold, while some said the size of mesh should be 
regulated.  Others wanted no new regulations.  A former fishermen and dealer named Joseph 
Gansey in Sault Ste. Marie recommended regulations on both fish and nets.  Others wanted the 
laws changed to level the playing field between individual fishermen with limited resources and 
larger operators with greater capital and equipment.  Michigan started experimenting with closed 
seasons at the end of the nineteenth century, but certain fishermen were still authorized to fish so 
long as they also gathered spawn for state hatcheries.  Frank King, a commercial fisherman 
stationed at Mackinaw Island complained that the large wholesaler A. Booth and Company could 
fish during the closed season on whitefish, but individual fishermen could not.  King believed 
“poor fishermen” deserved the same fishing privileges as the large company.21   
Henry Platt of Rogers City claimed that state game wardens never investigated his catch 
when he used A. Booth and Company as an intermediary to markets.  However, when he tried to 
handle the sale of his fish, wardens would check his catches for undersized fish on an almost 
daily basis.  Numerous other fishermen and even the Deputy Collector of Customs shared Platt‟s 
convictions that state authorities showed significant favoritism toward A. Booth and Company, 
but scrutinized individual fishermen.
22
   
A. Booth and Company wielded far more resources than the average fisherman.  The 
Booth Company was incorporated on July 20, 1898 with a capital of 5.5 million.  It operated its 
own fishing vessels and purchased fishes caught by competitors.  It was the largest fishing 
operation on Lake Huron at the time the second international commission made its rounds of the 
lake.  It remained an influential business on the Great Lakes until the time of the Great 
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Depression.
23
  For self-employed fishermen, A. Booth and Company was the elephant in the 
room.  Superintendant of Michigan‟s State Hatchery Harry Marks claimed A. Booth and 
Company operated pound nets around Whitefish Bay, Michigan at incredible depths.  He said the 
company connected individual pound net piles together at their ends in order to double their 
lengths.
24
  The pound nets at Whitefish Bay may have been the deepest pound nets ever operated 
in the lakes. 
Despite the efforts of commissioners the informational trips lacked the depth of the 
voluminous and detailed transcripts taken by the previous decade‟s international commission.  
The time frame given to the commission to complete their interviews and prepare their 
recommendations, a scant six months, likely contributed to their apparent failure to interview 
numerous interested parties.  The commission‟s decision to withhold their subsequent 
recommendations from the public also contributed to a growing atmosphere of suspicion and 
dismay among commercial operators. 
Many fishermen reported that they felt left out of the process.  Seymour Bower, the 
Superintendent of Michigan‟s State Board of Fish Commissioners wrote to Evermann in dismay.  
Bower said sources at Mackinaw had informed him that “commercial fishing interests west of 
the Soo to the Wisconsin line have been absolutely ignored” and that “practically the same 
situation” existed along Lake Huron‟s Michigan shoreline.  Bower urged better communication 
and less secrecy.  He said the commissioners were risking a “rocky road” by not promulgating 
their legislative plans.  “As one who has for many years preached Federal control of interstate 
and international waters, I urgently recommend that the revised proof sheets be placed in the 
hands of commercial fishermen all along the line.”25  While discontent and apprehension 
simmered in various locales, there were people working in the fisheries who supported the 
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commission.  For example, wholesaler August J. Anderson of Marquette Michigan on Lake 
Superior stated he “sided with the International Fisheries Commission” on its various proposed 
net regulations.
26
 
The commissioners created drafts of their proposed ordinances and then further trimmed 
the recommendations.  Several preliminary regulations did not make the final cut, including a 
rule banning fishing between nine PM Saturday and six o‟clock AM the following Monday 
morning.  Another code banning all commercial fishing with nets from Lake Champlain was also 
cut from the final list.
27
  The compiled regulations were forwarded to President Taft on January 
31
st
 of 1910.  On February 2
nd
 Taft passed the regulations on to Congress for their consideration.  
In Canada there was resistance to the treaty, especially within Parliament‟s House of Commons 
where members worried the treaty usurped their law making power.
28
  Nonetheless, the treaty 
was signed into law by the Canadian Parliament in 1910.
29
  However, in the United States 
strenuous objections arose. 
 The power of an idea: the small cisco of Saginaw Bay 
 
One of the new regulations called for a 2 ¾ inches minimum mesh opening for catching 
ciscoes in the Great Lakes.  Rathbun and Wakeham had suggested bifurcating Lake Huron into 
separate pound net enforcement zones.  They proposed pound nets north of a line running from 
North Point, Michigan (near Presque Isle) to Clark Point, Ontario should be no less than four 
inches after net shrinkage from tarring.  South of the line they recommended pound net pot mesh 
be no smaller than 2 ½ inches after initial shrinkage.
30
  In 1909 Michigan passed a law that 
established minimum mesh sizes for pound nets at 2 ¼ inches.
31
  The 1908 commission proposed 
a line from Thunder Bay Light, Michigan to Cape Hurd, Ontario.  North of the line the regulated 
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size of netting in the back of pound net pots was fixed at no smaller than 3 
1
/8 inches.  South of 
the line the recommended minimum mesh size for the back of the pot was 2 ¾ inches.
32
  That 
quarter inch difference in the legislation proved pivotal for Michigan fishermen.  At Saginaw 
Bay on Lake Huron the outcry was especially vociferous.  Saginaw Bay fishermen relied heavily 
on pound nets and seines.  Pound nets used for ciscoes in the bay were included under the 
recommended 2 ¾ inch mesh minimum.  Saginaw Bay fishermen and processing facilities 
argued that the 2 ¾ minimum mesh for ciscoes was too large.   
The Robert Beutel Company played a central role in organizing resistance.  Beutel and 
his allies wrote to various officials in Washington.  They claimed the regulations would destroy 
the Saginaw Bay fishery.  They argued that they had not seen any of the proposed regulations 
and had to rely on hearsay, but stated that the legislative proposal was already damaging the 
fishery.  They said the lack of definite information caused confusion among fishermen.  With a 
possible change in mesh requirements on the horizon, fishermen around the bay were unsure of 
what sized nets they should buy.
33
  Fishermen were unwilling to adopt larger meshes unless 
legally compelled to.  Additionally, Beutel claimed that larger mesh would gill more undersized 
whitefish in Saginaw Bay‟s pound nets.  However, the centerpiece of their resistance was the 
claim that Saginaw Bay was home to a smaller variety of cisco than Lakes Erie and Superior.
34
     
During their 1908 investigations, A.B. Alexander concluded Saginaw Bay fishermen 
were taking large numbers of undersized fish.  Alexander stated that the fishermen of the area 
were primarily concerned with “a large share regardless of the injury they might do to any one 
branch of the fisheries.”35 He believed that they were landing “larger quantities of small fish” 
than most other fishing operations and argued that the “most effective way to prevent the 
destructive waste” was to restrict both the numbers of nets fished and increase the mesh sizes.36  
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There likely were a large number of small ciscoes in Saginaw Bay.  Historically the bay provided 
a key spawning area for ciscoes, so it is hardly surprising that high numbers of smaller ciscoes 
would have been in the vicinity.
37
  In fact, later research showed that in general adult Saginaw 
Bay ciscoes were not significantly different in size from ciscoes in other regions.  Years later 
Biologist John Van Oosten and others concluded the fishermen of the bay were in fact catching 
juvenile fishes.
38
   
Incredibly, Commissioner and famed fisheries biologist David Starr Jordan apparently 
took the fishermen at their word.  In a letter to the Beutel Company Jordan suggested the 
commission might have erred by including Saginaw Bay in its regulations and admitted the 
commission did not have adequate information about the bay‟s fishing gear and the possibility of 
different cisco sizes in the bay at the time they formulated their regulations.  He said he now 
knew the claims of slender ciscoes in the bay were a “fact” and he agreed to work with 
Commissioner Prince to remedy the situation.
39
  These admissions suggest Jordan was not 
familiar with all of the field reports from his own commission or he dismissed them, as he made 
no mention of Alexander‟s conclusions.  Instead, he quickly equivocated on the commission‟s 
position regarding pound net mesh.  Nevertheless, Jordan urged Beutel to trust that the 
commission would look out for the interests of bay fishermen after the bill was passed.  He 
argued that changes to the bill were only possible through amendments after its passage.
40
  Since 
the Canadian government had already approved the regulations any last minute changes on the 
U.S. side threatened to bring the legislation to a halt in order to allow Ottawa time to reexamine 
and approve any revised version.   
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While the revolt of Saginaw Bay fishermen and processors was only one of several 
outcries opposed to the proposed regulations, it quickly became the most damaging.  Jordan‟s 
frank admissions to Beutel only emboldened the coalition forming against the commission.  
Beutel and his allies appealed directly to their Congressmen and Senators.  The treaty was 
submitted to President William Taft on January 31
st
.  Taft turned the treaty over to Congress for 
their consideration on February 2
nd
, 1910.  At the same time a contingent of Saginaw Bay 
fishermen made their way to Washington to appeal their case directly to Congress.  They brought 
some cisco samples from Saginaw Bay in order to prove the fish could easily escape a 2 ¾ inch 
mesh.  On February 16
th
 the fishermen appeared before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations “armed with nets, bait and a few live ciscoes in pails of water.”41  The results were 
swift.  On February 17, 1910 the New York Times reported the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations‟ decision.  “Against Fisheries Treaty” sounded the article.  The Senate sent the treaty 
back to the Secretary of State, claiming it would destroy the Lake Huron cisco industry.
42
  
Another newspaper aimed its sites directly on Jordan when it sniped: 
David Starr Jordan probably wishes he had interviewed those Saginaw 
Fishermen first.  As it stands, a senate committee got the first word and the luster 
of the Californian‟s reputation as a piscatologist has departed.  A song of triumph 
is wafted from the camp of the Saginaw fishermen.
43
 
Republican Congressman Joseph W. Fordney of Saginaw, Michigan argued that the 
regulations “would be disastrous to Saginaw Bay fishermen.”44  When U.S. Commissioner of 
Fish and Fisheries George Bowers expressed skepticism regarding whether fishermen would 
have bothered to bring any larger cisco specimens to Washington, Fordney defended his 
constituents.  He said he regretted that the commissioner questioned the intentions of the 
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fishermen and whether the fish presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations were of 
average mature size.  “I am no fisherman” Fordney admitted, “but those gentlemen brought what 
they claimed to be matured herring” to Washington.45  In June of 1910 the Detroit Free Press 
announced that the fisheries commissioners were finally convinced that ciscoes in Saginaw Bay 
were “smaller than others.”46  Canadian officials could only sit on the sidelines while the 
legislation ground to a halt in the United States.  Canadian supporters of the agreement were 
displeased with Washington‟s handling of the treaty.  They believed too many details were made 
public prior to Congressional review.
47
 
Meanwhile, the argument that Saginaw Bay ciscoes were a smaller variety steadily 
gained ground with the fisheries commissioners.  By the following April even the previously 
skeptical George Bowers was acknowledging the dubious claim as “fact” in his correspondence 
with Beutel.
48
  In June of that year the Detroit Free Press announced that both Jordan and an 
initially skeptical Prince agreed that Saginaw Bay should have been exempted.
49
  As the treaty 
descended into limbo, numerous Great Lakes fishermen were unsure about what regulations 
were in force.  August Anderson, a fisherman in Marquette, Michigan wrote the commission 
wondering when the new regulations would go into effect.  Anderson said he supported the new 
larger mesh sizes and protecting the fishes, yet he said he could not order nets for the following 
year until he knew if the regulations were in effect.  His willingness to protect resources by 
purchasing larger nets was apparently dependent on the new restrictions being shared by all.
50
  
Like the fishermen of Saginaw Bay, Anderson was reluctant to adjust his mesh sizes unless 
compelled to do so.  The commission urged Anderson to contact his local representatives and ask 
them to support pushing through the legislation so he could move forward with his business.  
They charged that “Certain fishing interests at Saginaw Bay” had successfully delayed passage 
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of the legislation.
51
  Secretary H. Hinrichs Jr. of the Keystone Fish Company in Erie wrote to 
Commissioner Barton Evermann in April of 1911.  Hinrichs Jr. stated that the larger 3 
1
/8 inches 
mesh size recommended by the commission for Lake Erie were working out fine but his 
company had been “unable to ascertain the status” of international regulations.52  The 
commission was quick to seize upon the statements about the effectiveness of the mesh in order 
to deflect criticism from other corners.  When another Lake Erie fisherman wrote to the 
commission objecting to the proposed 3 
1
/8 inch mesh size for that lake, the commission 
responded that the size was “agreeable to the Keystone Fish Co., perhaps the largest users of 
gillnets in Lake Erie.”53   
In the spring of 1911 Dr. Jordan resigned his position.  He was replaced by Job Hedges.  
Hedges had little direct experience in fishery matters.  The commission attempted to get the bill 
through Congress by simply removing large, controversial sections.  In May of that year a 
modified version of the bill was given to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs.  The new 
version lacked several divisive components included in the original treaty.  It excluded entire 
regions from enforcement, including Saginaw Bay, Puget Sound and all of Lake Erie.  No further 
action was taken on the treaty.
 54
  Lamenting the failure of Congress to enact the regulations, 
Fisheries Commissioner George Bowers stated that 
No set of fishery regulations can be drawn which will have any value 
whatever in the preservation of the fisheries which will not meet with opposition 
from some local interest.  And if local interests are permitted to control, the large 
problems of fishery conservation can never be properly handled.
55
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Stripping Lake Erie and the other districts from the legislation effectively nullified it.  The new 
version was unacceptable to Canada.  Bowers lamented that the new version was “only a 
fragment of a body of fishery legislation that should be considered as a whole.”56 
Saginaw Bay was not the only region to voice its objections to the proposed regulations.  
Once the commission had formulated its set of regulatory measures, determined opposition arose 
from several locales.  Because the commission‟s report recommended regulations for both 
marine and freshwater fisheries, objections arose from the West Coast and the East, in addition 
to opposition from fishing interests in the Great Lakes.  Fishermen from various regions rejected 
proposed regulations on net mesh sizes, types of fishing equipment and other components.  
However, it was the Saginaw Bay fishermen who appeared before the Senate and they were 
credited by the commissioners for stalling the legislation‟s passage.  The delay ultimately led to a 
permanent rejection.  In an attempt to both get the legislation passed while satisfying its 
numerous critics; the commission stripped it of its most controversial components.  The changes 
were significant, both weakening the proposal and rendering it unpalatable to the Canadian 
Government, which had approved the report in its original form.  Despite efforts at revision, the 
treaty was withdrawn by the British 1914.
57
 
In Canada utilization of fisheries remained an important topic for the provincial and 
Dominion governments. The Dominion drafted its own set of revised fishery legislation after the 
failure of the International Commission‟s legislation.58  Shortly thereafter National Fish Day was 
established in Canada as a day to raise awareness of Canadian fisheries and boost sales of their 
products.
59
  In 1923 the Canadian Fisheries Association authored an article on the importance of 
Canada‟s fisheries.  The publication of the article coincided with National Fish Day that year.  
The Department of Marine and Fisheries in Ottawa then distributed the article to Canadian 
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newspapers with a request to publish.
60
  The article, aimed at “educating the public” used ocean 
fisheries for its examples, but was meant to apply to both oceanic and inland fisheries.  It began; 
If the young of one single species of fish – for example the herring – were 
allowed to mature without interference by man or molestation by natural enemies 
in the seas, in the matter of a few years the seas would be unable to contain that 
species alone.  And if all the thousands of fishes matured one hundred percent of 
their progeny, in a surprisingly brief time the seas would be impassable to ships.   
This probably illustrates better than anything else the copiousness of the 
fishery resources of the world, and fortunately for Canada, we dominate waters 
which are the most fertile on earth. . . 
. . .We have the mechanical resources and the intrepid, hardy citizenship to 
prosecute our fisheries to the maximum, but unfortunately our population does not 
patronize the industry to justify more intensive fishing than at present.”61 
 The Great War and afterward 
 
In the United States World War I led to support for a different kind of cooperation with 
Canada in regard to shared fishing waters. William Redfield, then Secretary of Commerce, urged 
United States Food Administrator Herbert Hoover to support the opening of U.S. ports to 
Canadian fishing vessels.  With Canada and the United States allied in World War I, Redfield 
believed the measure would lead to a “considerable increase in the amount of fish food” 
available in the United States.
62
  In 1918 U.S. ports were opened to entry by Canadian fishermen.  
However, suspicion of the Canadians and a desire to limit their competition remained 
widespread.   
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Animosity toward Canadian fisheries was not limited to the Great Lakes.  Luther 
Maddocks of Boothbay Maine had a long history with the Atlantic fisheries, including ownership 
of Maddocks Packing Company in Boothbay, Maine.
63
  He was a long time opponent of fishing 
regulations and he also opposed allowing Canadian fishermen to use American ports.  He had 
much to say on both subjects.  “The migratory fishes that visit our coast” he said of Maine‟s 
Atlantic waters in 1911 “need no protection and the efforts of man cannot perceptibly diminish 
the supply.”64  He believed Canadians had nothing to offer in return for the use of American 
ports.  He stated that most U.S. deep sea fishing vessels were already commanded by 
“Canadians, Newfoundlanders and Italians.”65  United States Pacific Coast fisheries lodged their 
own series of complaints to Congress around 1916 and 1917.  The group charged that Canada 
was attempting complete “absorption” of United States fisheries.66  Federal officials were far 
from unanimous in their support of the plan.  Deputy Commissioner of Fisheries Henry F. Moore 
opposed opening the ports.  He believed it would be “impossible” for American fishermen to 
compete and that they would be driven from the coastal boundary waters.  He accused Canada of 
acting out of “self interest and the desire to drive an advantageous bargain.”67  On the East Coast 
some processors did voice support for the initiative.  Charles F. Wonson of the Gloucester Salt 
Fish Company supported allowing Canadians use of area ports.  He believed people in the United 
States needed all the fish they could get.
68
  Nonetheless, the rights extended in 1918 were 
abrogated shortly after the end of World War I. 
By the early 1920s there had been virtually no further Federal action related to 
international management of Great Lakes fisheries.  In 1922 a convention was proposed for the 
prevention of pollution in the boundary waters between Canada and the United States.  The 
convention focused on a paragraph from a boundary waters treaty of January 11, 1909 that 
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restricted pollution that might damage property on either side of the border.  Deputy United 
States Fisheries Commissioner Henry F. Moore said he assumed property would include the 
fishes that were “owned” by the states, Ontario and the Dominion government.  He warned that 
since fish were migratory, pollution could damage “property rights” on both sides of the 
international boundary, regardless of who the actual polluter was.
69
  Moore, who strenuously 
opposed opening American ports to Canadian fishermen during World War I, here demonstrated 
the widespread perception that the lakes were property with resources owned by the political 
entities that claimed their waters.  He was willing to work with Canada to protect those property 
rights from damage by other industries.   
When it came to regulation of commercial fisheries, Moore favored a minimalist 
approach.  His view of the fisheries was shaped entirely by economic considerations.  In 
November of 1922 the Central States Food, Drug and Dairy officials Association passed a series 
of resolutions asking for Federal control of the Great Lakes fisheries.  They recommended a 
treaty with Canada “for the purpose of uniform conservation, propagation and utilization” of 
Great Lakes fishes.
70
  Despite the interest in regulating pollutants, the overall direction of the 
Federal Bureau of Fisheries at the time can be ascertained through an exchange Moore had with 
the Ontario Department of Marine and Fisheries regarding the use of certain Alaskan fishes as 
fertilizer.  Moore said he favored regulations only so far as they provided an early precedent 
should fisheries interests become so large and powerful that developing regulations later from 
the outside could prove difficult.  However, fishes were given no regard beyond their economic 
value.  Moore said the Fisheries Commissioner, Henry O‟Malley, shared his views.  “The 
Commissioner and I. . .both agree” he said “that there is nothing gained by merely permitting the 
fish to live in the sea without some effort to utilize them for economic purposes” as long as 
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future supplies were not jeopardized.  Moore did not favor strong regulations, instead 
recommending “moral suasion” to maintain aquatic resources.71 
By May of 1926 the mood in Washington was again shifting toward support for some 
kind of intervention in the Great Lakes fisheries.  Henry O‟Malley continued as fisheries 
Commissioner in Washington.  Lewis Radcliffe was by then Deputy Commissioner in 
O‟Malley‟s department.  Radcliffe did not share his predecessor‟s hands off approach to Great 
Lakes management. He warned that investigations by the Bureau of Fisheries concluded the 
fisheries of the Great Lakes were in serious trouble.  Using Lake Erie as an example, he said the 
fisheries were threatened with the “danger of exhaustion.”72  Populations of ciscoes and 
whitefish were believed especially endangered.  Radcliffe and O‟Malley believed the 1908 treaty 
failed due to its breadth in attempting to cover boundary waters fisheries from coast to coast.  
Radcliffe advocated a new international agreement focused solely on the Great Lakes.
73
   
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover was also convinced negotiating a boundary 
waters treaty with Canada was the only way the Great Lakes fisheries would “be saved from 
ultimate exhaustion. . .”  Hoover pointed to Lake Erie, control of which was shared by four 
states, the Province of Ontario and Canada‟s Dominion Government.  The plethora of interests 
led to legislative chaos and a lack of cooperation.  Hoover recommended creation of a treaty that 
would provide both a joint study of the conditions of the lakes and establish a centralized 
regulatory agency.
74
  In July of 1928 Michigan Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg discussed the idea 
of an international treaty with Commissioner O‟Malley.  Vandenberg wondered whether the 
numerous, competing, individual interests of the Great Lakes were “insurmountable.”  He 
suggested “Federal leadership” might be the only way “formidable progress” could be made.75  
With a key Michigan Senator apparently on board and renewed support within the United States 
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Bureau of Fisheries it appeared that a cooperative international management scheme for the 
Great Lakes fisheries was again a real possibility.  The lines of communication between the 
Bureau of Fisheries and Senator Vandenberg grew. 
The subject was referred to Deputy Commissioner Radcliffe.  Radcliffe supported the 
idea of Federal intervention.  He told Vandenberg that he believed “a number of the important 
fisheries” were “threatened with economic exhaustion” without significant intervention.  
Radcliffe said the tendency of the competing states was to “revise the laws downward to the 
standards of the State with the least effective regulations.”76 Vandenberg responded with interest 
and asked Radcliffe to develop a proposal outlining exactly how they might go forward with the 
development of an international regulatory agency.  He suggested that the State Department 
assume responsibility for negotiating international talks and the Bureau of Fisheries take charge 
of interstate discussions.  Vandenberg said he was interested in pursuing the matter further 
during the next session of Congress.
77
  In August Commissioner of fisheries Henry O‟Malley 
told Commissioner Radcliffe he initially supported letting the states “work out their own 
salvation” but admitted it appeared they never would.  O‟Malley said he would cooperate with 
Vandenberg “to the fullest extent” if Vandenberg proved willing to get things moving forward in 
Michigan.
78
 
In September Radcliffe again wrote Vandenberg, advising him of O‟Malley‟s support and 
new conviction that the states would not cooperate effectively without Federal guidance.  
Radcliffe suggested that Vandenberg contact the state department and ask them to in turn contact 
Canadian authorities regarding the possible development of a new international fisheries treaty.
79
  
In his response Vandenberg retreated from his earlier statements that appeared to favor Federal 
intervention.  Ignoring Radcliffe‟s suggestions for moving the international process forward, he 
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now said he agreed with O‟Malley‟s initial contention that the states should be allowed to “work 
out their own salvation.”  He said he had submitted the “entire matter” to the Michigan 
Department of Conservation and would get back in touch with Radcliffe when the “situation 
clarifies at the state capital.”80  With that the renewed effort to design an international compact 
fizzled.  Radcliffe and Vandenberg initially asked each other to take the first steps at bringing the 
various affected parties together.  Vandenberg‟s sudden rejection of pursuing an international 
agreement likely reflected his isolationist convictions.  He opposed President Wilson‟s League of 
Nations and was a strident isolationist until World War II.  He gradually came to advocate 
internationalism only after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and his subsequent conviction 
that the postwar world would require more effective and modernized international security.
81
 
 Life of the lake 
 
The first half of the twentieth century was a time of change for Lake Huron.  For the 
numerous communities of fish and other aquatic species beneath its surface, the century brought 
a swift erosion of native ecological diversity and the introduction of numerous new competitive 
species.  On its surface and shores, commercial fishermen and their lakeside communities 
struggled to find economic viability in the fisheries as catch totals fluctuated wildly.  Ineffectual 
efforts at resource conservation collided with individual, regional and corporate economic 
interests.  Fishermen, government bureaucrats and conservation officials in Canada and the 
United States eyed each other warily.  Mutual suspicions and regional interests slowed the 
development of joint regulation to a lethargic pace.  Economic instability only fueled the lack of 
cooperation as people dependent on fisheries markets sought to maximize their share of the 
shrinking pie.  The numbers of recreational fishermen were steadily growing and with them the 
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friction between commercial operators and sport fishing interests.  It was a time that demanded 
swift and sweeping legislative intervention to stem the tide of fisheries decline.  Unfortunately 
for the industry, it was also a time of little meaningful change in the management of the lakes. 
In the first decades of the twentieth century sailing vessels, rowboats, gas boats and tugs 
dotted the waters of the Great Lakes seeking their fortunes.  For many fishermen the commercial 
catch was the only livelihood they knew.  When he applied for a license to net sturgeon on the 
French River in 1926, David Lamonday of Byng Inlet, Ontario said fishing was the only thing to 
do where he lived.
82
  A.G. Bowie returned home to Ontario after serving overseas in World War 
I.  Bowie wanted to become a commercial fisherman.  He applied for a license to set up two 
pound nets in Georgian Bay.  Bowie stated he had “considerable experience as a fisherman” 
which he acquired while fishing with his father.  He said his father‟s expertise was based on “60 
years of fishing in the Georgian Bay and Lake Superior.”83 
At the beginning of the twentieth century Michigan‟s commercial fishery had little 
regulatory control.  Although the state experimented with short closed seasons beginning in 
1897, some fishermen were allowed to keep fishing so long as they gathered spawn for 
hatcheries.  In 1919 Lake Trout fishing was closed state wide from October 10
th
 through 
November 8
th
.  Whitefish season was closed from November 20
th
 through December 15
th
.  
Additional state wide regulations on pike, suckers and yellow perch followed in 1927.
84
  Spawn 
fishing was still allowed by permit during the closed seasons.  More permits were issued than 
were necessary and the system provided fishermen with an excuse to continue fishing during the 
closed seasons.
85
 
The Department of Agriculture‟s Chicago Station undertook a comprehensive 
investigation of the Great Lakes commercial fisheries operating in Lakes Michigan and Huron 
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beginning in 1920.  They subsequently issued their findings in 1922.  The primary investigator 
was one J. Feldbaum.  The research uncovered shocking conditions in the Great Lakes fisheries.  
Sanitary conditions at fish packing plants were declared “abominable.”  The inspectors observed 
widespread abuse of fish resources as well as considerable deception in the marketing of fishes.  
Fishermen were observed operating as many as eight to ten gangs of gill nets in the water at 
once.  Since most fishermen could only effectively pull one gang a day, innumerable fishes died 
in the nets and slowly decayed before being delivered to the packing house.  Commercial 
operators had access to ice in order to prevent widespread spoilage on board fishing vessels.  
Using ice was especially important on hot days. However, very few fishing boats were seen 
carrying ice for preserving the catch.  The inspection noted some fishermen bringing in catches 
with approximately 75 percent of the fish dead and decaying.
86
 
Even fish that decayed in submerged nets for days were brought to the docks without ice.  
At the docks the fish were often packed in ice to await transport.  At various docking areas the 
investigators noted a lack of shade in which to store fish.  Catches were often left in the sun until 
the arrival of transportation to a processing and packing facility.  This meant the ice could be 
long melted by the time the catch reached a processing plant.  None of these issues prevented 
rotting fish from being sold to consumers.  A system had developed to support the processes in 
place.  Similar methods of marketing spoiled fish the previous century were carried on into the 
twentieth.  Decayed fish were routinely declared soft fish or “smokers.”  They were soaked 
overnight in brine and bicarbonate of soda and then smoked anywhere from two to seven hours.  
Smoked chubs and other less desirable species were sometimes relabeled as trout and whitefish 
and sold.  The investigation found that fish labeled as “smokers” were unfit for human 
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consumption.  Smoking houses were using food coloring to hide imperfections in the spoiled 
fish.
 87
 
Further issues plagued the U.S. industry.  In addition to the filthy conditions at processing 
plants, the fishermen were given used boxes to haul fresh fishes.  Fishermen lacked facilities to 
clean out the boxes so new fresh catches of fishes were exposed to the remains and refuse of 
previous catches.  At fishing plants in Alpena, Bay City, Cheboygan and Frankfort Michigan 
processing facilities drew their wash water from streams shared by the raw waste of the 
municipal sewage systems.  The water was in turn used to wash fishes, clean out used fish 
containers and make ice for packing and storage.  Perhaps not coincidentally, Frankfort, a town 
on Lake Michigan, was the site of repeated typhoid outbreaks.
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 After their discouraging findings, the Chicago Station and the State of Michigan 
cooperated on an “educational campaign” in June of 1922.  Their intervention was timely. 
Estimates in 1922 suggested over two billion pounds of fish were annually consumed in the 
United States.  They urged packing plants to clean up their facilities and encouraged fishermen to 
incorporate more sanitary methods for handling fishes.  Commercial fishermen were urged to 
limit their numbers of nets in the lake and to haul sufficient ice to preserve their catches.  On a 
follow-up trip in September investigators noted improvements at most packing facilities.  
Approximately fifty percent of observed fishermen carried packing ice on their boats.  However, 
investigators did not see any changes in the large numbers of gill nets being fished.  Further, they 
expressed skepticism regarding certain improvements they witnessed.  For example, they 
suspected area smoking houses would not reject or destroy partially decayed fishes without the 
inspectors‟ presence.  Federal investigator Feldbaum recommended new legislation to limit the 
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number of gill nets employed by fishermen and follow-up inspections and seizures of decaying 
fish to ensure compliance with the new sanitary recommendations.
89
 
Following the embarrassing discoveries and recommendations by the Federal inspectors, 
the State of Michigan‟s Department of Agriculture passed a new sanitary code with the approval 
of the Michigan Fishermen‟s Association in January of 1923.  The new code called for a separate 
room at packing facilities to be used exclusively for the cleaning, handling and packing of fishes.  
Rooms were to be kept clean and “free of flies.”  The revised rules called for clean washroom 
facilities and washable caps for employees.  Tables and utilities were to be cleaned “one or 
more” times per day.  Water was not to be used from contaminated sources.  Fishing boats were 
also ordered to be kept in a sanitary condition.
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Among fishermen tensions remained high between competitors on different sides of the 
international border.  Canadian fishermen were wary of their American neighbors.  Many 
Canadians were convinced that Americans ignored Canadian laws on land and water.  Neil 
MacNaughtan worked as the Game and Fisheries Overseer for the Parry Sound district from 
1920 until 1946.  He often walked a line between enforcement of the region‟s fish and game laws 
and listening to discontented locals complain about insufficient or unfair enforcement of 
Canada‟s fishery legislation.  Often American fishermen and tourists were the source of local 
complaints.  A “large number of Americans were here this summer and treated our game law as a 
joke” complained a resident of Dwight, Ontario in the fall of 1925.  The American tourists had 
been overheard bragging “that they had never been asked for and never had a license.”  Shortly 
thereafter they were safely across the border in the United States.
91
  Abuse by recreational 
anglers was a growing occurrence.  Many Canadians considered American tourists notorious for 
breaking Canadian catch laws.  “They can catch as many fish as they like and shoot all the deer 
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they like” complained Pickerel River resident Angus Prisk.92  An innkeeper in Muskoka, Ontario 
stated that some tourists were good sportsmen, and “others not, and either through ignorance or 
otherwise make a big catch of trout down to 5 or 6 inches and less.”  He said “It gets my goat 
when I see a string of the undersized trout caught” and stated when tourists made the mistake of 
showing him their undersized fish he did not hide his displeasure.
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Recreational fishermen from the United States were not the only ones garnering criticism 
in Ontario. It was common for commercial fishermen to cross international waters and fish 
illegally with nets.  In the early 1930s the Ontario Game and Fisheries Department in Toronto 
received numerous complaints about illegal netting by Americans in the Canadian waters of 
Lake Huron.  One complaint even originated from an American fisherman.
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The Canadian enforcement boat Miseford was subsequently dispatched on May 26
th
, 
1935 to inspect fishing waters near the international boarder.  The captain of the Miseford found 
a buoy numbered 245.  The buoy lacked a name as required by regulations.  The officer 
estimated the buoy at a full four miles inside Canadian waters.  He followed the nets and 
discovered them to be about seven miles in length, with no buoy marking the opposite end of the 
net.  The officer estimated the end of the net to be fully six miles within Canadian waters.  A 
total of fourteen boxes of gill nets were lifted and confiscated.  Within two months the Port 
Huron, Michigan based fisherman who had placed the nets wrote his Congressional 
representative in regard to the confiscation.  The constituent likely hoped added political pressure 
would convince Canadian authorities to return his nets.  He claimed his nets were two and a half 
miles west of the international boundary in U.S. waters.  After a series of exchanges between 
Canadian and American representatives and an internal investigation of the issue by Canadian 
authorities, Ontario‟s Lieutenant Governor H. A. Bruce wrote to the Secretary of State in Ottawa 
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and advised him of Ontario‟s decision.  Bruce said the Ontario Department of Game and 
Fisheries believed the officer‟s actions were fully justified and the department was prepared to 
present their evidence in any court of law.
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Americans were not the only fishermen who continued to profit through dubious means 
in the Canadian waters of Lake Huron.  At the turn of the century James and Charles Noble 
operated a commercial fishing enterprise running boats out of Killarney, Collingwood and other 
locations within Georgian Bay.  At the time Killarney was isolated.  It was fifty miles from the 
nearest railroad station and only accessible overland or by boat.  The Nobles caught, bought and 
sold fish and operated a general merchandise store that catered to the area fisheries.  The Nobles 
were widely suspected of numerous illegal fishing infractions.  By the late 1880s they were being 
monitored – such as they could be – by Canadian law enforcement.  In 1893 Pierre de 
Lamorandier, the local lighthouse keeper in Killarney, started supplying the Department of 
Marine and Fisheries with information about the Nobles‟ illegal activities.  At least two years of 
virulent harassment, intimidation and violence followed as the Nobles and their associates 
targeted Lamorandier and his family because of his willingness to work with authorities.
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The bay‟s insufficient number of patrol officers continued to try to enforce the fishing 
codes for the region.  In 1894, four of the Nobles‟ tugs were impounded when they were caught 
fishing without licenses.  Although the Nobles eventually secured the release of the fishing tugs 
they sued the Canadian Department of Marine and Fisheries for damages.  The Nobles, long time 
Canadian Conservatives, shrewdly courted the influence of the out of power Liberal opposition 
and their case subsequently became a political football in the Canadian House of Commons.  In 
1902 they were awarded $18,563 in damages.  At their height the Nobles were probably worth 
around $200,000, a very substantial sum for fishermen of the day.  Their financial power gave 
131 
  
them the ability to defend themselves against regulation at a level poorer fishermen could not 
achieve.  Following the Noble‟s political and financial victory over the Department of Marine 
and Fisheries locals claimed they were soon out violating the fishing laws all over again.
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Illegal netting continued to be a serious problem as the twentieth century progressed.  
Overseer MacNaughtan regularly heard from citizens complaining about illegal and out of 
season fishing both by locals and tourists.  Individual violations were most common.  For 
example, in April of 1927 a commercial tug operator complained that some gill net license 
holders along the North shore of Georgian Bay were fishing from row boats with seine nets and 
threatening the livelihood of legitimate gill net fishermen.
98
  During a patrol in May of 1931 
MacNaughtan confiscated a seine net from two fishermen operating without a license in 
Georgian Bay.
99
  While these small scale violations were the most frequent type officers 
encountered, more sophisticated criminal operations were occasionally discovered.  In May of 
1926 District Warden P. Stevenson sent MacNaughtan information from the office of the 
Minister of Game and Fisheries.  An illegal fishing and shipping operation was believed to be 
operating out of Point Au Baril, North of Parry Sound.  The perpetrators were illegally catching 
and delivering bass to area buyers.  Some of the catch was turning up in area restaurants.  
MacNaughtan was ordered to seize the operation‟s nets and shut the group‟s activities down.100 
Despite the efforts of Canadian authorities, many people were unconvinced they were 
doing enough to curb abuses within the fishery.  On July 12th of 1927 The Globe published a 
letter from one angry resident of Parry Sound.  “Times without number complaints and protests 
have been made. . .but thus far without any results” they charged.  “Illegal fishing is going on up 
and down the shore. . .The men engaged in it have grown so bold that they drive their stakes for 
132 
  
seines and other illegal methods openly. . .relying. . .on their complete immunity from 
interference.”101 
While MacNaughtan and other fish and game officials struggled to maintain the laws in 
their districts, a lack of sufficient manpower and equipment hampered travel and enforcement in 
the Canadian waters of Lake Huron.  MacNaughtan maintained detailed journals of his travels 
around the Georgian Bay region, much of it on foot.  Other barriers to enforcement also arose.  
In August of 1927 enforcement officials received a tip regarding illegal trap nets in use near the 
Limestone Islands East of Parry Sound in Georgian Bay.  Captain H. Gidley was ordered to 
Parry Sound.  He was instructed to cooperate with Overseer MacNaughtan in the seizure of the 
nets.  However, Gidley failed to show up.  His patrol boat was out of commission.
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At other times enforcement of conservation measures conflicted with basic subsistence 
practices.  In May of 1931 as most of North America shuddered under the aftershocks of the 
United States‟ stock market crash of 1929, Deputy Minister McDonald blasted members of his 
department for targeting hungry, impoverished people illegally fishing for something to eat.  He 
suggested officers “lay off” enforcing game laws on subsistence fishing intended to keep 
families from starving.  “It is this class of enforcement” he charged “that makes it difficult for 
the Department to maintain public sympathy in the interest of conservation.”103  Members of 
Ontario‟s First Nations were also targets of provincial enforcement.  Indians were expected to 
abide by the same laws as Ontario‟s other residents.  For example, while patrolling Shawanaga 
Township near Parry Sound in May of 1940, MacNaughtan twice seized fish from Indigenous 
fishermen.  They had been caught fishing during Ontario‟s closed season.104 
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Not all Canadians were convinced illegal fishing caused the decline in fishing fortunes.  
The same day The Globe ran its angry letter, the Georgian Bay Tourist Company of Midland, 
Ontario wrote to Deputy Minister McDonald to congratulate his department for their 
“exceptionally good work” controlling illegal fishing and to point out what they believed were 
the real threat to stocks of desirable fish.  They believed suckers and carp bore the primary 
responsibility for declines in other species.  The company representative claimed he watched a 
large number of suckers ravage a bass spawning bed while he was on a houseboat.  The company 
offered to operate under a government bond in order to assist authorities in the destruction of the 
undesirable fish.  If something was not done quickly, they warned, “the waters will have 
practically no game fish.”105 
Overfishing remained a serious problem as well.  During MacNaughtan‟s tenure with the 
Ontario Department of Game and Fisheries the issue of overfishing sometimes worked to shape 
policies on the local level.  For example, in April of 1926 Byng Inlet fisherman Joe Hubert was 
denied a license to fish in Georgian Bay with a pound net.  The department stated that the area in 
question was “already overfished.” 106  Hubert reapplied in May, changing his request to a gill 
netter license and switching to a slightly different region in the bay.  He also included some 
additional information related to illegal seining he had witnessed, perhaps hoping to positively 
influence his request.
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Canada‟s sport fishermen and the tourist enterprises that served their needs were anxious 
to push commercial netters away from the streams and rivers recreational fishermen used.  The 
records for the Parry Sound region demonstrate the conflict that simmered between commercial 
fishermen and sport fishing interests.  The same year Hubert initially failed to secure a license 
for Byng Inlet another pound net operator came into conflict with a local recreational fishing 
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club that catered to tourists.  The club began to complain to government officials about the effect 
commercial pound nets were having on the sport fishery.  The pound net operator responded that 
he saw his own livelihood threatened by “those yankee.”108  In January of 1927 C.W. West and 
Son complained to MacNaughtan of “fishing dropping off at an alarming rate” due to 
commercial nets that were placed near the mouths of the French and Bad Rivers in Georgian 
Bay.  They worried about the impact the loss of fish would have on the region‟s tourist 
industry.
109
  Similarly, N. L. Martin, the secretary-treasurer of the Hartley Bay Club asked the 
Deputy Minister of Game and Fisheries to investigate a commercial fisherman believed to be 
ruining the fishing for the club‟s tourists.110  All around Georgian Bay, clubs and other 
businesses that catered to the growing sport fishing industry complained about the numbers of 
fish being taken by commercial netters. 
Within the Canadian commercial fisheries individual profitability varied widely.  In 1920 
the Pillgrem brothers fished near the mouth of the French River on Georgian Bay, in the vicinity 
of the Bustard Islands.  They ran a four man crew on a nearly twenty-seven ton fishing tug.  
They valued their tug at approximately five thousand dollars.  They had sixty thousand yards of 
gill nets valued at an additional five thousand dollars.  In 1920 they hauled in an estimated 
38,900 pounds of Whitefish valued at 10 ¾ cents a pound Canadian, or $4,181.75.  They also 
caught 25,660 pounds of trout sold at the same price per pound for a total of $2,758.45.  
Together their grand total for the year was $6,940.20 Canadian.
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Contrasting the better equipped tug boat fishermen were men like W.R. Wallace.  
Wallace valued his unpowered boat at thirty dollars.  He had 2,500 yards of gill nets which he 
valued at $125.00.  In 1920 Wallace caught 650 pounds of trout which he sold salted at fourteen 
cents a pound.  He caught an additional 140 pounds of trout which he sold fresh for thirteen cents 
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a pound.  This put his total profit for the season at $109.20.
112
  These numbers do not take into 
consideration gear purchases and upkeep, fuel, license fees and other additional costs. 
 Michigan regulations and a renewed call for cooperative management 
 
Michigan‟s commercial fishery was the largest of the Great Lakes states.  Surrounded by 
freshwater along most of its borders, Michigan hosted commercial netters who operated in Lakes 
Erie, Huron, Michigan and Superior.  In 1859 the approximate value of the Great Lakes 
commercial fishing catch was $900,000. $650,000 of that total originated from Michigan waters.  
In the first half of the twentieth century Michigan produced more freshwater commercial fishes 
than any other US state.  In 1934 Michigan produced 18.8 percent of the United States‟ 
freshwater commercial fishes.  Among the Great Lakes states, Michigan produced 30.8 percent 
of the total catch that year.  At that time Lake Huron was regarded as the most import 
commercial repository among Michigan‟s lakes.  For example, from 1931-35 Lake Huron 
accounted for 52.2 percent of the total commercial yield for Michigan.  Lake Michigan was a 
distant second, at 28.5 percent.  Despite the large hauls, populations of fishes in Michigan‟s 
waters were declining.  New and modified fishing gear and increased mechanization improved 
efficiency and helped sustain catch numbers as overall fish populations declined.  As the years 
rolled by, the situation continued to worsen.  In 1937 Dr. John Van Oosten, director of the Great 
Lakes Biological Laboratory in Ann Arbor, Michigan stated “the formerly abundant fisheries of 
the State of Michigan, at one time universally believed to be inexhaustible, have been depleted 
and in many localities exterminated.” 113 
 
 
136 
  
As the decline continued, so did various attempts to create some sort of cooperative 
framework for better managing the fisheries.  On March 3, 1927 representatives from several 
Great Lakes states as well as from Canada met in Michigan to discuss how they might better 
share information and improve cooperation.  As a result of the meeting the International 
Fisheries Conservation Council of the Great Lakes was formed.
114
  The first conference was 
followed by another meeting the following year.  On February 8, 1928 the Second Great Lakes 
Fisheries Conference met in Lansing, Michigan.  The meeting was organized by Michigan 
Governor Fred W. Green.  Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania and 
Wisconsin all sent representatives.  While several states had neglected to send a representative to 
the previous year‟s meeting, Minnesota was the only state bordering the Great Lakes system that 
failed to send a representative to the 1928 meeting.  Two representatives from Ontario also 
attended the 1928 conference.  The meeting focused on relations between the states and the 
Province of Ontario.  Attendees shared information from their respective regions and discussed 
how they could all collaborate in managing the lakes.  Governor Green warned that without 
cooperation the fisheries faced “annihilation.”115  
Dr. John Van Oosten, director of the then newly established Great Lakes Biological 
Laboratory was among the attendees.  Van Oosten‟s laboratory was established in response to 
dramatic declines in Lake Erie‟s profitable cisco fishery.  Van Oosten would go on to devote 
forty-two years of his life working in the United States Bureau of Fisheries and the United States 
Fish and Wildlife Service.  During his long career he authored over ninety scientific papers and 
worked diligently to better understand and thus improve management of the fisheries of the 
Great Lakes.
116
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Van Oosten warned that despite the discouraging trends in fish populations, recent 
surveys of the lakes‟ fishermen exposed a continuing resistance to any suggestion of new 
regulations.  Fishermen who operated on Lake Erie were especially vociferous in their rejection 
of the idea.  “The dissension among the Lake Erie fishermen” he stated “has reached the point 
where all efforts put forth at the present time to effect cooperation in the framing of regulatory 
measures are practically doomed to failure.”117 He recommended an impartial investigation of all 
of their objections.  He believed finding the solutions to their grievances might lead to the 
development of uniform regulations not only for Lake Eerie, but for all of the Great Lakes.  Lake 
Erie fishermen pointed to pollution, bull and trap nets, small net mesh sizes, the number of nets 
employed and predatory blue walleye feeding on herring eggs as the various causes of that lake‟s 
decline in choice marketable species.
118
  Blue walleye, a subspecies of yellow walleye, were 
driven extinct by the fisheries a few short decades later.
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The attendees discussed the rise in fishing gear and nets in the lakes as well as the decline 
of various fishes.  They conferred about methods for improving their systems for obtaining 
statistics on fish populations.  Different localities tracked fish populations differently and used 
some species names interchangeably.  For example, the United States Bureau of Fisheries 
included statistics on chubs, bloaters and lake herrings (ciscoes) together under the heading 
ciscoes.  Ontario included chubs and bloaters under herrings.  Most attendees at the meeting said 
they were willing to modify the way in which they gathered statistics in order to make them 
more uniform.  However, they voiced concerns about the reliability of fishermen to record them 
consistently.
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Despite the eagerness of most attendees to share concerns related to their individual 
regions, disagreements and age old competitiveness arose when the meeting turned to the stickier 
topic of harmonizing individual laws and regulations.  Toronto‟s Inspector of game and 
Fisheries, H.G. Cox, was asked what Canada‟s minimum size restriction was on yellow pickerel.  
What Canadians often called yellow pickerels were known as walleyes in the United States.  
“Fifteen inches” he responded.121  The representative from New York stated that would equate to 
about a pound in weight.  Someone in the room then accused Cox‟s government of dragging its 
feet on instituting strong regulations.  “Hasn‟t your commission been promising to come up to a 
pound and a half and you never came to it.  I understand it has been promised for the last six or 
eight years.”  Cox explained that they would adjust their regulations when the states modified 
theirs as well.  He went on to point out that Canada had maintained a true closed season on 
whitefish, salmon and trout for years.  Every year Canadian fishermen petitioned the government 
to lift the closure because the American states had no such closed season and operated freely 
while Canadian fishermen sat idle.  Ignoring Cox‟s salient point, an American delegate 
continued the rebuke.  “You are making hijackers out of our fishermen because they don‟t like to 
throw away pound fish and have your fishermen take them.” 122   
The meeting underscored the divided interests at play in the lakes.  Some attendees 
claimed they were unable or unwilling to impose certain changes on their fishermen.  The 
divisions between the U.S. States and the Federal Government as well as Ontario and the 
Dominion Government were also apparent.  While the Dominion Government in Canada did not 
arbitrarily pass fisheries laws without input from the provinces, it carried the ultimate legislative 
authority.  J. A. Rodd, a representative from the Department of Marines and Fisheries in Ottawa 
stated “The absolute power to make fisheries regulations rests with the government. . .So far as 
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making the laws, that is done by the Dominion Government.”123  That reality contrasted sharply 
with the chorus of regional interests and claims represented by the several states.  The U.S. 
States had enjoyed a longstanding ability to regulate the fisheries as they saw fit without 
significant intervention from Washington.  Governor Green called the conference together a third 
time on December 5
th
 of that same year.  One of the biggest successes of the conference was the 
increased awareness of the importance of good recordkeeping.  Other states adopted more 
detailed records, likely influenced by the pioneering work in Michigan.  Aside from some 
informal agreements on fish and mesh sizes and on the need for improved pollution control, little 
cooperative intervention developed in the immediate aftermath of the meetings.
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In May of 1933 the Smith Brothers, commercial fishermen out of Port Washington, 
Wisconsin visited some fishing ports along Lake Huron.  They recorded that the area fishermen 
were financially struggling.  Fishing returns were poor.  The Smith Brothers claimed that 
fishermen they talked to were in general favorable to increased restrictions on mesh sizes as a 
way of protecting the fishery.  Nonetheless, the Smith Brothers worried that they were 
witnessing “the beginning of the end” for the commercial industry.125  With profits tumbling 
fishermen scrambled to maximize their catches even as they worried about a complete collapse 
of the fisheries.  The Great Lakes were at a critical juncture that demanded sweeping changes to 
the status quo.   
For decades the various U.S. States and many Federal officials believed hatcheries could 
offset declines in the numbers of various fishes.  Michigan‟s first state hatchery was built at 
Pokagon, Michigan in 1873.
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  Numerous others followed.  The hatcheries in turn often worked 
with fishermen to obtain spawn from caught fishes.  However, by the early twentieth century it 
was evident hatcheries alone were not capable of filling the growing population voids in 
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commercialized species of fish.  The Michigan Legislature established the first statewide closed 
season in 1897.
127
  However, spawn licenses allowed fishermen to collect spawn for the 
hatcheries during the closed season.  It was an open invitation to continue fishing.  Fishermen 
were expected to turn in spawn to collection stations.  The early closed seasons were designed to 
provide some protection to lake fishes during their spawning times.  The Michigan Department 
of Conservation developed its early restrictions based on the varying depths and temperatures of 
the lakes around Michigan and how those factors appeared to affect the spawning cycle.  Many 
commercial fishermen resisted what legislation existed and continued to fight for minimal 
regulations.  In 1929 the State of Michigan passed legislation that declared fishes inhabiting state 
waters to be property of the state.  Trout fishing on Lake Huron was closed from October 10
th
 to 
November 4
th
.  On Lake Michigan it was closed from October 20 to November 22
nd
.
128
  One 
angry fisherman expressed his dismay over the longer closed season on Lake Michigan saying: 
I will agree that there may be a different time that the fish in different 
lakes might spawn but I do not believe that it takes longer for our trout to spawn 
in Michigan than in Huron and Superior.  Is it fair that we have these extra eight 
days?
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 In 1925 Fred A. Westerman became chief of Michigan‟s Fisheries Division in the 
Department of Conservation.  Westerman directed the unit for the following thirty-four years.  
Westerman‟s father John H. Westerman also worked in the Michigan fisheries.  John H. 
Westerman first worked at a hatchery in Paris, Michigan and later served as the overseer for a 
state hatchery at Harrietta, Michigan until his death in 1923.  The elder Westerman discouraged 
his son from entering work with the fisheries.
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In 1933 the United States Bureau of Fisheries decided to close two spawning stations in 
the State of Michigan at Alpena and Charlevoix.  Westerman concurrently recommended 
strengthening Michigan‟s closed season laws.  He had observed a lot of abuses in the system.  He 
believed that some licensed commercial operators abused their freedom to fish during the 
spawning season and wasted a lot of by-catch that were not ready to spawn.  “I have for a long 
time held the belief” Westerman contended, “that it would be better to allow no fishing during 
the closed season, but rather allow the fish to spawn naturally.”131  Westerman developed a list of 
modifications to the existent closed seasons in Michigan waters.  Lake Huron‟s closed season for 
Lake Trout would continue to run from October 10 through November 4
th
, but with no fishing 
for lake trout during the closed season.   He made similar recommendations for the whitefish 
closed season running from November 5
th
 through December 15
th
.  Westerman believed 
sufficient spawn could be gathered for the state‟s hatchery operations just after the closed 
seasons ended.  His recommendations were approved on September 6
th
.
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That same year, a further proposal by the Michigan Department of Conservation to 
classify lake trout as a sport fish raised objections within the commercial fisheries.  Individual 
fishermen expressed their opposition to the plan, worrying that such a maneuver could eventually 
threaten their ability to harvest various lake fishes.  Westerman attempted to assuage the fears of 
commercial operators by stating; 
We understand that a rumor has gained some circulation to the effect that 
lake trout were to be placed on the game fish list and their taking with nets for 
commercial purposes prohibited. . .the only possible direction such a movement 
may take might lead to the eventual closing of some local bay or area where such 
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trolling can be successfully carried on. It is preposterous to suppose that the Great 
Lakes will be closed to commercial fishing.
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Despite Westerman‟s reassurances, time was not on the side of the commercial fisheries.  
The century that opened with promise led instead to decades of failed proposals and continued 
abuse of dwindling lake resources.  Overfishing, a lack of managerial cooperation between 
various political entities, continued lakeshore industrialization and pollution, the added pressure 
and hostility of a competitive sport fishery and a host of other issues threatened to undermine and 
destroy both the commercial fishery and the resources it harvested.    In the environment of 
uncertainty fishermen scrambled to get all they could while there was still any money to be 
made.  The ecosystem of Lake Huron reeled under the massive scale of ongoing environmental 
change.     
The 1940s brought a time of new, unprecedented economic growth to the United States 
following the Great Depression.   The rapid economic recovery was stimulated by the material 
demands of World War II.  In the Great Lakes conservationist principles took a back seat to 
maximum food production in support of the war effort.  However, before the war in Europe and 
Asia was over conservationists and lake fishermen alike were outmaneuvered at home by a new 
species that had migrated into the interior Great Lakes.  Parasitic sea lampreys first entered Lake 
Erie via the Welland Canal over a decade earlier.  By the 1940s the species had spread through 
the interior lake system.  The number of lampreys in the lakes quickly multiplied.  The 
introduced parasite added its own significant environmental impact to the list of factors affecting 
populations of native Great Lakes fishes already struggling to survive.  Out of the chaos that 
followed a new and concerted effort to develop a cooperative international Great Lakes 
management system was born. 
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Chapter 4 - Invasive by design: nonindigenous species and the role 
of humankind in destabilizing the Great Lakes biome 
 The growing pains of Great Lakes market systems 
 
Numerous environmental changes in and around Lake Huron were fueled by the activities 
of human beings working within the commercial fisheries.  However, human beings affected the 
ecology of the lake in a variety of other ways as well.  In response, the nonhuman inhabitants of 
the lake reacted to human induced environmental change in a variety of ways.  The twentieth 
century brought a tide of widespread economic development to the basin.  The interlocking lakes 
and the industrial centers that dotted their shorelines provided a network of production and 
shipping centers linked via the lakes and their growing fleets of ships.  Enlargement and 
modernization of the waterways and canal systems connecting the interior lakes to the Saint 
Lawrence Seaway and Atlantic Ocean beyond promised a world of markets and goods to the 
ports of the Great Lakes states and the Province of Ontario. 
Massive construction projects meant to improve accessibility and fuel industrial growth 
throughout the basin opened the interior lakes to both intended and unintended consequences.  
Growing commercial activity led to a rapid increase in both the size of lake vessels and in lake 
surface traffic in general.  The desire for brisk economic development led to the construction of 
numerous harbors, canals and an overall industrialization of shoreline in many areas.  The desire 
for profit and the belief that human ideas of modern industrialization meant progress affected 
staggering physical changes throughout the Great Lakes Basin.  Sustained development caused 
widespread changes among the living inhabitants of the lakes.  Species experienced 
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displacement, migrations and population blooms and collapses. Manufactured connections 
between previously separated bodies of water led to the introduction of numerous nonindigenous 
species.  Unseen migrations of a growing number of non-indigenous aquatic species 
accompanied increased shipping and commercial saturation.  Canals and lock systems provided 
ready avenues to marine aquatic species capable of colonizing the interior freshwater lakes.  In 
addition, ballast water from oceanic shipping released large numbers of transported species into 
the interior lakes.  However, not all of the new introductions were accidental.  Humans had 
already acquired a history of introducing nonindigenous species to the Great Lakes in the hope of 
new species creating additional profitable populations for harvest. 
 The introduction of common carp 
 
An early candidate selected by the United States Federal Government for widespread 
dissemination into numerous North American freshwater systems was the common carp.  Carp 
were being widely distributed throughout the United States by the United States Fish 
Commission by the 1880s.  State agencies also began stocking carp.  It did not take long before 
carp were thriving in the Great Lakes.  In Canada carp may have spread into public waters after a 
dam broke in Newmarket, Ontario in 1896 and released carp from a pond into the nearby 
Holland River.
1
  Though the fish had a long history as a food source in both Asia and Europe, it 
was quickly relegated to the status of a rough fish in North America.  Carp did not obtain a high 
price per pound in the fisheries. They also proved destructive to pre-existing aquatic fauna.  It 
was not long before many were questioning the logic of the U.S. introductions.   
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James Gillingham, a commercial fisherman operating out of Bay Port Michigan said carp 
offered little advantage to fishermen but conceded they could if “there was a good market for 
them.”2  Edward Harris was a Canadian author and the former president of the popular Long 
Point Company, a private hunting and fishing preserve on Lake Erie.  In the late nineteenth 
century he worked as a commissioner for the Dominion of Canada gathering information on the 
Great Lakes fisheries.  Harris was a well known critic of waste in the commercial fisheries. He 
was especially critical of American fishermen.  Nor did Harris think much of the United States 
Government‟s decision to stock that nation‟s waterways with carp.  In his 1905 book Our Great 
Lake Fisheries: A Vanishing Heritage Harris charged that it required “the exaggerated 
descriptive talent, or hyperbole peculiar to the Americans to understand carp as a table luxury.”3  
Both Harris‟ book and The Mixer and Server, the official journal of the Hotel and Restaurant 
Employees International Alliance reprinted the following recipe in their respective publications 
in 1905; 
Proper Way To Prepare Carp. When fishing, if you catch a German carp, 
clean it and hang it out in the sun six weeks to dry, then nail it to a pine board and 
cover it thoroughly with salt or mud. Let it stand for two months longer and then 
bake it two days. Remove the nails, throw the carp over the back fence and eat the 
board, but never eat the carp.
4
 
In addition to the public‟s reluctance to view carp as a desirable food resource, the 
nonindigenous fish dramatically altered the environment of areas where they flourished.  Carp 
are omnivores, but prefer feeding along the bottom where they dig into the lakebed for plant 
roots and other materials.  As a result of their vigorous feeding habits, large expanses of aquatic 
plants that provide shelter and habitat for other aquatic life are uprooted and killed.
5
  Water 
157 
  
where carp thrived became cloudy.  Increased sediments in the water meant less sunlight 
penetrating beyond the surface and thus less favorable conditions for lakebed plants to replenish 
themselves.  Carp can affect other species in a myriad of additional ways as well.  They can 
directly compete for resources, damage spawning areas with their feeding activities, decrease the 
hunting efficiency of vision dependent fishes and reduce the level of dissolved oxygen in the 
water that other fish breathe through their gills.
6
 
 Smelts 
 
Smelts were originally introduced as a food source for planted salmon. On April 6
th
 of 
1912 salmon and smelt eggs were planted in Benzie County at Crystal Lake. Smelts were soon 
thriving in the lakes.
7
  In 1936 Dr. John Van Oosten labeled smelt a “problem of major 
proportions” and predicted they would require coordinated state, federal and provincial 
intervention.
7
  Smelt populations were initially regarded as a menace by commercial fishermen.  
The food of the adult smelt is usually young fishes and insect larva. . .it is 
easy to understand that the smelt will disturb the balance of nature in the fisheries 
in several important respects, both as a competitor and as an enemy.
8
 
In February 1932 smelt were creating problems for commercial fishermen in the waters 
off of Green Bay, Wisconsin.  Fishing nets were becoming clogged with the small fish.  
Individual smelt attached to gill nets with their teeth and then were unable to free themselves.  
Nets filled with smelt prevented other marketable species from being caught in desirable 
numbers.  Some believed the small size of smelts ensured they would not have significant market 
value.
9
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After their introduction in 1912 smelts gradually spread throughout the Great Lakes 
system, spawning in the millions in the streams and tributaries of the lakes.  They were initially 
considered an undesirable pest by people working in the fisheries.  Commercial fishermen 
believed smelt would have a negative effect on their trade.  By February of 1936 smelt were 
confirmed in the far western end of Lake Superior, completing their migration through the entire 
Great Lakes system.
10
 
Despite the initial warnings of fisheries experts, smelt eventually proved valuable to the 
fisheries.  When Great Lakes fish markets began to experiment with selling smelt the small fish 
proved to be a popular item. By 1935 the commercial fisheries were changing their tune.  They 
reported that smelt had shown a “great increase as a market fish.”  Over a million pounds were 
harvested, with a total value somewhere between $30,000 and $50,000.  In Delta County in 
Michigan‟s Upper Peninsula, 219 tons of smelt had been taken from streams.11 
By the 1940s four to five million pounds of smelt were being harvested each year by 
commercial fishermen.  Approximately twice as many were taken by recreational fishermen 
around the Great Lakes.
12
  When a huge die-off occurred in the winter of 1942-43 the reaction 
was not relief, but alarm as the former nuisance had proven itself both a desirable game fish and 
useful as a commercial species.  Two years later the effects of the “mysterious disaster” (which 
may have been caused by a water born fungus), had passed and high numbers of smelt were once 
again part of the commercial fisheries‟ harvests.13 
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 The Welland Canal 
 
In addition to the intentional introduction of non-indigenous species, numerous other 
species were granted access or transported into the interior Great Lakes through human 
environmental modifications.  One of the most significant vectors for introducing new species is 
the Welland Ship Canal.  The canal cuts across the Ontario‟s Niagara Peninsula.  The peninsula 
extends East between the northern coast of Lake Erie and the southern shoreline of Lake Ontario, 
meeting western New York at Buffalo.  The Niagara River serves as the border between the two 
countries at that juncture.  The river also provided an impassable barrier to shipping heading 
south from Lake Ontario or North from Lake Erie.   
Beginning in 1829 the Welland Canal served as a bypass for shipping crossing between 
those lakes.  The canal provided shipping with a convenient way of circumventing Niagara Falls.  
Prior to the completion of the first Welland Canal ships had to unload their cargo at Queenston, 
Ontario.  The freight was then transported overland to Chippewa Creek south of the falls.  The 
decision was made to build a bypass around Niagara Falls.  The Welland Canal Company was 
formed under the leadership of William Hamilton Merit.  Upon completion of the original canal 
an American schooner and a British schooner sailed through the bypass.  The boats served as 
symbols of human triumph over the natural barrier to economic development.  The first canal 
could accommodate a maximum boat draft of about eight foot.  In 1841 the Government of 
Upper Canada purchased the canal.
 8
 
Further enlargements and modifications were completed in the 1840s, 50s and 80s.  
Horses were used to tow vessels through the canal until 1882, when enlargements made the use 
of tugs possible for almost all watercraft.  One ship, the four-masted schooner Minedosa was so 
large that horses still had to be used to haul it through the canal because there were not any tugs 
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small enough to fit in the locks along with the schooner.
9
  In 1887 dredging and other 
improvements deepened the canal sufficiently to accommodate 14 foot drafts.
10
  By 1900 the 
canal‟s route ran from Port Dalhousie on Lake Ontario, south to Port Colborne on Lake Erie.  In 
addition to being an important commercial route, the canal even became the target of domestic 
bombing.  On April 21, 1900 three men attempted to blow up lock number twenty-four at the 
town of Thorold.  The plot failed because the conspirators placed their dynamite in a container 
that floated and thus the explosion traveled upward from the water‟s surface and did not damage 
the lock.
11
 
As freight tonnages steadily rose agitation grew for a still larger canal system capable of 
handling the lengthening steel hulls of twentieth century cargo ships.   In 1913 construction 
began on a new canal route that followed the valley of the Ten Mile Creek across Ontario‟s 
Peninsula.  The primary entry point from Lake Ontario became Port Weller instead of Port 
Dalhousie.  The canal was deepened to twenty five feet and constructed in such a way as to make 
future dredging to accommodate thirty foot depths relatively easy.
12
  Construction proceeded 
slowly and was interrupted by World War I.  The project continued into the 1920s and early 30s.  
The new route was straighter and required less locks.  The work on the canal was arduous and 
demanding on both men and equipment.  The construction process was not without its tragedies.  
The worst occurred approximately four years before its completion.  On August 1
st
 1928 at Lock 
number six near Thorgold a crane sitting on the upper edge of the canal and engaged in lifting a 
heavy steel beam suddenly toppled over into the canal bed. The beam crashed into a huge steel 
lock gate weighing approximately three hundred tons.  The massive gate tumbled into the dry 
canal bed.  Nine workers were killed.  Twenty-three others were injured, twelve or thirteen of 
them seriously.
13
  Despite the accident and other setbacks, construction was finally completed in 
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1932.  The enlarged bypass was dubbed the Welland Ship Canal.  The 633 foot long SS 
Lemoyne, the largest ship then operating in the Great Lakes, became the first vessel to pass 
through its waters.
14
  Shipping grew exponentially.  The restructured Welland Ship Canal 
provided an enlarged and modernized route for international commerce traveling to and from the 
interior Great Lakes.   
The canal also served as an access point for what became a growing list of aquatic 
species that were not indigenous to the inland Great Lakes.  During the renovations the canal was 
again deepened and the numbers of locks were reduced making it easier for organisms to swim 
into the interior lakes.  The smaller schooners and wooden vessels of the past were gone.  New 
steel cargo ships of ever growing sizes dominated the regional and international commerce of the 
Great Lakes.  Increasing numbers of larger ships meant more opportunities for organisms 
attached to hulls to be carried into the interior.  Modern ships also carried and transported large 
quantities of ballast water.  Cargo ships utilize ballast water to compensate for their lighter 
weight when they are not carrying the heavy loads of cargo they are designed for.  Ballast water 
aides in keeping a ship level and stable in the water.  A ship will discharge water from its ballast 
tanks when it is loaded with cargo.  Ballast tanks on cargo ships operating in marine waters can 
contain organisms that are later released into Great Lakes when the ships discharge the contents 
of the tanks.  By the end of the twentieth century a host of newly introduced non-indigenous 
species were established in the Great Lakes.  Many of them hitch-hiked a ride in the ballast water 
of oceanic freighters.  Each new species brought its own set of environmental challenges to the 
lakes. 
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 Alewives 
Alewives were an early migrant into the interior lakes via the Welland Canal system.  
Alewives are a small schooling salt water fish.  Originally they were considered useless as a 
commercial species due to their diminutive size.  Within a few years they swarmed in the 
millions throughout the Great Lakes ecosystem and competed with other species for food 
sources.  Schools of alewives reached astronomical numbers in their new freshwater home.  They 
also proved to be rapacious resource competitors with other species of Great Lakes fishes.  For 
example, alewives were a primary catalyst in the population crash of bloater ciscoes in Lake 
Michigan during the 1960s and 1970s.  An emergency closure of the bloater fishery followed in 
1976.
15
 
By 1964 ninety percent of the fish in Lake Michigan by weight were alewives.  As 
alewives spread through the lakes planktivore communities in each successive lake of the 
alewives‟ migration fell into decline.  In addition to their predation on the foodstuffs of native 
fish species, alewives are highly destructive consumers of other species‟ spawn. The kidneys and 
liver of alewives are negatively affected by the freshwater environment to the extent that their 
populations occasionally experience mass die-offs in the Great Lakes.  Millions of rotting 
alewives littered the shores of nearby beaches after the periodic die-offs.
27  
While alewives 
inflicted staggering changes on the interior lake environments, sea lampreys were the most 
infamous of the numerous new species introduced through the Welland Canal. 
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 The origins of sea lampreys in Lake Huron 
 
Sea lampreys were one of the numerous species introduced to the lakes as a result of the 
modernized Welland Ship Canal.  Lampreys quickly became the most well known new species 
to commercial fishermen and state, federal and provincial conservationists.  The Canadian 
Department of Marine and Fisheries was formed in 1867.  England born E.E. Prince, a specialist 
in fish embryology, was appointed as Canada‟s Commissioner of Fisheries in 1893.  Prince 
subsequently lobbied for the establishment of a marine biological station for fisheries research.  
The idea was further discussed at the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science at Toronto in 1897.  With the assistance from a government grant, the Marine Biological 
Station of Canada was opened at St. Andrews, New Brunswick in 1899.  The Georgian Bay 
Biological Station followed in 1901.  Professor B. Arthur Bensley was curator of the new station.  
A Pacific Coast station was opened in 1907.  In 1912 Canada‟s research stations were placed 
under the authority of the newly created Biological Board of Canada.
 16
  The research center 
generated a great deal of scientific data on the fish and fauna of the bay region.  Unlike much of 
the scientific work being done related to hatcheries and fisheries statistics in the United States, 
the Georgian Bay station focused on life histories of various species as well as taxonomic work 
with various species.
17
  Research papers were published on various fishes, insects, plants and 
fungi.   
Professor Bensley, an associate professor of Zoology at the University of Toronto, 
compiled research of the region‟s fishes and published his research in 1915.  Bensley‟s work 
included an early discussion of Great Lakes lampreys.  He concluded there were then two species 
of lampreys that were active in Georgian Bay.  Several silver lamprey had been removed from 
the Go Home River east of Honey Harbour.  The immature lamprey ranged from four to six 
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inches in length.  Bensley estimated that adults would reach maximum lengths of ten to twelve 
inches based on his findings and the research of other scientists.  Bensley also included a second 
lamprey species which he called lake lamprey.  While Bensley did not have any actual 
specimens, he had heard accounts from fishermen who claimed they caught fish with lampreys 
up to fifteen inches in length attached to them.  These lamprey were believed to be too big to be 
silver lamprey.  Bensley theorized that they may have been accidentally introduced and that 
factor could account for their low numbers.
18
  Historian Margaret Bettie Bogue suggested 
Bensley‟s lake lampreys may have been sea lampreys that had traveled through the Trent-Severn 
Waterway – a man-made waterway which linked the Trent River, which drains into Lake 
Ontario, with the Severn River, which drains into Georgian Bay.  This hypothesis was an 
interesting one, which brought into question the Welland Canal as the original vector for sea 
lamprey migrations.  A similar hypothesis was brokered by Isobel Radforth in 1944 and was later 
considered and dismissed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.
19
  There are several 
factors that eliminate the Trent-Severn Waterway as a possible vector. 
The Department of the Interior dismissed the notion because of the complexities and 
obstructions present in the Trent-Severn system.  Even more convincing is the fact that 
throughout the twentieth century sea lampreys were unknown in the majority of the Trent-Severn 
Waterway east of the Big Chute Marine Railway.  In fact, the Big Chute Marine Railway, a 
critical connection in waterway, was not even operational until 1918, several years after 
Bensley‟s supposed sea lampreys were found in the lake.20  Decades later plans to update Big 
Chute with locks were scrapped because the railway proved itself a formidable barrier to lamprey 
migration.  Additionally, the Trent-Severn Waterway did not begin regular service through its 
many locks until 1920.  The remarkable success sea lampreys seemed to enjoy from the moment 
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they were conclusively identified in Lake Huron also suggests they were not introduced years 
earlier.  Once they were conclusively identified in Lake Huron their populations quickly 
skyrocketed.   
Sea Lampreys were first verified in Lake Erie in 1921.  In 1933 G. C. Toner published an 
updated list of Georgian Bay fishes.  While Toner acknowledged the presence of silver lampreys, 
he found no record of the larger species mentioned in Bensley.
21
  If sea lampreys were already in 
Lake Huron at the time of Bensley‟s writing, they should have been relatively easy to locate by 
1933.  Ironically, by the time Toner‟s research was actually published the first sea lampreys were 
likely in Lake Huron.  Lake Huron‟s first lampreys migrated west from the Welland Ship Canal 
through Lake Erie.  Sea lamprey did not enter Lake Huron via the Trent-Severn Waterway. 
Understanding the origins of sea lampreys in the interior lakes was also muddled by the 
early notion of a larger variety of freshwater lampreys.  Was Bensley‟s larger variety of lamprey 
an unidentified native species?  Freshwater lampreys were believed to be a distinct species from 
silver lamprey.  What about the notion of a larger, freshwater lake lamprey species?  In the 1918 
edition of Copeia David Starr Jordon discussed lake lampreys.  Jordan referenced a variety 
inhabiting Cayuga Lake in New York, part of Lake Ontario‟s drainage system. 22  Is it possible 
there was a larger lake lamprey that was indigenous to the interior Great Lakes prior to the 
arrival of sea lampreys?  Even more convincing than scattered early accounts, recent 
Mitochondrial DNA testing suggests that the lampreys of Lake Ontario are native to that lake.  If 
so, decades of assumptions about Lake Ontario‟s lamprey populations and by extension the 
foundation for control efforts in that lake may be wrong.
23
   Was there a distinct variety of 
freshwater lamprey, larger than the known silver lampreys, inhabiting the inner lakes prior to the 
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migration of sea lampreys in the twentieth century?  Did those original lampreys die out or were 
they absorbed into a possibly genetically similar native species from Lake Ontario? 
Similar Despite the intriguing possibilities, the most likely scenario is also, perhaps, the 
most obvious.  The fishermen reporting to Bensley likely caught fish with large lampreys 
attached to them, but the parasites they captured were freshwater silver lamprey that had attained 
their maximum adult size.  Bensley believed silver lamprey grew to a maximum of ten to twelve 
inches in length.
24
  Subsequent research has shown that silver lampreys are capable of reaching 
lengths greater than fifteen inches.  Bensley had estimated the lengths of the lampreys reported to 
him at fifteen inches.  Adult sea lamprey can reach lengths of over 35 inches.  If someone had 
reported a parasite of that length it likely would have shown up in Bensley‟s report.  Thus, 
reports of large freshwater lampreys distinct from silver lampreys in Lake Huron were likely 
nothing more than cases of mistaken identity.  This is not to suggest Lake Ontario‟s sea lampreys 
are not an indigenous species to that lake and the primary source for the subsequent colonization 
of the interior lakes.  It only means the interior lakes were free of sea lampreys until their 
migration through the Welland Canal. 
Perhaps no species introduced to the interior lakes has caused greater concern nor 
generated more cooperative control efforts than sea lampreys.  The first verified sea lamprey in 
Lake Erie was taken at Merlin, Ontario on November 8
th
, 1921.  In May of 1932 spawning sea 
lampreys were verified in Michigan‟s Huron River on the western end of Lake Erie.  This 
suggested the lake had been colonized from end to end in about eleven years.  Writing for 
Copeia in 1932, Charles Creaser of the Colleges of Detroit warned that the sea lamprey, along 
with another recently introduced species, the smelt, would “act as great disturbers of the natural 
balance of the large fisheries.”25  During the 1930s large numbers of fishermen around Lake 
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Huron complained about fish damaged by lamprey wounds.
26
  Subsequent complaints of marked 
fishes led eventually to a confirmed spawning run in the Ocqueoc River in 1937.
27
  By 1936 
lampreys had penetrated the inner lakes at least as far as Milwaukee, Wisconsin on Lake 
Michigan.  In 1938 the first lampreys were confirmed in Lake Superior.
28
  Sea lampreys had 
devastating effects on the imperiled fishery in subsequent years.  The added demands of 
lampreys on populations of fishes already under heavy pressure by commercial fishing 
operations proved devastating.  Between 1945 and 1948 the commercial fishery for lake trout in 
Lakes Huron and Michigan collapsed.  While trout fisheries in those lakes went into a tailspin, 
sea lampreys spread into Lake Superior via the St. Marys River.  Large numbers of wounded 
fishes and lampreys were then caught in Lake Superior as well.
29
 
 The troubled waters of the 1930s 
 
In Canada the Biological Board established research stations on both coasts and in 
Georgian Bay.  While the Georgian Bay station produced some remarkable research of the 
region, its efforts at improving understanding of the bay‟s inhabitants had little demonstrative 
affect on the day-to-day operations of the commercial fisheries.  The Georgian Bay station was 
closed in 1914.  Bensley went on to establish the Ontario Fisheries Research Laboratory in 1924 
at the University of Toronto. He focused his energies on the smaller, inland lakes of Canada. 
By the 1930s there was widespread recognition that the marketable fishes of the Great 
Lakes were in serious peril.  Overfishing via a vast array of gradually improving technologies 
had strained populations of whitefish, lake trout, herrings and others to the breaking point.  With 
the introduction of sea lamprey and other non-native competitors to the freshwater lakes, the 
downward population spirals accelerated into a vortex that threatened to finally destroy what 
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economically profitable species remained and finally sink the struggling commercial fishing 
industries that depended on them.  A growing sense of urgency and desperation motivated 
national, regional and local governments toward the development of a cooperative management 
plan to save the fishing industries.  The various regional and international conferences of past 
decades had accumulated significant data and offered numerous recommendations, but by 1930 
little tangible change had been instituted.   
In the 1930s there were a series of efforts, both regional and international, to harmonize 
management of the various lakes.  On December 20
th
, 1929 representatives from Michigan and 
Ontario met in Toronto, Canada at an informal conference.  They discussed their different 
approaches to resource management on Lake Huron.  A second conference between 
representatives from both Michigan and Ontario occurred in Toronto in March of 1936.  
Attendees sought to develop a uniform approach to managing the lake.  While a tentative 
agreement to work toward uniform regulations was struck at the 1936 meeting, it languished in 
abeyance and ultimately went nowhere.
30
  
Wisconsin‟s Conservation Director also organized a meeting of regional representatives 
for the purposes of creating a more uniform system of management for Lake Michigan in 
January of 1933.  The effort went nowhere.  In 1936 another conference was held at Chicago for 
the purposes of creating cooperative management over both lakes Michigan and Superior.  Once 
again the attendees left without widespread agreement, although Michigan and Illinois did pass 
some of the suggested legislation.
31
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The decade‟s first substantial international agreements at cooperative management did 
not result from efforts at joint or uniform management of the entire Great Lakes Basin.  The first 
apparent success at an international agreement was related specifically to Lake Erie.  In 1931 a 
conference was organized by New York State‟s Commissioner of Conservation.  The conference 
was intended to foster harmonization in the management of Lake Erie‟s shared waters.  The 
International Lake Erie Advisory Committee was formed as a result.  The committee included 
one representative from each of the states bordering the lake, the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries and 
the Province of Ontario.  In 1933 the committee developed a list of five proposed management 
recommendations.  Incredibly, all of the recommendations save one were approved by each 
represented locale.  It was the first time the states and the Province of Ontario had successfully 
negotiated uniform regulations on their own.  For a moment it looked as if a model for future 
cooperation had been developed.  It was not to be.  The following year the State of New York 
withdrew from the agreement, bowing to local political resistance to unified closed seasons.  In 
October of that year another meeting of the committee was held.  Additional signatories decided 
to follow New York‟s lead.  Before the meeting was over the treaty was abrogated entirely and 
the committee dissolved.  On April 27
th
, 1937 the representatives met again and decided that any 
efforts at cooperative management of the lakes were a pointless undertaking due to the lack of 
widespread public support and the continued resistance of commercial fishermen.
32
 
Outside of the Great Lakes commercial fisheries support for Federal intervention and 
cooperative management remained strong.  The organization‟s resolutions calling for 
management beyond the state level continued into the 1930s.  Beginning in 1891 the American 
Fisheries Society repeatedly recommended that the United States Federal Government assume 
control over the lake fisheries.  The Fourth International Fisheries Congress met in Washington 
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D.C. in 1908.  They recommended Federal control of the Great Lakes fisheries.  At its national 
convention in May of 1937 The Izaak Walton League of America adopted resolutions urging 
international control of the Great Lakes fisheries.
33
  Numerous other organizations and 
government representatives similarly continued to push for U.S. Federal or international 
intervention in the management of the Great Lakes. 
While efforts at cooperative state and international management repeatedly stalled, 
professional scientific research of the lakes and their fishes continued.  In the United States the 
focal point of fisheries research and its resultant management strategies gradually evolved 
beyond its nineteenth century roots focused on hatcheries and statistical surveys.  Dr. John Van 
Oosten was at the forefront of Great Lakes fisheries research from the late 1920s until after the 
end of World War II.  Like Bensley over a decade earlier, Van Oosten was studying 
classification and the life history of fishes at the University of Michigan in the 1920s.  The Great 
Lakes Biological Laboratory was established in 1927.  Van Oosten was appointed director of the 
new facility.  The laboratory had grown from a wellspring of agitation following the collapse of 
the cisco fishery in Lake Erie in 1925.
34
  Van Oosten was also head of Great Lakes Fisheries 
investigations within the Department of Commerce and later the Department of the Interior. 
Sufficient funding for the laboratory‟s research was slow to develop.  Van Oosten often 
struggled with financial shortfalls and insufficient staff.  In the years leading up to World War II 
he was able to occasionally augment his resources through project grants.  For example, in order 
to complete a 1938 statistical and biological study of the Great Lake fisheries Oosten applied for 
a $2,500 grant through Roosevelt‟s Works Progress Administration.35   
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During the subsequent war financial support for fisheries research was especially slim.  In 
November of 1943 Van Oosten requested that the Fish and Wildlife Service publish a paper he 
had completed on the effect deep trap nets on populations of whitefish.  Edward W. Bailey, the 
acting Chief of Fishery Biology at Chicago gave him discouraging news.  Bailey informed him 
there was practically no chance of his work being published.  The law mandated that certain 
materials be published, and the Fish and Wildlife Service lacked the funds to publish those 
materials.  The basic day to day operational expenses of various offices could not be met if 
research was published.
36
  During the summer of 1946 Van Oosten complained “Numerous past 
researches on the Great Lakes have lost much of their usefulness because their results were 
published too late or not at all.”37 
Throughout Van Oosten‟s tenure as head of Great Lakes Fisheries Investigations a lack 
of sufficient political interest and financial support hindered the accumulation and dissemination 
of critical biological data and undermined even the most basic efforts at imbuing lake 
management with twentieth century conservation theories.  Despite the serious shortcomings, 
Van Oosten and a slowly growing list of other Great Lakes scientists began to make inroads into 
the veil of ignorance surrounding the fisheries of the Great Lakes.  Under Van Oosten‟s guidance 
numerous new scientific studies of various aspects of the Great Lakes fishes and the commercial 
fisheries were completed.  When on May 18
th, 1939 Fred Westerman of Michigan‟s Department 
of Conservation phoned Van Oosten asking about research being done related to Michigan‟s 
coastal waters, he was sent a lengthy list of current projects that were either ongoing or recently 
completed.  Investigations had been done of several major bays around the state, including 
Saginaw Bay.  Van Oosten‟s office was examining the ongoing effects of deep sea trolling in 
Lakes Michigan and Superior.  Ongoing investigations were being completed related to size 
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restrictions on certain fishes, the effect of non-native smelts on other lake fishes and the effects 
of baited hooks on populations of young fish.
38
 
Despite fisheries research in the United States branching off into numerous new 
directions and an evolution in the equipment and methods used to gather data, the primary goal 
remained support of a profitable fishery through conservation.  However, even meager 
conservation efforts often met with organized and powerful resistance.  In December of 1933 
fishermen met in Chicago to discuss a Federal Great Lakes Fishery Code being developed by 
Van Oosten and others.  At the meeting Van Oosten was approached by the meetings organizers.  
He was asked not to speak about the code.  Instead, they requested he only make general 
comments.  He was subsequently barred from attending the small business sessions that took 
place at the conference.  The entire proceeding was facilitated by one Mr. Lambert, a 
representative of trap net fishermen out of Harbor Beach, Michigan and Chaired by John 
Schacht, a lawyer from Philadelphia.  “I am sure that you got the worst humiliation you ever 
received” Captain William Muntinga later wrote to Van Oosten.  “I sure felt sorry for you.  
Trying to be fair and good does not have any place with paid crooks and law violators” Muntinga 
said.  He informed Van Oosten that during the business session he attended Van Oosten‟s code 
was presented and then quickly cast aside.  The majority of attendees showed little interest in 
reading the recommendations, claiming they already knew them and then quickly voted them 
down.  A few fishermen pushed their own regional agendas at the meeting.  Muntinga said 
fishermen from Indiana and Illinois voiced support for a closed season everywhere except in 
their own fishing waters.  He claimed the meeting was held to support fishermen who wanted no 
conservation in the fisheries.  He said the fishermen were trying to design their own fishing 
codes that would protect violators from existing state laws.
39
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A series of letters were sent to various Congressional representatives from various 
fishermen opposed to the proposed code.  For example, the following June A.H. Matt, General 
Manager of the Huron Fish Company in Huron, Michigan appealed to his Congressman to block 
the passage of a uniform fishery code.  Matt argued that the individual states were better able to 
manage the fisheries than Federal officials in Washington.  He said the United State Bureau of 
Fisheries was taking away the rights of the states to regulate their fisheries.  He claimed any new 
size restrictions on caught fish would cause ninety percent of the commercial fisheries operations 
to close within one year and means the loss of thousands of jobs.
40
  Martin Tansey wrote in from 
Vermilion, Ohio in support of the proposed code.  Tansey said something needed to be done to 
stem the tide of undersized fish being caught and destroyed in trap nets.
41
  The proposed code did 
not include any limitations on mesh sizes.  The focus was on legislating minimum sizes for 
various species fishes.  The restrictions were to be uniform for all of the Great Lakes.  Bureau of 
Fisheries Commissioner Frank T. bell said he was hopeful that state legislation would cover the 
areas the proposed code did not address.
42
  The code was ultimately defeated.  Van Oosten 
claimed many fishermen supported the proposed federal code, but lamented that a minority of 
fighting “pirates” successfully derailed any chance of it becoming law.43  While the proposed 
regulations went nowhere, the State of Michigan passed its own legislation in 1934 that limited 
trap nets to waters of eighty feet or less in depth.
44
   
As fishes declined, the conflict between sport fishermen and commercial operators grew.  
Van Oosten became the target of criticisms leveled by a leader among sport fishermen in the  
region of Potagannissing Bay on the Western end of Lake Huron‟s North Channel, near Detour, 
Michigan.  Father T.G. Bateski and W.H. Lewis, the President of the Detour Chamber of 
Commerce, charged Van Oosten with improprieties in scientific investigations carried out in 
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their area.
45
  Bateski charged that Van Oosten was using his office protect commercial fishing 
criminals who worked in Potagannissing Bay.  Bateski argued that black bass in the bay were 
being wholly impounded in commercial nets.  He also spread a story in which the former 
governor of the state, William Comstock, had ordered a net pulled out of the water so he could 
examine its contents during an unsatisfactory sport fishing trip to the bay.  Van Oosten felt 
personally stung by the charges.  He charged Bateski with “extreme exaggeration” and 
“misrepresentation or misinterpretation” of both the work of Van Oosten‟s office and conditions 
in the bay.  “It is because Bateski is a religious leader” he concluded, “that his unscrupulous 
tactics in the Potagannissing Bay propaganda have become unusually irritating and exasperating 
to those who know the facts.” 46  Gradually, as other people quoted in Bateski‟s stories were 
sought out and questioned, including former Governor Comstock, Bateski‟s credibility came 
apart.  Van Oosten felt bruised from the affair.
47
  “I must confess” he confided to Elmer Higgins 
“that my first contact with the organized sportsmen has been a great disappointment.”48 
In 1940 John Van Oosten stated that most sport fishermen were “a fine lot” but believed 
them “ignorant of the commercial fishing industry.”  Further, he felt they were too often “misled, 
by a few equally ignorant but radical sportsmen who want to abolish all commercial fishing.”49 
Despite his misgivings, Van Oosten expressed hope that better leaders would guide sportsmen in 
the coming years.
50
  Conflict between the commercial fishing industry and sport fishing interests 
only grew. 
In August of 1942 Harry Gaines, then secretary of a recently formed umbrella 
organization of sport hunting and fishing clubs in Michigan known as Michigan‟s United 
Conservation Clubs, contacted I.N. Gabrielson, the director of the Fish and Wildlife Service in 
Washington D.C.  Gaines said the organization wished to “correct” aspects of the commercial 
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fishing industry.
51
  He went on to criticize recent actions in the Michigan House of 
Representatives where bills intended to bar all trap net fishing in Lake Huron, ban netting in 
parts of Grand Traverse Bay on Lake Michigan and extend the closed season on Lake Trout were 
blocked.  Gaines blamed Representative Louis Anderson of Northport, pointing to the strong 
commercial fishing interests in his district.  Gaines indicated his organization was working to 
reintroduce the measures again in the coming year and they were considering adding Thunder 
Bay, near Alpena, to their list of areas recommended for closure.
52
   
Gabrielson responded in defense of commercial fisheries.  He pointed to the war effort 
and the focus on food production. He stated “regulations proposed by sportsmen to restrict 
commercial fishing and increase angling opportunities” should not be passed.  He said 
conservation programs needed to focus on “producing every pound of fish possible this year and 
every year until the war is won.”53  H.J. Deason, chief of the conservation section within the 
Office of the Coordinator of Fisheries also reviewed the letter.  “There is a tendency for 
sportsmen‟s organizations” he stated “to urge the enactment of regulations that have little or no 
justification as conservation measures.”  He believed sportsmen‟s groups too often operated 
“under a smoke-screen of conservation” pushing for regulations that would create “angler‟s 
monopolies” on the lakes.54  During the first half of the 1940s the food production goals of the 
United States‟ war effort served as a protective shield for commercial operators, blocking the 
passage of legislation backed by the growing sport fishing industry.  The production protections 
of World War II vanished in the postwar years. 
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In 1940 the Bureau of Biological Survey was combined with the Bureau of Fisheries to 
create the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.  Early on officials in the service considered 
ways to reduce the amount of commercial fishermen that worked the lakes.  Assistant Director of 
Fish and Wildlife Charles E. Jackson believed over the coming years they would need to devise 
“methods of reducing the number of fishermen on some equitable basis.”  Jackson believed a 
licensing system based on quotas was a viable method to initiate reductions.  While the number 
of fishermen would be reduced, Jackson envisioned higher personal profits for those who 
remained and an overall increase in commercial production through streamlining of the 
industry.
55
 
 World War II and the Great Lakes Fisheries 
 
In the United States during World War II maintaining fisheries resources competed with 
the Federal Government‟s wartime goal of maximum food production.  Prior to the war Van 
Oosten and some of his contemporaries working in fisheries management sought to administer 
the fisheries through the incorporation of conservation principles.  After Japan bombed Pearl 
Harbor on December 7
th
, 1941 everything abruptly changed.  Van Oosten believed overfishing 
was a major factor in the decline of various fish species.  He believed numerous marketable 
populations had been negatively affected by overfishing and was convinced excessive fishing 
had destroyed the cisco fishery in Lake Erie in 1925.
56
   
Nonetheless, during the war much of his work gradually moved away from 
conservationist efforts to a focus on the maximized harvest of fishes for wartime food.  He 
operated with the title Office of the Coordinator of Fisheries in the Great Lakes Region, and 
produced a manual field officers could use when working with commercial fishermen in order to 
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assist them in securing the necessary supplies for their trade.
57
  Van Oosten was personally 
responsible for approving certain acquisitions and the construction of new fishing vessels on the 
lakes.  However, embracing wartime patriotism and casting aside his convictions regarding his 
conservation responsibilities was no easy process for Van Oosten.  As late as June of 1942 he 
continued to view the biological research of his office as outside of the overall war effort.  He 
refused to use language that framed his department‟s research in terms of strengthening the home 
front and damaging the enemy.  He said he could not connect the work of his department with 
the ongoing war.  He believed their “efforts must stand or fall on their benefits within this 
country rather than their injury to our enemies.”58 
In November of 1942 when Elmer Higgins, the Chief of the Division of Fishery Biology 
within the United States Fish and Wildlife Service expressed misgivings about publishing one of 
Van Oosten‟s essays on trout because it did not seem to relate to the war effort and the goal of 
maximum production, Van Oosten was clearly annoyed.  In a remarkable five page letter to 
Higgins he expressed his growing irritation at having to justify research activities as part of the 
overall war effort.  He complained that it was “ridiculous to try to attach ourselves to the war 
effort under the guise that we are increasing production.”  He said the war time goals of fishery 
biologists were the same as their peacetime goals.  He believed “protection of the existing natural 
resources. . .to insure a continuous supply” remained the central focus of his department.  He 
said it was important not to let their “war emotion run riot” and continue to “guard zealously our 
natural resources from over exploitation.”59   
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Higgins responded that “certainly all of our research is or should be directed toward 
increasing production of food” in both peace and war.  Higgins stated that by definition 
conservation contributed to food production through “protection of the supply.”  He said various 
localities should be pressured into easing regulations in order to fuel greater production.  This did 
not conflict with the role of conservationists, Higgins reasoned, because peacetime regulations 
might not fit wartime realities.  Higgins claimed fisheries biologists increased production and 
said sustained yield models provided excellent working models.  He further charged that if the 
areas of fisheries expansion were halted it would surely damage the country as much as any 
military defeat.  “I cannot believe” Higgins challenged “that you will disagree with any of these 
statements.”60  Van Oosten thus found his scientific convictions challenged in an environment 
electrified with calls for patriotism and conformity to the national cause. 
Field work declined during the war and apparently the social and professional pressures 
on Van Oosten gradually won out.  In January of 1943 he suggested a number of dramatic 
changes in management of the Great lakes fisheries during the war.  He wanted the available 
fishing vessels used to their fullest extent.  Van Oosten pointed out that one fishing outfit in Bay 
Port, Michigan only utilized eight or twelve boats in the fall of 1942 due to manpower shortages.  
He believed all available boats should be out fishing.  He advocated for the opening of untapped 
fishery reserves, a suspension of various protective state laws, an increased amount of gear 
fishing the lakes and additional marketing of various species of so-called rough fishes.
61
   
Van Oosten compiled data on targeting rough fishes for increased production in the fall 
of 1942.  Despite his support for the effort and for advertising rough fishes, he was skeptical that 
the focus on less desirable species would take hold.  Commercial fishermen, he said “are neither 
philanthropists not fools.  They must show a profit or be bankrupt. . .the surest way to a profit 
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lies in the exploitation of the more valuable varieties.”62  One of the rough fishes Van Oosten 
suggested for intensified harvesting were chubs, claiming they could withstand an expansion 
from 4.5 million to six million pounds annually.
63
  Van Oosten‟s predictions conflicted with 
another scientist.  Several months earlier Dr. Frank W. Jones who also worked in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan had concluded that chubs were already in decline and possibly headed for their own 
collapse in Lake Michigan.
64
  In April of 1943 Van Oosten summed up the changed focus of his 
day to day duties.  He said he was going to give “war-time activities precedence over biological 
studies” and address research already underway as time permitted.65  Considering his clear 
dedication to conservation principles, Van Oosten may have privately found some solace in the 
fact that maximum wartime production would lack the potential teeth an unrestricted fishery 
might have otherwise inflicted on the lakes.  There were fewer fishermen on the lakes due to 
military service requirements so the total number of vessels harvesting fishes dropped during the 
war. 
The war affected the lakes in other ways.  During the war areas around and on the lakes 
were used for training ground forces and aircraft.  For example, in December of 1943 fishermen 
operating near Michigan‟s port town of Holland on Lake Michigan were warned to exercise 
caution when operating in areas where bombing practice was taking place.  They were urged to 
keep their boats at least a mile from designated targets on the lake.
66
 
In addition to his own work and research, Van Oosten was sometimes called upon to 
review the work of other specialists writing in the fields of fish and fishery research.  He read 
and reviewed a variety of research articles and reports written by professionals studying aquatic 
environments.  In 1943 Edward Bailey passed along a manuscript written by Rachel Carson 
entitled “Fishes of the Middle West” for Van Oosten to read and comment on.  Van Oosten said 
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was it was “well written,” but added “in spots there is evidence that the most recent publications 
have not been consulted.”67  Rachel Carson became well known around the world with the 
publication of her seminal work Silent Spring (1962) nineteen years later.
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Despite the growth in research the conservation focus of Van Oosten‟s office remained 
squarely on the fisheries – the marketable fishes and the species that affected the marketable 
fishes of the Great Lakes.  The era‟s conservationist approach to Great Lakes resource 
management was not a holistic model of environmental stewardship.  There was no perceptible 
intrinsic worth assigned to lake fishes beyond their importance as a human resource.  To fisheries 
biologists of the day the fishes of the lakes existed to support the fisheries.  Preserving the 
economic viability of fishing operations through conservation measures designed to sustain or 
enhance catch yields was the ultimate goal.  In 1943 a Great Lakes Lake Trout Committee was 
formed to consider various aspects of lake trout management, including the effects of fishing for 
lake trout during the closed season.  Van Oosten chaired the committee.  During the committee‟s 
meeting 1944 meeting the question arose as to whether trout should be protected from 
commercial fishing during their spawning period.  Local interests won out when the idea was 
rejected.  It would have been too difficult, the committee members decided, for some states to 
adopt a completely closed season for the entire spawning period.
69
  Initially the committee was 
limited to American membership.  After Canadian officials expressed interest in joining 
membership was extended to them in 1946.
70
  Coordinated regulations at the state level remained 
an elusive goal. 
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Despite the growing interest in conservation principles.  Van Oosten‟s office did not 
stand in the way when other economic endeavors unrelated to the fisheries encroached on the 
lakes.  When the Reserve Mining Company wanted to erect a taconite beneficiation plant on 
Western Lake Superior‟s shoreline at Beaver Bay, Van Oosten‟s office was supportive.  “Dr. 
Van Oosten has expressed the belief” Ralph Hile reported “that this plant will have little effect 
on the fisheries of Lake Superior.”  Van Oosten had studied the turbidity of Lake Erie and 
concluded turbidity had little effect on the overall populations of fishes.
71
  Apparently the 
assumption was made that the inorganic turbidity of mine tailings would be similar to the 
mixture of organic and inorganic turbidity that occurred in Lake Erie‟s shallower waters.  Van 
Oosten was not alone.  Other state experts came out in support of the new plant.   
The ultimate effects the mine tailings could have on the lake were not well understood at 
the time.  The Reserve Mining Company‟s operations on Lake Superior provided an economic 
boom to Northwestern Minnesota‟s economy.  Unfortunately they were an ecological disaster for 
western Lake Superior.  The company dumped a staggering 67,000 tons of taconite tailings into 
Lake Superior on a daily basis.  The United States Government eventually sued Reserve Mining 
Company in 1972.  It was determined that the taconite tailings also contained asbestos fibers.  
Although the case initially focused on the massive amount of waste being dumped into the lake, 
by the time of the trial the heart of the case shifted to asbestos and Duluth‟s drinking water.  
Reserve Mining Company eventually agreed to an alternate disposal method for their waste.
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Industrial development long occupied a corner of the Great Lakes economy that 
conflicted with the interests of the commercial fisheries.  The problematic relationships of 
commercial fishermen and the timber industry in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
were relived decades later through the general unease that accompanied sharing fishing areas 
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with twentieth century industrial development. In 1945 United States Game Management Agent 
Stephen Creech warned of the expansion of oil explorations around Saginaw Bay.  Creech was 
concerned about the potential for pollution and the effect oil explorations would have on fish and 
wildlife.  In this instance John Van Oosten sided with the developers.  Van Oosten pointed to the 
“8 or 9 proven oil wells” at Essexville, a shoreline community along Saginaw Bay.  “If oil wells 
are drilled near the shore” Van Oosten confidently reassured him, “you may be certain that 
proper safeguards have been taken by the department to avoid pollution of state waters.”73  
Creech responded that the wells Van Oosten spoke of were about one mile from his house.  He 
expressed his dismay over the rapid spread of leases to Pure Oil and Gulf Company as well as to 
Consumers Power Company.  He said sportsmen voiced a growing distrust for the state‟s 
Department of Conservation, since they appeared very willing to approve widespread 
development projects by the oil and power companies despite the dangers to lake resources.  
Referring to the well that operated nearest the shore where he lived, Creech said a breakage 
would wreck Saginaw Bay.
74
  Michigan‟s Department of Conservation drafted a bill designed to 
clarify the department‟s authority to extend drilling rights into the lake if the oil companies 
deemed it necessary. Commercial fishing interests and sportsmen aligned briefly and killed the 
bill.
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With catches declining and consistent cooperation between states almost nonexistent, 
problems within the Great Lakes fisheries were further compounded by increasing competition 
from oceanic fishing enterprises.  Salt water rose fish are not members of the order Perciformes, 
which includes freshwater perch. They are Scorpaeniformes.  Marketers of oceanic seafood 
labeled rose fishes as “rose perch” and “ocean perch” and marketed them as such in the Great 
Lakes regions.
76
  The less expensive rose fish undercut the market for the costlier freshwater 
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perch.  Fishermen claimed it also damaged the reputation of freshwater perch due to its less 
desirable flavor.  Norman Macaulay, the manager of Booth Fisheries in Bay City said purchasers 
in the Great Lakes would buy them thinking “they are buying yellow perch and they‟re getting 
rose fish.”77  Booth stated Great Lakes perch sold for around thirty to thirty five cents a pound by 
the early 1940s, while relabeled rose fish were usually less than half that price.
78
   
George S. Wolff, a commercial fisherman out of Conneaut, Ohio was concerned the fish 
might turn off customers to his quarry.  “If some housewife got those in and cooked them she 
would probably chase the whole family out of the house and nobody would ever want to touch 
perch again. . .That is one of the things that is hurting our markets more than anything else.”79  
H. R. Beutel of Sebewaing, Michigan agreed.  “If they are classed as perch they will think they 
are Saginaw Bay perch. . .We couldn‟t fillet a carp and call it a white bass.”80  Robert Ludiwg, a 
commercial fisherman and fish dealer out of Michigan City on Southern Lake Michigan summed 
up the situation saying “There has been an awful lot of poor quality ocean perch sold around 
here.”81  John Van Oosten pointed out that even the highly respected David Starr Jordan stated 
that rose fish resembled perciforms.  Despite the resemblance, Van Oosten strongly sympathized 
with Great Lakes fishermen whose catches had to compete with the deceptively labeled imports.  
“If I were a Hitler, a Stalin, or a Mussolini” he said; 
I would force every commercial fisherman to label every package of rose fish as. . 
.Sebastes marinus (Linneaus); family Scorpaenidae; the scorpion fish.  With this 
label attached I believe that there would be little difficulty in retaining our Great 
Lakes market for the yellow perch.
82
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Other fishermen pointed to what they saw as continuing abuses of lake resources.  Two 
days before the bombing of Pearl Harbor, a frustrated Herbert W. Clow of Beaver Bay, 
Minnesota wrote to Claude R. Wickard, the Secretary of Agriculture in Washington D.C.  Clow 
complained of intensive fishing by well capitalized fishing outfits with multiple tugs that 
operated on Lake Superior during the ciscoes spawning season.  He said fish dealers were 
“parasites” who controlled the fishing industry of the Great Lakes.83  He believed state laws 
worked in favor of the larger dealers.  Clow favored Federal or international regulation and 
wanted a closed season on ciscoes so their spawning areas could be protected.  He said the larger 
outfits that fished during the spawning periods glutted the market and made it nearly impossible 
for smaller fishermen to get decent prices for their own catches later.  Clow apparently felt 
trapped by the system.  He drew comparisons between the competition over the embattled 
fisheries of his region and patriotic slogans that proclaimed that America should fight for 
democracy and freedom.  “I am of the opinion” he said, “that most of us are about as free as a fly 
in a spider‟s web.”84 
Even as the perceived food demands of World War II eroded conservation efforts in the 
Great Lakes other forces were at work to devise more effective management strategies for the 
marketed fish populations.  The desire for cooperative management of the Great Lakes was given 
new impetus through the support of scientists such as Van Oosten and the continued decline of 
various species throughout the 1930s and early 40s.  “It has been established definitely” wrote 
the Division of Fishery Biology within Fish and Wildlife “that overfishing and inadequacy and 
lack of uniformity in regulations” had contributed to a dramatic decline in the fisheries. 85 
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Concern about the effects of overfishing was soon joined by anxiety about sea lampreys.  
Lampreys spread throughout the lakes during the 1930s and early 1940s.  In August of 1941 
A.M. Sandberg, an agent within the Fish and Wildlife Service, canvassed the Great Lakes region 
to gather statistical data.  While in Escanaba, Michigan Sandberg reported that “a large blood 
sucker or sea lamprey” had been turning up in fish catches around Fayette, Michigan.  Sandberg 
received his information from local fisherman Frank DeVet.  Sandberg wondered if anyone in 
Fish and Wildlife knew what the creatures were or where they came from.
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As lamprey spread, many believed the introduced parasite could lead to the professional 
ruin of commercial fishermen.  Sea lampreys added significant additional pressure to lake fishes 
already reeling under the intensive fisheries.  Catches of market species, especially Lake Trout, 
began to drop dramatically as the numbers of lampreys increased.  Increasing numbers of fishes 
caught in nets bore ferocious looking wounds, attached lampreys or were dead or dying from a 
recent lamprey attack.  Over the ensuing years the governments of the Great Lakes states, 
Washington D.C., Ontario and Ottawa faced increased pressure from fisheries shareholders to do 
something.  Once again cooperative management appeared to be the only solution to the shared 
lake problems.   
 John Van Oosten and the International Board of Inquiry 
 
The International Board of Inquiry that came together in the 1940s began as an effort to 
address widespread declines in the populations of commercialized Great Lakes species.  Initially 
contributors believed that coordinating legislation across state and national boundaries was the 
best method for addressing declines in the fisheries.  Predictably, widespread resistance again 
formed within the commercial fisheries.  As the numbers of sea lampreys multiplied the central 
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focus of conservation management shifted from commercial operations to the introduced species.  
Over the ensuing years control of sea lampreys dominated the work of the new international 
coalition. 
After a series of communications between officials in the United States and Canada a 
new International Board of Inquiry was established on February 29
th
, 1940.  President Franklin 
Roosevelt appointed Hubert E. Gallagher and John Van Oosten as the United States‟ members of 
the commission, while D.J. Taylor and A.G. Huntsman represented Canada.
87
  While John Van 
Oosten was the Chief of Great Lakes Fisheries Investigations for the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service, Gallagher was the Assistant Director of the Council of State Governments.  
Gallagher‟s state coalition formed during the height of the Great depression.  The council 
functioned as an information cooperative for states to use to share and glean information in order 
to weather challenging times.  The idea in appointing two men with such different backgrounds 
was to provide a balanced board.  The regional interests of the states would presumably be 
represented by Gallagher, providing a balance to the biological and conservation ideas embodied 
by Van Oosten.
88
  The council played a key role in providing the impetus for the formation of the 
new International Board of Inquiry.  In 1938 the Council of State Governments arranged a 
meeting at Detroit to study Great Lakes management.  As a result of the meeting the council 
recommended the formation of the new board of inquiry.
89
  The International Board of Inquiry 
sent surveys to over four thousand fishermen across the Great Lakes shorelines in both Canada 
and the United States.  A series of hearings were held around the lakes.  The commissioners 
sought input from commercial fishermen, conservationists, sport fishermen and welcomed input 
from other interested persons.
 90
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Opposition to the commission quickly surfaced.  John R. Schacht, President of the Great 
Lakes Fisheries Association leveled criticism at the necessity of an international regulatory body.  
In dire language he warned that the commission would have “absolute autocratic power over the 
fisheries, and from their judgment there would be no appeal.” He said his association viewed 
such “absolute arbitrary power” as “inimical to the best interests of the American commercial 
fisherman of the Great Lakes, and we are therefore opposed to it.”  Schacht charged that the 
commission would bring “ultra-conservationists” to power.  Schacht blasted recent state and 
national conferences as fomenting propaganda against commercial fishermen.  He argued that 
commercial fishermen were “progressive in their ideas” and “amenable to reasonable regulation 
based on common sense and experience,” but that they were opposed to “regulation dictated by 
conservation hysteria.”91 
When he was urged to respond, Van Oosten dismissed Schatcht‟s criticisms as “sop.”  
Van Oosten claimed the best way to handle Schatcht was to ignore him.  Schacht focused much 
of his argument on trying to disprove that fishes were being depleted.  Van Oosten said that 
approach did not resonate with fishermen.
92
  However, Schatcht was not alone.  Dr. A.G. 
Huntsman, Secretary on the International Board of Inquiry for the Great Lakes Fisheries was 
himself a critique of theories of overfishing affecting fish populations.  In February of 1944 
Canadian Fisherman published an essay by Huntsman that questioned whether fishing had any 
lasting effect on fish populations.  He instead pointed to “natural fluctuations” as a common 
culprit.  He warned that applying limitation on the fisheries when “natural fluctuations” might be 
the cause of population declines would be “needlessly” make “a bad situation worse.”93  
Huntsman‟s writings were reprinted by the Howard K. Balch Commercial Fisheries Supplies 
Company out of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and distributed amongst commercial operators.  Howard 
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Balch said Huntsman should be “congratulated” for his “cautious and thoughtful” approach.  
Balch questioned the logic of imposing new regulations that might serve no other purpose that to 
create additional burdens for commercial fishermen.
94
 
Despite resistance from some sectors, there remained widespread support for 
international regulations.  In 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943 the Izaak Walton League reaffirmed its 
support for international regulation.
95
  In spite of the renewed impetus for international 
cooperation, funding problems initially hampered the International Board of Inquiry‟s work.  No 
significant budget allocations were made during its initial establishment.  In March of 1940 
Higgins said he was “very much afraid that the work of the board will be severely hampered in 
the immediate future because of a lack of funds.”96  As the first hearings were scheduled in late 
May and early June, Higgins repeatedly warned Van Oosten that his own depleted travel funds 
were the only funding options available to pay for the commission‟s expenses.97  Finally on July 
17
th
 Van Oosten was sent word that Congress had allocated requested funding for the Great 
Lakes International Board of Inquiry.   
Regional hearings began in earnest the following October, when the board met with 
fisheries representatives in Sault Ste Marie, Ontario on October 17
th
, 1940.  The twenty-nine 
regional meetings, surveys and one site data collected by the international commission would 
result in what was arguably the most comprehensive examination of current conditions within 
the lake fisheries yet completed.  “Without doubt,” one of Van Oosten‟s colleagues would later 
state “the best single reference to the Great Lakes Fisheries is the report of the International 
Board of Inquiry for the Great Lakes Fisheries issued in 1943.”98  World War II interrupted any 
chance of taking immediate action on the information the board compiled.  Thoughts of 
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conservation evolved into calls for ever increasing food production, of which fish was a key 
component.   
Following the board‟s report in 1943 Van Oosten and others pushed for cooperative 
intervention by the United States and Canada in order to better manage the Great Lakes fisheries.   
Passing legislation to authorize joint international or even Federal intervention proved as difficult 
a challenge as it had for the investigative commissions of past decades.  Meanwhile conditions 
on and in the lakes continued to take a heavy toll on fisheries resources.  Even as production was 
encouraged during the war, non-native species were increasing in the lakes.  Sea lamprey 
predation combined with overfishing to send already endangered populations of lake trout into a 
precipitous population crash. 
The International Board of Inquiry for the Great Lakes Fisheries found that 92% of 
fishermen operating in the United States‟ waters of the Great Lakes wanted a standard set of laws 
governing the lakes.
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  While professional pressure from colleagues and a perceived patriotic 
duty may have motivated Van Oosten‟s decision to work for maximum fishery harvests during 
the war, he continued to believe that something had to be done to stem the tide of declining 
harvests.   He viewed the work of the international board of inquiry as an important step toward 
better management.  He strongly supported intervention into Great Lakes management by either 
the United States Federal Government or an international regulatory body.  He argued that 
setting up such a system was the only way to establish a management program that would be 
“logical, sensible, scientific, equitable, and effective.”  He believed such a system would ensure 
better treatment of fishermen than under competing legislative systems and that it would improve 
marketing opportunities for them as well.
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Like previous generations of Great Lakes biologists Van Oosten was frustrated by the 
inability of the individual Great Lakes States to reach any lasting joint accord.  When two or 
more states had conflicting laws over the same shared resources, enforcement was weak.  Van 
Oosten said there was an overall “tendency to lower the standards of a state to the lowest existing 
level” when conservation legislation of different states came into conflict.101  Van Oosten 
pointed to an Ohio law prohibiting the sale of ciscoes after that fishery collapsed in 1925.  When 
populations of ciscoes seemed to be on the rebound fishermen immediately canvassed the lake to 
catch them.  Ohio officials did not enforce the law because other states had no such law and thus 
they would have discriminated against their own fishermen while fishermen from other locales 
and Canada continued to fish.  Instead, Ohio repealed its ban on the sale of ciscoes.  He also 
cited examples from Michigan.  He said the state was obligated to reduce its size limitations on 
nets for chubs because of less restrictive laws in neighboring states and Canada.  Similarly, 
Michigan reduced the legal catch size of walleyes in response to Ohio‟s smaller size 
limitation.
102
  Van Oosten lamented that for seventy-one years lake scientists recognized the 
necessity of uniform regulations yet over two dozen interstate and international conferences 
failed to achieve that goal.
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Without a cooperative, coordinated effort Van Oosten predicted the fisheries of the Great 
Lakes would continue their precipitous decline and eventually sport fisheries would feel the 
squeeze as well.   Van Oosten strongly believed recommendations published by the International 
Board of Inquiry in 1942 needed implementation.  The findings called for an international 
agreement patterned after the Migratory Bird Treaty, to be applied to the fishery resources of the 
Great Lakes.  Van Oosten believed there would never be a better time for action.  If the board‟s 
recommendations failed to achieve the necessary result he said future conferences would be as 
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futile as those of the past.  Unless an international treaty was forged he was “convinced on the 
basis of 22 years of research on the Great Lakes fisheries that coordinated action will never be 
attained.”104 
The board issued its report on August 6
th
, 1942.  Officials from both the United States 
and Canada then collaborated on how they might best implement the board‟s recommendations.  
The Great Lakes Treaty was the result.  It was signed on April 2
nd
, 1946 and sent to the U.S. 
Senate on the 22
nd
 of that month.  The treaty would establish a commission consisting of three 
men from each nation who would work together to make research recommendations to their 
scientific bodies.  More significantly, the treaty bestowed the commission with “full 
discretionary powers to regulate the fisheries for the sole purpose of securing the maximum use 
of these Great Lakes resources consistent with their perpetuation.”  The states and the Province 
of Ontario would bear the responsibility of enforcing legislation passed by the commission, but if 
they failed to do so the federal governments of Canada and the United States would be 
authorized to act.
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  As Van Oosten and other supporters waged a public campaign to get the 
legislation passed, opponents continued to oppose their efforts.  In at least one instance the effort 
to build public support for the pivotal legislation was damaged by an erroneous interpretation 
and application of catch data. 
In May and July of 1946 articles appeared in Michigan newspapers as well as various 
fishing publications including The Fisherman and Atlantic Fisherman that claimed production 
levels of marketable lake fishes had risen by as much as 42% in Lake Michigan waters over the 
first four months of that year.  The articles claimed the numbers were substantiated by data 
“compiled by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service” and were based primarily on catches of “lake 
trout and yellow pike.”106  The reports sent Van Oosten and other conservation officials 
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scrambling to discover where the bizarre figures had originated.  Their own data clearly showed 
lake trout in rapid decline.  On Sunday, July 7 1946 the Detroit News blasted the article.  
Conservation Editor Albert Stoll Jr., writing for the Detroit News attributed the recent press 
release to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.  Stoll Jr. said the rosy claims about production 
increases “carried the inference that we are doing quite all right under state and provincial 
regulations” and international control was therefore not necessary.  He charged that was the 
“same hackneyed argument used in 1916 to block the migratory bird treaty” between the U.S. 
and Canada.
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After Van Oosten‟s own office was asked where the numbers had originated, Van Oosten 
realized they had likely originated with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service‟s Market 
News Service in Chicago.  He then contacted Paul E. Thompson, the Act Chief of the Division of 
Fishery Biology in Chicago.  Van Oosten expressed dismay that regional reports that included 
non-commercial and inland fishery statistics as well as data on species imported from Canada 
were being used as a barometer for all of the Great Lakes.  The picture they provided was in no 
way an accurate reflection of Lake Michigan catch statistics as a whole.
108
  Charles M. Reardon, 
the Fishery Marketing Specialist in Chicago subsequently revealed the identity of the person 
behind the recent news releases and articles.  A Mr. Eldridge, An Associated Press reporter, 
contacted the Market News Service asking if he might have access to four months of market 
statistics as a way of proving or disproving accounts of rising lamprey predations in Illinois 
waters.  Instead, once the data was in hand, the ambitious reporter had produced several articles 
claiming a significant increase in overall lake catches.  When Reardon contacted Eldridge to ask 
why the reporter assumed the local market statistics might be valid for the entire lake basin, 
Eldridge seemed to Reardon to be entirely ignorant of how to accurately interpret the statistics he 
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was using.
109
  Whatever his motivation or understanding of the data he utilized, Eldridge‟s 
damaging articles appeared just as Congress was considering the latest proposal for international 
management of the lakes. 
From August until mid November of 1948 Van Oosten was temporarily away from his 
office and Dr. Ralph Hile assumed the role of acting director.
110
  The overall catch of whitefishes 
had recently risen while lake trout populations continued to slump.  When Hile received an 
inquiry asking whether the population changes among whitefish resulted from recent die-offs of 
smelt, he cautioned against such an assumption.  He compared the recent rise in the catch of 
whitefishes to an unexpected and temporary rise in cisco populations in Lake Erie during 1944.  
Hile said the population increases could have been coincidental or caused by other factors.  
Questioned whether smelt might be blamed for the decreases in Great Lakes populations of lake 
trout, Hile said the available data did not support the idea.  Hile pointed elsewhere for the cause.  
“From the evidence at hand” he said, “I am inclined to believe that the sea lamprey. . .is to be 
blamed for the decreased abundance of lake trout.”111 
Sea lamprey populations grew rapidly in the lakes during the 1940s.  Following the end 
of World War II, Van Oosten‟s office devoted increasing time and attention to studying the 
parasitic species.  In 1946 the cooperative Great Lakes Sea Lamprey Committee was established. 
The committee included members from the Great Lakes states and Ontario.  John Van Oosten 
chaired the committee.  He directed the resources of his Ann Arbor office toward increasing 
investigations of sea lampreys, including their life cycles, feeding habits, effect on marketable 
species of fish and other issues.  By the mid 1940s sea lampreys were perceived as a serious and 
growing threat to the stability and longevity of the Great Lakes commercial fisheries.
112
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However, the additional requirements of sea lamprey research further stretched the time and 
resources of Van Oosten‟s office.   
Even as sea lampreys were affecting the communities of the lakes, their impact was also 
felt in Ann Arbor as Van Oosten struggled to address the varied and growing areas of fisheries 
research that required attention.  By August of 1947 sea lamprey research was requiring 
investments in new equipment and vehicles in order to complete necessary field work.  Plans 
were drawn up to establish a test weir at the Ocqueoc River.  Expansions in personnel were also 
under consideration.
113
  In November of 1947 Paul E. Thompson, the Assistant Chief of Fishery 
Biology within Fish and Wildlife contacted Van Oosten asking whether the Ann Arbor office 
might benefit from the establishment of a new position to head up sea lamprey investigations.
114
  
A seemingly exasperated Van Oosten replied that he would be “delighted” if a satisfactory 
candidate could be found.  He said an extensive backlog of materials accumulated related to sea 
lampreys that he would be happy to turn over to a suitable candidate.
115
   
Van Oosten‟s office was also fielding communications from private citizens concerned 
about sea lampreys appearing in area waterways.  In June of 1948 Van Oosten received a letter 
from Emma Skutt.  Skutt complained of sea lampreys on the bodies of trout in the White Cloud 
River at White Cloud Michigan.  White Cloud lies well inside the interior of Michigan‟s western 
shoreline.  Sea lampreys penetrated deep into the interior rivers and streams of the Great Lakes 
system, especially during their spawning runs. Van Oosten thanked Skutt for the information.  
He said lampreys had “raised havoc” with lake trout populations in both Lakes Huron and 
Michigan.
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Van Oosten continued to struggle for the resources needed to execute the multifaceted 
research demands of the lakes.  The lack of adequate resources was a continuous hindrance Great 
Lakes scientists struggled with while trying to compile research on lake fishes.  Funding 
shortfalls inevitably hampered their research. Because of ongoing shortages of manpower, 
financing and other challenges basic knowledge of the life cycles of key lake species remained 
elusive into the mid twentieth century.  In December of 1943 John Van Oosten expressed 
frustration at the lack of understanding they had when it came to determining the age of lake 
trout, one of the most important fishes in the lakes in terms of its value to the commercial 
fisheries. 
We have little information on age of lake trout.  Apparently the lake trout 
grow much more slowly than we believed.  In the case of the lake trout we do not 
know what time interval to use to try to correlate planting with harvest, we do not 
know the average age of the lake trout in the catch. . .age determination is pretty 
much guess work in the larger trout.
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The eventual conclusion of World War II did not signal the end of Van Oosten‟s funding 
woes.  He continued to struggle for sufficient finances to support the work of his department.  In 
March of 1946 on the eve of the international Great Lakes Treaty‟s submission to the Congress 
for consideration, Van Oosten learned that $300 had been cut from his budget allocation, leaving 
his office with a debt of $18.01 even as an important conference in Toronto loomed.  Thus in the 
midst of the treaty‟s final push the constant lack of funds threatened to undo his department‟s 
work yet again.  Upon appeal to Paul E. Thompson, then the Acting Chief of Fishery Biology, it 
was agreed that the funds would be restored, but first Van Oosten was asked to write up a budget 
justifying their return.  Thus he was thus forced to devote additional time to getting the necessary 
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dollars restored during the eleventh hour of the push to get the international treaty passed.
118
  In 
early 1947 Van Oosten submitted a memorandum to Elmer Higgins outlining the work of his 
department and drawing comparisons between Federal allocations for Great Lakes research and 
allocations for other districts.  Van Oosten estimated the fisheries as valued at $11,500,000.  At 
the time $19,000 was allocated for research.  He compared this allocation to those given to other 
fisheries research, including one area of approximately equal value that received $54,000 and 
one he estimated at less than double the overall economic value that received $240,000.  Instead 
of considering the shortfall, Higgins suggested that Van Oosten devalued the research being done 
for other fisheries around the nation.  Van Oosten assured him that was not the point.  Instead, he 
tried to demonstrate the lack of funding directed at addressing the multifaceted problems of the 
Great Lakes fisheries, while other districts received much higher levels of funding relative to the 
respective values of their fisheries.
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In 1949 Van Oosten stepped down as Director of the Great Lakes Biological Laboratory, 
but continued on as a senior scientist. In June of 1951 when Van Oosten‟s secretary resigned her 
position, he hoped for a speedy qualified replacement.  However, in October of that year he 
reported that conditions in his office were “becoming intolerable” as he still had no permanent 
clerical assistant.  He said he spent his time doing “the secretarial work and related duties that 
were absolutely essential.”120  Van Oosten desired the assistance of a specific staff member then 
working for James Moffett, the new Chief of Great Lakes Fishery Investigations.  Van Oosten 
found himself at odds with the new director, who was himself struggling with the underfinanced 
day to day operations of the biological laboratory.
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Van Oosten‟s office worked with a variety of conservation departments on numerous 
issues to better understand and sustain the Great Lakes fisheries.  Hatcheries had lost their once 
preeminent place atop United States fisheries management programs, but they remained an 
important component of overall management.  Hatcheries were plagued by their own sets of 
issues including a host of fish ailments that were only marginally understood.  Fin and eye 
infections, sores, diseased eggs and other conditions plagued their operations.   
The work of fishery conservationists led them in a variety of directions as the field of 
research broadened and the list of factors recognized as influential in production grew.  In 
October of 1945 a University of Michigan faculty member and friend of Van Oosten‟s visited 
their doctor complaining of chest pains.  After a series of tests and x-rays they could not find 
anything wrong with him.  His doctor suggested he was suffering from angina pectoris, a 
condition usually related to heart disease.  When the faculty member relayed his story to Van 
Oosten, he included information on where he thought the condition might have originated.  He 
said he sprayed an enclosed chicken coop with DDT and the insecticide Flit about a week prior 
to the onset of chest pains.  Van Oosten wondered if DDT was the real culprit and wrote the 
merchandising department of United States Fish and Wildlife to inquire about information on 
DDT safety.  He was concerned, he said, because he might encounter cases of fishermen using it 
in their fish houses or aboard their boats and he wanted to know what sort of safety data 
existed.
122
  Van Oosten was eventually referred to Paul A. Neal at the National Institute of 
Health.
123
  Two years earlier Neal declared DTT safe for use in multiple forms and would go on 
record in Life Magazine in 1946 stating that no proven case of a human being poisoned by DDT 
existed in the United States.
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  Van Oosten‟s curiosity in regard to the new pesticide was well 
founded.  However, it would be another sixteen years before Rachel Carson, a biologist whose 
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work Van Oosten had one time critiqued, raised an international alarm about the dangers of DDT 
through her book Silent Spring. 
The first half of the twentieth century brought monumental changes to the entire Great 
Lakes Basin.  Urbanization, industrialization, mechanized agriculture, spreading market systems, 
modernized shipping and a host of other changes effected vast modifications to the lakes.  Lake 
Huron fishermen adopted new and modified types of fishing apparatus in an effort to maintain 
their catch tonnages as various fishes steadily declined.  Numerous efforts at building 
cooperative interstate and international management programs failed time and again as regional 
demands superseded comprehensive agreement.  Numerous new species were introduced to the 
interior Great Lakes.  A few of them competed directly with native species for lake resources.  
Sea lampreys preyed on large, marketable species and added their own resource needs to the 
existent pressure of overfishing.  A new international coalition was formed in the early 1940s, 
but as the years rolled by its ultimate form and function would vary greatly from the model its 
framers had intended. 
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Chapter 5 - Managing Huron:  The Great Lakes Fisheries 
Commission and the enduring challenge of freshwater aquatic 
management 
Sea lampreys dominated the work of Great Lakes fisheries experts in the late 1940s and 
1950s.  On the U.S. side of the lake efforts at lamprey control accelerated in the late 1940s as the 
lake trout fisheries in Lakes Huron and Michigan collapsed.  In October of 1949 sea lamprey 
investigations were added as an ongoing component of the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service‟s Great Lakes Fisheries Investigations.  Scientists focused on several key areas research.  
Lamprey life cycles were studied in an effort to determine vulnerable points in their growth 
stages.  Spawning areas were monitored and studied.  Fish targeted by lampreys were examined 
in order to determine effects on overall abundance.  Finally, physical control mechanisms were 
built and tested in an effort to control the spread and overall effects of lamprey populations.
1
 
The rapid colonization of the interior lakes by sea lampreys further fueled the drive for 
international cooperation.  On September 10
th
, 1954 the U.S. and Canada signed a treaty for 
cooperative research and sea lamprey control known as the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries.  
The agreement went into force the following year and its operational requirements were 
established with the passage of the Great Lakes Fishery Act of 1956.  The treaty created the 
Great Lakes Fisheries Commission.  The commission was a far cry from the comprehensive 
oversight envisioned by the International Board of Inquiry.  However, its creation marked an 
important precedent in the history of Great Lakes fishery management.  At long last the national, 
state and provincial governments of Canada and the United States agreed to cooperate on Great 
Lakes research.  The commission lacked the broad legislative authority repeatedly recommended 
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by various Great Lakes researchers and organizations.  In fact the Act specifically protected the 
legislative authority of the individual states.  However, it created specific processes for the 
commission to recommend conservation measures directly to state governors.  The Act also 
authorized direct United States Federal participation in cooperative sea lamprey control with the 
commission.
2
 
A variety of different methods for controlling the non-indigenous parasites were 
attempted.  Modern chemicals, including DTT and its derivatives, were being widely applied to 
control insects on land.  A chemical solution for sea lampreys seemed to many to offer the most 
promise.  John Van Oosten stepped down as Chief of Great Lakes Fisheries investigations in 
1949.   In the 1950s James W. Moffet held the position.  Moffet was interested in the application 
of chemicals to control species of fishes deemed less important to the market. “I have always felt 
that one of the major contributions that will be made from the testing of these chemicals is that 
one might possibly be used for selective performance where fish management desires. . .The idea 
of carp control occurs to me too.”3 
However, while the application of chemicals to control less desired species held some 
future promise for Moffet, by the waning months of 1954 his office had a specific target in mind.  
“We are interested in finding a compound specific to lamprey larva and relatively harmless to 
associated fishes” Moffett wrote to Dr. Peter Doudoroff at Oregon State College in November of 
1954.
4
  Moffett wondered if Doudoroff, who was then working in the Toxicity and Fisheries Unit 
of Oregon State College‟s Biological section, had suggestions for chemicals that could prove 
selectively toxic to lamprey.  When contacted by W.F. Carbine, Chief of the Section of Inland 
Fisheries the following month regarding the use of toxicants to control other species of fishes, 
Moffett stated the singular purpose of his department‟s toxicology studies.  “It is imperative that 
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we continue our search for, and development of, specific toxicants for sea lamprey larva.  We 
cannot divert any effort, at present, to explorations in the field of fish toxicology.”5  Moffett 
estimated at least an additional year would be needed to focus research on using toxin against sea 
lamprey.  He suggested that once that research had been completed they might further explore 
the application of their findings in relation to other fish species.
6
   
Most of the toxicology studies were completed at the Hammond Bay Laboratory near 
Roger‟s City, Michigan.  Dr. Vernon C. Applegate oversaw activities at the research center.  A 
wide variety of chemicals were utilized.  Some chemicals required special handling.  For 
example, in April of 1954 Moffett submitted a travel order to Washington D.C. to cover travel by 
Applegate in relation to obtaining additional chemicals for testing at the lab.  Moffett argued that 
the chemicals required special handling in order that they would arrive for testing in satisfactory 
condition.  Applegate drove from Hammond Bay, Michigan to Leetown, West Virginia in order 
to retrieve the substances.  Over 2,000 various chemicals were acquiesced in that trip alone.  
Researchers in Michigan intended to share them with Canadian scientists conducting similar 
experiments in Ontario.
7
  The resignation of two office personnel in 1954 strained Moffett‟s goal 
of finding a suitable larva toxicant within a year.
8
  When filling the vacancies women applicants 
were preferred, because, according to the job posting, they were believed to have the higher 
degree of dexterity necessary for completing the lab‟s weighing procedures.9  At the lab 
chemicals were tested in amounts of five parts per million (ppm) over a twenty four hour period.  
Compounds that proved lethal in eight hours were then re-tested in amounts of 1.0, 0.1, .001 
ppm.  In each test two lamprey larvas were tested alongside two each of blue-gill and rainbow 
trout fingerlings.
10
  At the University of Toronto Dr. F.E.J. Fry was also experimenting with the 
214 
  
application of chemicals for controlling sea lampreys.
11
  Toxicology studies had taken center 
stage in state, provincial and federal fishery research for the Great Lakes. 
At the same time, other control efforts were also employed.  Various types of physical 
structures designed to manage sea lamprey populations were experimented with.  Barrier dams 
and electrical devices were two types of physical structures that were used in lamprey research 
and control.  In October of 1954 Moffett reported the installation of ten “experimental sea 
lamprey control devices in streams tributary to Lake Michigan in addition to the seven structures 
already installed.”12  Electrical barriers were the centerpiece of physical lamprey management in 
1954.  Forty-seven sea lamprey control devices, in as many streams and rivers, had been 
constructed around Lake Superior.
13
  As more powered barriers were constructed, their upkeep 
became a source of concern.  Commercial contractors were proving costly to employ for the 
construction and wiring of the devices.  In March of 1954 Moffett sought the appointment of a 
permanent electrician to work for his department in Marquette, Michigan.  The new hire was 
responsible for both with construction and maintenance of the electrical components of the 
various weirs.
14
 
Rivers and streams feeding into Lake Huron also hosted control mechanisms.  A 
permanent electrified barrier was constructed on the Ocqueoc River and in operation by 1949.  
Ten portable trapping devices were installed in various streams feeding Northern Lake Huron in 
1950.  The area was designated Control Zone H-1 by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.  In 
1949 the Ocqueoc barrier captured 24,645 sea lampreys.  The following year 18,882 were 
removed.  In 1951 19,393 sea lampreys were captured at the Ocqueoc barrier.  Despite the slight 
drop in Lake Huron‟s lamprey populations after 1949, biologist Vernon C. Applegate believed 
sea lampreys were maintaining their populations.  In Lake Michigan some streams were 
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producing three times as many sea lampreys in 1951 as they had one year earlier.  The Wisconsin 
Conservation Department operated six control barriers on its side of Lake Michigan.  In 1950 
they captured 16,410 lampreys at those sites.  In 1951 the numbers had jumped to 42,980.  
Applegate noted that lamprey numbers in Lake Superior were also on the rise.
15
   
Various other studies were carried out to better understand sea lamprey life cycles.  
Studies of their sex ratios showed that their populations favored males.  In 1951 specimens from 
eight Northern Lake Huron tributaries were examined and their sex ratios were compared.  There 
were 258 males to every 100 females.  Samplings of Pendills Creek in Eastern Lake Superior 
showed ratios of 110 males to every 100 females.  (When control efforts eventually shifted to 
chemicals in the late 1950s and 1960s, those ratios shifted dramatically.)  The Hammod Bay 
Biological Station began experimenting with tagging sea lampreys in the early 1950s.  Sixty 
seven lampreys were tagged in September of 1951.  They were then released near the Straits of 
Mackinaw.  Eleven days later one of the lampreys was discovered over fifty miles away.  A 
month after their tag and release, another lamprey was found attached to a chub nearly 100 miles 
from the release site.  The tag and release experiments demonstrated that individual sea lampreys 
ranged far and wide in the lakes during their parasitic life cycle.
16
  
In addition to research related to controlling the number of sea lampreys in the lakes, 
various ideas were considered for making use of them as a commercial species.  The idea of 
marketing lampreys failed to take hold, despite their use as a food fish in parts of Europe.  
Occasionally experiments were done in an attempt to utilize lampreys in other ways.  In October 
of 1954 Moffett received a request to supply “a sample of about 25 pounds of salted sea 
lampreys” to Emmet Andrews in Cambridge, Massachusetts.  Andrews experimented with using 
lampreys as bait for crabs.
17
 
216 
  
While sea lamprey research and control dominated much of the work of Great Lakes 
fishery investigations, other research continued.  In the mid-1950s the sixty foot Great Lakes 
research vessel M.V. Cisco was charged with carrying out experimental fishing tests in Lake 
Michigan to determine the numbers of bloater chubs in that lake.  The combined pressures of the 
fisheries and invasive species had driven lake trout populations to collapse.  Among chubs the 
smaller bloater chubs were not valued by the fisheries due to their oily nature and smaller size.  
Initially Moffett hoped for “the development of a market or a processing procedure” that could 
turn the small fish into a “profitable product.”18  The small bloaters were an important food fish 
for native lake trout.  When lake trout populations crashed bloater chubs multiplied in number 
and were viewed as a competitor species by fisheries experts.  “They compete with the more 
valuable chubs for space and food and create a nuisance by becoming entangled in vast numbers 
in fishermen‟s nets.”19  In order to preserve the fish valued on the market and relieve fishermen 
of the nuisance of cleaning undesired species from their nets, the M.V. Cisco sought a solution to 
the “bloater problem.”20 
Moffett continued the work started by Van Oosten.  In his capacity as Chief of Great 
Lakes Fishery Investigations he worked to complete research geared toward the conservation of 
market fishes and the longevity of commercial fisheries.  He and his representatives continued 
both their research and regional meetings with commercial operators in both the United States 
and Canada.  Legislative control of the lakes remained in the hands of their many divided 
jurisdictions.  Lake researchers were increasingly cognizant of the complexity of their charge. 
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Ecological conditions and the character of the fisheries vary widely both 
between and within lakes.  We cannot speak of the Great Lakes fishery.  Rather 
we must underscore the plural and think in terms of many Great Lakes fisheries 
scattered along the nearly 5,000 miles of U.S. shoreline.
21
  
In addition to their role investigating Lake Michigan chubs, the crew of the M.V. Cisco 
also recorded various aspects of lake‟s hydrology and ecology.22  Lake Huron also had a research 
vessel working its waters.  The 52 foot trap net boat Musky operated in that lake in the early 
1950s.  In 1954 the University of Michigan contacted U.S. Fish and Wildlife to obtain 
permission to use the vessel for their own limnological study of Lake Huron.
23
  Researchers were 
increasingly aware that maintaining a profitable fishery meant addressing a multiplicity of 
interconnected issues.  The multidirectional research approach was buffeted by an increase in 
funding over the sparse financial pickings of the Van Oosten years.  The Saltonstall-Kennedy 
Act of 1954 created a fund for fishery research and development that began adding critical funds 
to investigative efforts in the Great Lakes region.
24
  This and other initiatives to restore and 
maintain the fisheries combined to increase overall funding.  For example the State of Michigan 
was able to construct a new 42,500 square foot research center in Ann Arbor in 1966 for a cost of 
$1,488,000.  The following year Michigan‟s research efforts were funded at $1,786,000, 
including $722,000 from the Great Lakes Fishery Commission.
25
 The research station at Ann 
Arbor focused primarily on commercial species and various factors related to their growth and 
distribution.  The Federal Bureau of Commercial Fisheries was created with the passage of the 
Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956.
26
  The bureau was heavily involved in lamprey research and 
control.  In Canada the Canadian Department of Fisheries carried out similar research. The Great 
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Lakes Fishery Commission worked as a coordination and information sharing body for the 
programs operating in each nation.
27
 
 Backlash at chemical control 
 
By the late 1950s and early 1960s resistance was growing toward state and federal 
programs aimed at controlling various species regarded by government agencies as pests.  Most 
of the outcry was directed at control programs for mammals and insects.  Fish and other water 
based animals, often regarded by human beings as radically different and inferior, living out of 
site and less accessible, received less attention.  However, the freshwater of the Great Lakes 
system was a source of drinking water for millions.  Water purity would play an important role in 
what would become a protracted and bitter feud over pest control and the widespread use of 
toxins in the environment.  Sodium fluoroacetate, popularly known as Compound 1080, was the 
Federal government‟s lethal answer to predator and rodent control.  When a concerned resident 
of Monroe, Michigan wrote to a newly elected President Kennedy in 1961 expressing his 
concerns about an article he read in Nature magazine condemning the widespread use of 
Compound 1080 by Federal wildlife control officials, his letter was forwarded to Assistant 
Director of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife Lansing A. Parker.
28
  Parker denied the 
article‟s claims, saying that the government‟s poisoning campaigns had no “deleterious” effects 
on “desirable wildlife.”29  While Parker supported the poisoning campaign, he was not 
supportive of  all of the government‟s control efforts.  He was critical of the government‟s 
pesticide use in its fire ant control program.
30
  While fire ants did not inhabit the Great Lakes 
region, DDT and other pesticides were widely used to protect crops and kill other insects.  By 
1965 a report on the Great Lakes acknowledged that pesticides were “accumulating” in the 
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environment and affecting both populations of fishes and posing a human health hazard.
31
  Even 
as concern was mounting regarding the application of chemicals to control animals and insects 
deemed undesirable on land, researchers at Hammond Bay had settled upon their own chemical 
control compound for the waters of the Great Lakes.  In 1958 they discovered TFM (3-
trifluoromethyl-4-nitrophenol) was particularly lethal to lampreys and believed relatively 
harmless to most other fishes.  Widespread treatment of Lake Superior‟s tributaries began 
thereafter and gradually spread to the other Great Lakes.
32
 
 The United States Federal Government and maximum consumption 
 
During the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower the Federal Government 
embraced a renewed commitment to maximum production of fisheries resources.  In 1959 The 
National Academy of Sciences and National Research Council published Turn to the Sea.  
Athelstan Spilhaus, Dean of the University of Minnesota's Institute of Technology and a member 
of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Oceanography authored the tract.  In it he 
argued that there was little difference between the world‟s aquatic resources and farmland.  With 
proper management the sea could provide an endless harvest of foodstuffs for the people of the 
world.  The author called for the creation of processing ships that could operate as “huge floating 
chemical factories.”  The ships would work in the midst of fleets of fishing vessels, seasoning 
even the most undesired species of fish into “tasty, nutritive protein.”   Spilhaus predicted the 
rise of floating industrial cities around the most plentiful fishing zones.  He believed aircraft, 
sonar, electrical currents and air bubble fences would eventually be employed into the deepest 
ocean depths to extract the living creatures of the seas from their aquatic homes and plop them 
onto dinner plates in dining rooms around the world. 
33
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In the same year Turn to the Sea was published, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
congratulated the commercial fisheries of the United States for their contributions to the 
American diet.  He labeled their industry as vital to both the nation‟s food requirements and its 
economy.   It was the fourth year in a row Eisenhower had sent personal words of 
encouragement to an industry he held in high esteem.  He believed the commercial fisheries 
needed to use “every possible means” to make their products available to “every American 
family.”  He reassured them that as the American population grew, it would increasingly “turn to 
the sea for more and more of the nutritive food requirements needed to maintain our American 
standard of living.”34  
Growing concerns over the viability of United States commercial fisheries were key 
factors in the decision to restructure the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.  Secretary of 
the Interior Fred A. Seaton spearheaded the reorganization drive.  Seaton had previously served 
as a Senator from Nebraska.  During his tenure in the Interior Department he confronted the 
concerns of fisheries head on.  In May of 1956, a few months before the dramatic reorganization 
of the Fish and Wildlife Service, Seaton‟s department advised the president regarding the major 
issues involved in the decline of the fisheries.  Controlling fluctuations in populations of fishes 
for the benefit of the fishery industry became a core strategy for the department.
35
   Domestic 
food products from farms and livestock were viewed as growing competitors to the fishing 
industry, as were imported products from foreign fisheries.  In fact, the Interior Department went 
so far as to equate fishing and farming on equal terms, bemoaning the fact that farmers on land 
were out producing what they viewed as the farmers of the sea.  They called for greater emphasis 
on the practice and study of “fish husbandry.”36    
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Seaton‟s department suggested promotional campaigns, new products, scientific 
improvement of food quality and increased gear efficiency as ways to resuscitate the ailing 
industry and maximize consumption of fishes.  They further urged that future studies focus on 
predicting marketing trends, and investigate possible relationships between national income and 
consumption rates.  Eisenhower‟s Interior Department pushed for a more aggressive fishery in 
order that it might close the output gap with land based agriculture.  Outside of the assumed 
economic benefit the fisheries would receive through dramatically increasing fish consumption 
by the American public, no definitive reason was given as to why the returns of the commercial 
fisheries needed to be as high as landed agriculture.  Seaton and the Interior presented an 
argument that placed fisheries in a competition with landed agriculture for the stomachs of the 
American public.  The long-term ecological ramifications of initiating an aggressive competition 
with landed agriculture were not considered.  Conservation proposals included “conceivably” 
making payments to fishermen who avoided fishing in areas depleted of fish or that used larger 
nets that would not trap young spawn, continued fish stocking and the maintenance of funding 
for research directed toward maintaining fish populations at “optimum levels of abundance.”37  
While focused on the coastal fisheries, the recommendations were applicable to all commercial 
producers and the reorganization that followed directly affected policies in the Great Lakes.   
In response to the commercial fishing industry‟s economic woes, President Eisenhower 
charged Seaton with the responsibility of developing a solution.  The result was the 
reorganization of the Fish and Wildlife Service, a key component of which was the creation of 
the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (hereafter BCF) and Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife 
within the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.  The move to reorganize Fish and Wildlife 
demonstrated the administration‟s commitment to commercial fisheries‟ interests.  Seaton 
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claimed to formulate his reorganization policy based on meetings held with commercial and 
sport fishing interests, as well as with representatives of national conservation groups.
38
 
Before the reorganization became law a significant amount of opposition arose toward 
the creation of separate bureaus for sport and commercial fisheries within the United States Fish 
and Wildlife Service.  Among the numerous complaints received by the White House was one 
from Ralph G. Carpenter II, Director of the State of New Hampshire Fish and Game Department.  
Carpenter urged the administration to rethink its decision to go forward with the separation of 
fisheries from wildlife management.  He stated that integration of resource management was a 
sound conservation goal, while the proposed dismemberment of the Fish and Wildlife 
Department was politically based.  He charged that the creation of the BCF was “undoubtedly 
sponsored by commercial interests.”39 
Representatives of conservation organizations such as the Forest Conservation Society of 
America, National Parks Association, National Wildlife Federation and the Sport Fishing 
Institute, among others, condemned the reorganization as political pandering.  Collectively, the 
organizations charged that politicians of both parties were conspiring to win key Senate seats in 
coastal states where commercial fisheries played an important role.   The reorganization would, 
they charged, destroy the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service as an effective conservation agency, 
opening it up to increased control by commercial fisheries‟ representatives interested in their 
business profits and not conservation.  The representatives of the various organizations pointed 
to the interrelations of animal species and the importance of managing land and water based 
wildlife as interdependent species.  The groups further charged that the problems besetting 
commercial fisheries were not ones of poor research and outdated equipment, as members of 
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commercial fisheries and their various political allies claimed.  Opponents instead charged that 
fishery problems were rooted in years of rapacious fishing practices carried out by the industry.
40
  
As part of the reorganization, the Pribilof Islands and their fur seal populations were 
brought under the management of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries.  The islands were home 
to huge seasonal seal killings.  The Fouke Fur Company of Saint Louis, Missouri operated under 
contract with the Department of the Interior to carry out the killings, process the skins, and sell 
the finished product at public auction.  The profit potential of the industry was large for the time.  
For instance, in 1954, 63,882 seals were clubbed to death.  The total sales value of the finished 
furs was approximately $8,260,000.
41
  Conservation groups argued that bringing the Pribilof 
Islands under the control of the commercial fisheries would lead to the wholesale destruction of 
animals the industry regarded as predator species, such as hair seals, sea lions, walruses, and 
Beluga Whales.  They feared that fisheries interests would regard those species as threats to the 
commercialized fur seal populations and use that as a justification for their destruction.   
Conservationists stated that any new positions created to address problems in Fish and Wildlife 
should be created within the existing services and suggested the creation of an Assistant 
Secretary of the Interior for Fish and Wildlife was one possible course of action.  They pointed to 
the 1940 consolidation of the old Bureau of Fisheries and Bureau of Biological Survey into the 
Fish and Wildlife Service as an example of sound policy development, and alleged that dividing 
the authority for fish and wildlife between two separate bureaus represented a “definite backward 
step.”42 
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 The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the Great Lakes 
 
Despite the objections of conservation groups across the country, the reorganization was 
made into law with the passage of the Fish and Wildlife Act of August, 1956.  The act chartered 
an aggressive course for the national fisheries with the goal of establishing the “maximum 
sustainable production of fish.”43  The act created the BCF and the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and 
Wildlife.  Guided by the act‟s mandate, the BCF would “increase and maintain forever. . .a 
fishery resource capable of yielding the maximum annual product.”  Fisheries would be 
strengthened by providing “full and fair access” to both the “raw materials” and to the 
“American market” while protecting free enterprise.44  Donald L. McKernan was director of the 
BCF until 1967.  McKernan viewed the commercial fisheries of the United States in terms 
similar to other for profit industries in operation across the country.  He believed the fishing 
“industry, like all others, must have a supply of the raw product before we can do business.  Our 
industry makes use of a natural reproducible resource which comes from the sea.”45  He 
conceded that fishes were not inexhaustible, but advocated an expansion of fishing effort and 
sought to increase the amount of fish being consumed domestically through more efficient 
fishing, processing and marketing.
46
 
The Great Lakes were an area of great interest to the BCF.  In an article written for 
publication by the American Fisheries Society, McKernan pointed out that from 1947-1956 the 
fisheries of the Great Lakes “averaged 77 million pounds,” with total annual catches varying less 
than 10 percent up or down.
47
  McKernan said this was done by targeting historically less 
desirable species.  He stated that while catch tonnages had remained more or less consistent, the 
growing numbers of less desirable species had led to an overall decline in profitability for lake 
fishermen.  He attributed the decline of various historically important species to sea lampreys 
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and other nonindigenous species.
48
  Under McKernan‟s leadership the BCF embraced its 
mandate to maximize commercial harvests.  In 1965 McKernan expressed the desire for a 
“twofold to tenfold increase” in oceanic harvesting, both in U.S. waters and worldwide.  He 
believed the United States was “falling hopelessly behind other fishing nations in catching, 
marketing and in the consumption of fish.”49 
In 1962 McKernan teamed up with Donald R. Johnson, the Bureau of Commercial 
Fisheries Director of Operations in California to produce the article “The Fisheries in the Year 
2000” for Fishing Gazette.  They predicted an intensification of fishing efforts for the American 
fisheries.  A number of new innovations would make increased catches possible. They predicted 
that submarine vessels would be developed to follow fish deep into the sea and negate the effects 
of weather on surface fishing fleets.  Large processing facilities would operate at sea and fleets 
of smaller fishing vessels would unload their catches at the ocean based factories.  Fishing 
vessels would be highly mechanized with small crews and the day‟s catch would require minimal 
handling before processing.  They painted a picture of aggressive catch, processing and 
marketing techniques designed to imbue the commercial fisheries with increasing economic 
profit.
50
   
The BCF deemphasized commercial fishing as a factor in the decline of profitable fish 
stocks.  McKernan argued that science had established that “abundance often fluctuates from 
natural causes” and that the fisheries were often unfairly blamed for those fluctuations.  He 
outlined the bold objectives of the BCF and the commercial fisheries.  He said they would strive 
to “reap maximum sustainable yields from the sea‟s living resources, reduce to a minimum the 
cost of locating and catching fish, and eventually to improve yields by controlling physical and 
biological sources of mortality.”51  Thus the department intended to protect fish from their 
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biological mortality in order to ensure more of them would instead be caught in the nets of the 
fishery at the lowest cost possible.  Fish were to be genetically steered toward “rapid growth, 
disease resistance, and good flavor.”  In a mirroring of the government‟s predator control 
program aimed at protecting animal agriculture, the BCF proposed controlling predators who 
threatened stocks of valuable fishes.
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Led by McKernan, the BCF launched “Operation Trident,” the long range plan for the 
bureau‟s future operations.  Operation Trident mandated that the commercial fishing industry be 
“viable, aggressive, productive and profitable” in the world market.  Fisheries were expected to 
use and apply knowledge of maximum sustainable yield for their respective resources and “find 
economic ways to fully utilize presently under – or non-utilized fisheries available to our 
fishermen.”53  Optimum yields were heralded as the goal for fisheries just as they were “for 
agricultural, forest, and game management.” In order to keep pace with other industries, fishing 
needed to modernize and mechanize. The BCF argued that “age old prejudices” that suggested 
increased efficiency would lead to depletion needed to be challenged.  In the plan the bureau 
argued that fishery explorations were as costly and difficult as oil exploration, but lacked the 
incentive to invest capital since it was “intrinsically impossible” to incorporate the same leasing 
and ownership schemes that accompanied the mineral industries.
54
   
The BCF acknowledged the difficulty of completing Federal research on the fisheries.  A 
great deal of information about the aquatic environments of the oceans and inland lakes remained 
unknown.  In Trident they tried to illustrate the challenges of fishery research by drawing 
comparisons with the management of cattle.  They argued that the problems associated with 
researching the lifecycles of fishes “has been likened to the task of obtaining similar information 
about a herd of cattle in a field, from a balloon drifting above solid cloud cover, with a lariat as 
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the only sampling tool.”55  The bureau launched a program of grants to institutions of higher 
education to encourage and support the training of students interested in fisheries work and 
research.  It was believed that a new era of scholars were essential for keeping the United States 
fishing industries competitive on the world stage.  Fishes were regarded as very valuable for 
human use, contributing to overall health through consumption and readily available to be 
processed into a variety of products, from vitamins to industrial chemicals.  In their Trident plan 
the BCF also claimed the seafaring abilities of the American people were honed as they practiced 
their boating skills in the commercial and recreational capture of fishes.
56
  This presumption was 
an aquatic echo of Frederick Jackson Turner‟s Frontier Thesis which had so neatly packaged the 
development of American character with the taming and utilization of the North American 
wilderness and its inhabitants by white settlers.
57
  Fish still garnered little consideration beyond 
their use as a human commodity.   
The BCF‟s definition of conservation summed up the focus of the department‟s fishery 
management scheme.  Conservation was “a much abused term” they argued, which meant 
“different things to different people.”   For the BCF conservation meant “keeping the resource in 
a condition that will provide the maximum sustained yield of products useful to man.”58  
According to the BCF fish did “not exist in limited quantities” but could “endure forever” with 
proper management.  For the Bureau proper management meant thinning them out by catching 
them.  In an echo of maximum sustained yield theories often applied to forests, the BCF argued 
that large groups of fish were not healthy.  They hypothesized that large groups would starve 
each other by eating up their resources which would lead to a food shortage.  Fish would then be 
weakened from not eating and more likely to fall prey to other predators.  Thus, the older fishes 
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needed to be removed to protect the younger, faster growing species until they too could be 
swept up in commercial nets.
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While the efforts of the BCF were heavily focused on the oceanic fisheries, the Great 
Lakes were part of its charge as well.  A new 65 foot Federal research vessel dubbed the Kaho 
was put to work on the lakes in early 1962.  The vessel was stationed at Saugatuck, Michigan, 
Southeast of Grand Rapids.  During exploratory trawls in Lake Michigan during 1962 the Kaho 
hauled catches dominated by bloater chubs.
60
  In their annual report for 1961 the BCF blamed 
lamprey, smelt and alewives for declines in the trout and chub fishery and for the resultant 
“severe hardship” suffered by the industry.61  They estimated the value of the lake trout fishery at 
eight million dollars but conceded that it had been destroyed by the beginning of the 1960s.  
Similar declines of whitefish and larger species of chubs were well underway.  The BCF assisted 
in the administration of a combined control effort whereby lampricide was applied to streams 
and tributaries in order to control lamprey larva, while adult lampreys were captured in weirs.
62
  
Larger varieties of chubs had been heavily fished by commercial operators.  The bloater chub, a 
variety of cisco, was not valued because of its diminutive size and oily flesh.  They were 
considered a nuisance.  By the 1960s bloaters were the dominate form of chub left in Lake 
Michigan.  The BCF estimated that bloater chubs accounted for upwards of ninety percent of the 
total chub population in that lake.
63
  The BCF was determined to fill the economic holes left by 
the collapse of various fish populations.  The BCF viewed fishes of lesser utilized varieties as the 
foundation of future profitability on the lakes.  Varieties of historically less desirable species like 
bloater chubs were targeted for potential future development.   
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Advertising and public education were important components of the Bureau‟s efforts to 
revitalize the Great Lakes fisheries.  The Bureau maintained a marketing specialist and one home 
economist on its payroll at the laboratory in Ann Arbor.  By the mid 1960s the Bureau was 
spending approximately $13,500 annually on advertising in the State of Michigan.  In addition, 
the BCF conducted outreach which included fish cooking techniques to school lunch 
administrators, military food service staff, restaurant workers and others.  For example, the BCF 
reported that in 1966 a total of 4 demonstrations were provided in Michigan alone for 
approximately 170 food service managers along with “three additional smoked fish seminars” for 
“approximately 150 processors, distributors and retailers of smoked fish products.” 64    While 
they selected a wide variety of fishes for future marketing through processing or smoking 
techniques to make them more palatable, they believed even the least desirable varieties of carp, 
gizzard shad and others could fuel a growing demand for pet food and provide a ready source of 
animal feed for the mink industry.  By BCF estimates the mink industry around the Great Lakes 
required approximately 200 million pounds of fish annually.  In addition to minks, planners 
envisioned a wide array of outlets for processed fish to feed other animal industries.  Agricultural 
animals, zoos and fish farms were considered ready markets for fishes human beings did not care 
to eat.  The growing pet food industry could potentially process tremendous amounts of 
freshwater fishes.  Historically less profitable species were also considered valuable as bait fishes 
that could be reused in the fishery cycle as bait for both commercial and recreational fishermen.
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McKernan played a direct role in formulating and advising research efforts throughout 
the Great Lakes during his tenure in the BCF.  He served on the Great Lakes Fishery 
Commission from 1957-1967, including two years as chair of the commission.  Speaking before 
the commission at its eleventh annual meeting on June 21, 1966, McKernan lauded the successes 
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of the sea lamprey control program in Lake Superior and looked forward to the results of recent 
lampricide treatments in the tributaries of Lake Huron.  While McKernan commended many of 
the efforts of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, he echoed earlier officials and administrators 
when he called for increased coordination of policies and regulations across the Great Lakes 
Basin.  The recreational fisheries were beginning to share equal weight in discussions of Great 
Lakes management.  Sport fishing organizations were vocal and organized.  They pushed their 
own legislative agenda with a political strength that by then eluded the shrinking number of 
Great Lakes commercial operators.  Recreational fishing and the support services it fueled also 
brought growing profits to the Great Lakes States.  Despite McKernan‟s position in the BCF and 
the long history of dominance by the commercial fisheries when discussing legislative initiatives, 
he said the “Commission should consider, with the Province and States, how trout stocks are to 
be shared by the commercial and sport fishermen.”  He advised that it was essential to compile 
information on the growing sport fisheries in order to determine future management schemes.
66
 
 “Too little too late” - Commercial fisheries failures and sea lamprey control 
success 
 
The influence and political clout of sport fisheries were being felt at the state level.  As 
commercial viability and profitability declined, recreational fishing was on the rise.  State offices 
could increase their operational income from licensing schemes.  Sport fishing also promised a 
boon to tourism.  The states began turning away from their tradition of support for the 
commercial fisheries and instead tied their interests to the growing profitability of the sport 
fishing industry.  While Ontario was experimenting with cross breeding native lake trout with 
brook trout, Michigan charted an entirely different course and began planting non-indigenous 
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exotic salt water species that were attractive to recreational fishermen in an effort to turn state 
waters into a sport fishing paradise.  Steelhead and Coho salmon were planted in streams feeding 
into Lakes Michigan and Superior.  The program would bring Michigan into conflict with the 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission over its continued operation of lamprey weirs in streams where 
salmon were being planted.  Divisions between Michigan and Ontario also deepened.  Canadian 
authorities worried about the intentional introduction of yet more exotic species to the lakes.  
However, Ontario‟s Department of Lands and Forests experimented with kokanee salmon 
plantings, a freshwater variety of sockeye salmon.  Michigan‟s conservation authorities and sport 
fishermen resented Canadian commercial operators catching what they perceived as their new 
sport fishes. 
The total production of Ontario‟s commercial fisheries had remained relatively consistent 
in the years following World War II.  In fact, in 1956 the total commercial catch was nearly 60 
million pounds across all lakes – a record for the province.  There were, however, dramatic 
changes in the make-up of the catch.  In Lake Huron the fishery had historically targeted lake 
trout, whitefish and chubs.  The lake trout fishery had collapsed in Canadian waters just as it had 
on Michigan‟s side of the lake.  Fluctuations in numbers of chubs were also reported.  Due to 
dramatic changes in the numbers of other species, the whitefish industry was of paramount 
importance to Canadian fishermen.  In 1959 the total take of whitefish in Georgian Bay and the 
North Channel was 2,600,000 pounds.  Gill nets were the primary technology used, with some 
local areas utilizing pound and trap nets.
67
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During the 1960s the Ontario Department of Lands and Forests expressed growing 
concerns about the viability of the commercial fishery.  In July of 1966 Department Minister A. 
Kelso Roberts prepared a memorandum that was distributed to all of Lake Huron‟s commercial 
operators.  The department initiated a program of refusing to renew licenses that were not used 
over a two year period.  The program was intended to strengthen the resources available to 
commercial and recreational fishermen by weeding out those fishermen who did not depend on 
the fisheries for their livelihood. When a series of appeals were received from a number of 
fishermen who were unable to renew their licenses the department reviewed each case and 
carefully decided who would and would not be granted a renewal.
68
  For example, when three 
brothers in Southampton acquired a commercial license via their father‟s estate in 1966, the 
department opted to deny their renewals. Officials cited the fact that the brothers were not 
themselves fishermen and all had separate sources of income.  The province also withdrew 
licenses for the Sucker Creek Band of Indians at Manitouaning and the Spanish River Band at 
Sagamok, citing their “failure to make returns.” 69   
Some of the fishermen who were denied their license successfully appealed the decision 
and their licenses were reinstated.  The Parr Brothers of Parry Sound appealed and were granted 
a renewal on “compassionate grounds.”  They came from a family that had fished for three 
generations and the department concluded that the new policy had caused them “genuine 
personal distress.”70  Jay Skilliter was the Mayor of Killarney, Ontario.  When his license was 
not renewed he also appealed.  While he was not currently fishing, the community under his 
charge was heavily involved in the fisheries and he considered the continuance of his license 
essential for his public image.  The department decided the blocked renewal caused the mayor 
hardship and his appeal was granted.
71
  However, even in Killarney where the town mayor 
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considered having a commercial fishing license important to maintaining the community‟s 
respect, resistance to commercial operations was on the rise.  In 1964 and 1965 commercial 
fishermen out of Killarney fished in areas where they were in close proximity to recreational 
anglers and charter companies catering to tourists.  Area anglers complained to the Department 
of lands and Forests and to the District Forester.  In 1966 the Department of Lands and Forests 
moved forward with plans for additional restrictions and designated new closed areas.  The 
area‟s commercial fishing association apparently supported the regulations, perhaps to quell the 
any conflict.  The new and expanded restricted areas were specified on the region‟s subsequent 
commercial fishing licenses.
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Charles H.D. Clarke was born in 1909 at Kerwood, Ontario.  He obtained a PhD through 
the Department of Zoology at the University of Ontario in 1935.  After working several years for 
Canada‟s Federal Department of Mines and Resources, Clarke joined Ontario‟s Department of 
Lands and Forests and eventually became Chief of the Fish and Wildlife Branch.
73
 In 1966 
Clarke summed up the province‟s position in regard to the Great Lakes Fishery Commission.  
While the Province of Ontario and the several U.S. States had been party to the development of 
the Great Lakes Commission, they were “not parties to the Great Lakes Treaty. The two parties 
are Canada and the United States as represented by the Federal Governments.” Clarke said the 
Department of Lands and Forests intended to go forward with plantings of splake.   He said his 
department also intended to experiment with kokanee salmon plantings.
74
  Clarke blamed 
lampreys, not fishermen, for the collapse of lake trout populations. The research branch of the 
Department of Lands and Forests shared his opinion.
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By the mid 1960s the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries reported significant progress in 
their TFM control program.  Lake Superior was the first of the Great Lakes to receive 
widespread lampricide treatments of its tributary streams.  On the U.S. side of Lake Superior 16 
electric barriers were also in use by the mid 1960s.  The barriers served as sampling sites to track 
lamprey population fluctuations and eventually the effects of TFM treatments.  At these 
sampling sites the BCF charted a marked decline in captured lampreys.  In 1961 42,119 sea 
lampreys were removed from Lake Superior barrier sites.  In 1966 that number had plummeted 
to 2,869.  In the spring of 1967 the barrier sites captured 1,613 sea lampreys.  At Lake Huron‟s 
Ocqueoc River the electric barrier there captured 631 sea lampreys during 1967s spawning runs.  
That number represented a drop of 834 from the year before although subsequent years would 
see another rise in lamprey populations at that site.  Another tag and release program was 
initiated in an effort to chart lamprey migration patterns and population distribution.  Between 
1966 and 1967 1,706 tagged lampreys were released into Lake Huron by United States and 
Canadian authorities.  Due to the cost of TFM and the amounts necessary for successful 
treatments, United States control agents were also experimenting with different synergists in 
order to save on the amount of TFM necessary for individual applications.  The Hammond Bay 
facility that had discovered TFM‟s toxicity to lamprey undertook additional studies to explore 
the toxicity of lampricide when used in conjunction with the synergist Bayer 73.  While the 
chemicals proved toxic to fish, the concentrations necessary for a lethal dose were deemed high 
enough above the level necessary to kill lamprey to warrant their combined use when 
applicable.
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On the Canadian side of the lake lamprey control efforts followed a similar vein to those 
in the United States.  The two countries coordinated their efforts in order to maximize the effects 
of TFM treatments through the auspices of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission.  The Province 
struggled with its own budgetary issues and the widespread treatment of Lake Huron streams 
was initially delayed because of the substantial ongoing cost of Lake Superior treatments.
77
  In 
December of 1965 Charles H. D. Clark informed district foresters working along Lake Huron‟s 
Canadian coastline that he expected the sea lamprey program to soon spread to Lake Huron 
proper, beginning with treatments of the St. Marys River area.  Clarke was optimistic about the 
rehabilitation of Huron‟s trout population.  He predicted sea lamprey controls combined with 
Ontario‟s concurrent program of planting splake hybrids would restore a vibrant trout fishery to 
the lake.
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By the mid-1960s sea lampreys had penetrated deep into the Ontario interior via Lake 
Huron‟s numerous streams and tributaries.  Government authorities struggled to track lamprey 
migrations through Canadian waters.  Sometimes separating sea lamprey infestations from 
indigenous lamprey activity proved challenging.  In the summer of 1967 a party of pike 
fishermen on Woseley Bay along the French River reported catching marked pikes and other 
fishes with attached lampreys on them.  It was further reported that a muskellunge (a relative of 
the Northern Pike), was observed floating in the water with “four or five lamprey hanging on it.”  
The lampreys were described as having the diameter of a pencil and being “dirty white” in color.  
A biologist in Ontario‟s sea lamprey control unit believed the lampreys were actually silver 
lampreys, a freshwater species indigenous to the lakes.  Officials were surprised at accounts of 
such a large number of marked fish in the area.
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The chemical treatment of sea lampreys was spreading during a period of increasing 
public resistance toward the widespread application of chemicals to control various species.  In 
1962 Rachel Carson‟s Silent Spring was published in the United States.  Silent Spring criticized 
the vigorous and often compulsory application of industrial pesticides as a control mechanism 
for varieties of insects human beings labeled as pests.  Carson documented the widespread chain 
of poisonings that often accompanied those chemical applications.  Her title referred to a future 
spring when no birds would sing.  Silent Spring uncorked a fountainhead of growing public 
concern regarding the mismanagement of environmental landscapes and life forms.   
In 1966 TFM treatments of streams around Lake Huron‟s North Channel began in earnest 
and in subsequent years gradually moved south around the Canadian side of the lake.  
Lampricide treatments proved controversial in the changing climate of ecological thought.  In 
June of 1966 the Ontario legislature took up the question of lampricide applications in the Root 
River and other streams near Sault Ste. Marie, Canada.  The control program was spreading into 
Lake Huron from Lakes Superior and Michigan.  House member D.A. Patterson asked whether 
lampricide applications were justified considering the losses of other fishes as a result of 
treatments.  The Minister of Lands and Forests A.K. Roberts assured Patterson losses in other 
fishes were not significant.  Roberts further opinioned that the synergist Bayer 73 was the likely 
culprit in the deaths of most other non-target species.  He was confident of the program and said 
it would eventually include all tributaries inhabited by lampreys in the Great Lakes.
80
  As 
Roberts predicted, the chemical control program subsequently spread throughout Lake Huron‟s 
rivers and streams.   
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Despite political approval and assurances to the public of the safety of TFM, the 
Department of Fisheries continued to meet with resistance from localities concerned with the 
new chemical applications.  The Noisy River is a tributary of the larger Nottawasaga River off of 
Southern Georgian Bay, Ontario.  In 1968 the Noisy River Fishing Club was advised to delay its 
annual stream stocking until after planned lampricide treatments.  The advice raised alarm.  
Applications of TFM occurred in the river system in 1961, but this was the first application since 
then.  A drop in fish wounding and mortality as a result of sea lamprey predation had followed 
the 1961 application.  By 1968 sea lamprey populations had rebounded and officials believed 
widespread treatment of neglected Canadian rivers and tributaries around Georgian Bay and 
Lake Huron proper were overdue.  They hoped to eventually achieve results similar to those 
calculated for Lake Superior, where there was an estimated 90% decline in sea lamprey 
populations following the regular application of TFM.
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Officials assured residents that there was little or no danger to other fishes from the TFM 
applications.  If there was no danger as authorities claimed, then why, some residents wondered, 
were they now warned not to plant fishes until after the treatments?  Author Richard S. Lambert 
took the cause to the local press.  In a provocatively titled “ „Silent Spring’ on the Noisy?” 
Lambert accused officials of poisoning the river, threatening the local water supply and failing to 
properly notify residents of the chemical applications.
82
  Lambert did not go unnoticed.  Chief of 
the Fish and Wildlife, Charles H.D. Clarke wrote Dr. J.J. Tibbles regarding Lambert‟s article.  
Tibbles worked in Ottawa‟s Department of Fisheries and was the Director of the Sea Lamprey 
Control Experiment.  Clarke said he believed Lambert submitted his letter “only to tarnish our 
images and not to correct any situation particularly.”83   
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4,448 gallons of lampricide were used in applications of the Nottawasaga River System 
in 1968.  Ottawa‟s Department of Fisheries acknowledged that subsequent fish mortality was 
“much higher than anticipated” in the system.  Suckers and carp suffered “heavy mortality” 
while walleyes, pikes, alewives, bass and other fishes were also killed.  The Department of 
Fisheries believed higher water temperatures potentially contributed to the large die-offs.   
Nonetheless, they conceded that the TFM applications produced a “spectacular and regrettable 
fish kill.”84  Following the chemical treatments Lambert again wrote an editorial for the local 
news questioning the economics of the program and pointed out that he had personally 
discovered numerous species of fishes killed by the lampricide.  He claimed that fishing had 
been good before the treatments, but declined precipitously afterward.  He did concede that a low 
water level may have contributed to the decline in fishing fortunes.
85
  In August Richard S. 
Lambert contacted Dr. Tibbles and asked about the recent treatments as well as the fish kill.  
Interestingly, Lambert also expressed his “warm appreciation” for Tibbles‟ recent approval to 
stock 428 trout at the location of Lambert‟s home on the river.86  Director Tibbles informed 
Lambert authorities had removed approximately “six truckloads” of dead fishes from the river 
following the treatments.
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  The Department of Fisheries also released their control data to the 
press, pointing out that the Mad and Noisy Rivers accounted for 98% of “ammocoetes collected 
in the entire Nottawasaga River system.”88 
The following year Richard T. Lambert, Secretary of the Noisy River Fishing Club, urged 
the Department of Fisheries in Ottawa to research “less harmful methods of lamprey control,” 
suggesting that authorities investigate what factors made certain streams unattractive to lamprey 
migration and spawning and attempt to mechanically recreate those conditions elsewhere.
89
  
Tibbles responded that it would be a mistake to try to switch gears after the early successes of the 
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program and that the government lacked the resources to undertake such an ambitious change in 
their program.
90
  Others were supportive of the government‟s control efforts and believed they 
were producing positive results.  As treatments continued and the numbers of sea lampreys 
declined in various regions, support for the control program grew.  At their annual meeting in 
1973 the Lake Huron and Georgian Bay Fish Producers Association passed a resolution which 
stated in part that they appreciated “the Sea Lamprey Control Program and credit this program 
for the return of a reasonably good fishery in our area of Huron and Georgian Bay, and are 
requesting its continuance.”91 
Canadian authorities enlisted the help of commercial fishermen in acquiring samples of 
sea lamprey specimens.  Beginning in 1967 the government offered a $1.00 reward to 
commercial fishermen who submitted lampreys caught incidental to their main catch.  Fishermen 
were required to provide the place, date and method of capture in order to qualify for the 
payments.
92
  Between 1967 and 1968 Canadian commercial fishermen submitted nearly 5,500 
sea lampreys together with information relevant to the circumstances of their acquisition in the 
catch.  Most of the lampreys originated as a bycatch in pound nets and large mesh gill nets meant 
for whitefish as well as in small mesh gill nets used to target chubs.  Based on their various 
sampling methods Canadian officials believed the North Channel showed declines in the 
numbers of sea lampreys caught from 1967 until 1968, while Huron‟s main basin did not.  They 
correlated the declines with treatments of most North Channel streams with TFM.  Various 
sampling statistics also noted a gradual decline in the number of male sea lampreys in favor of 
more female specimens.
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In addition to the chemical treatment program, Canadian authorities continued to take 
assessments of lamprey populations using fixed electric barrier traps.  Barriers predated chemical 
treatments and the growing costs of the control program inevitably fostered interest in cutting 
components of the program that might be unnecessary.  Because of the initial successes and 
growing reliance on TFM some organizations such as the Fisheries Research Board of Canada, 
questioned the desirability of continuing the use of barrier technologies.
94
  However, barriers 
remained a critical component of assessment and control.  Most trap designs evolved 
considerably from their earliest designs.  Various traps were examined or experimented with in 
the early years of the sea lamprey control program.  Early mechanical traps functioned in a 
manner similar to pound nets.  The first mechanical barriers laid across streams and guided fishes 
and lampreys into a holding area at the rear of the barrier.  Fish were then removed from the 
device and allowed to continue upstream while lampreys were removed and destroyed.  The 
earliest barrier devices were difficult to maintain.  The wire mesh along the wings extended to 
the shore and was designed to guide lampreys into the holding area.  Rivers and streams often 
carry significant amount of sediment, leaves and branches.  During winters months flows of ice 
chunks are common in streams and rivers around the Great Lakes.  The wings of mechanical 
traps tended to clog with various water borne deposits.  This would lead to area flooding or 
would cause the structure to collapse from water pressure.
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The first electric barrier was put into use in 1951.  Electric barriers that utilized AC 
current became a favored mechanical control structure.  In 1960, 162 barriers that combined 
mechanical traps with electricity were installed by Canadian and U.S. authorities.  Early 
electrical barriers used AC current and were prone to power outrages and other mechanical 
problems.
96
  They also electrocuted non-target fishes.  Charles H.D. Clarke expressed his own 
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concerns with those unintended kills in April of 1966.  By then Clarke was a Great Lakes 
Fisheries Commissioner.  He suggested the organization investigate other control means.  
However, on both sides of the border there were concerns about the affect changing to a new 
sampling technology would have on tracking overall statistics.
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In 1969 Ottawa‟s Department of Fisheries oversaw the operation of nine electrical 
barriers on the Canadian side of Lake Huron.
98
  The numbers of lampreys caught in those 
barriers fluctuated from year to year.  In some areas there were dramatic declines after the advent 
of chemical control.  For example, at the Still River off of Georgian Bay, 1,621 lampreys were 
captured in 1969.  In 1971 the total dropped to 960.  In 1973 only 14 were captured at that 
location.  At the Mad River, a tributary of the Nottawasaga River off of Southern Georgian Bay 
42 sea lampreys were captured in 1969.  In 1971 that total had dropped to 15, and in 1973 none 
were captured at the Mad River site.  However, even as the chemicals proved effective in various 
locations, sea lampreys reestablished themselves elsewhere and were discovered in new areas.  
In 1973 the Department of the Environment at the Sea Lamprey Control Center in Sault Ste. 
Marie Canada reported that “surveys revealed previously undetected sea lamprey populations in 
two streams” including the Western Channel of the French River where commercial fishermen 
had reported an increase in scarred fishes.  Sea lampreys had also re-established themselves in 
areas believed cleared, including numerous streams on St. Joseph‟s Island in Lake Huron‟s North 
Channel.
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In Michigan a barrier on the Ocqueoc River showed substantial declines during the same 
period, although there were fluctuations in the total number of lampreys removed each year.  In 
1969, 3,291 lampreys were removed from the Ocqueoc barrier.  In 1970 the total dropped to 736, 
but rose again to 2,997 in 1971.  2,847 were removed in 1972.  In 1973 the total had again 
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dropped.  639 lampreys were removed from the Ocqueoc River barrier that year.
100
  By 
comparison, traps in the Ocqueoc River had produced 4,608 lampreys in 1945.  Native lampreys 
were caught in the barriers as well and were sometimes included in overall statistics.
101
  There 
were fluctuations elsewhere.  In May of 1968 Frederick H. Dahl of the Bureau of Commercial 
Fisheries Biological Station in Marquette, Michigan estimated that four times as many lampreys 
were being captured during lamprey spawning runs compared to the previous year.
102
  Barriers 
sometimes served as tools for the assessment of other species as well.  For example, in July of 
1969 J.M. Halpenny, the District Forester for the Lake Huron region contacted C.H.D. Clarke in 
the Fish and Wildlife Branch of the Department of Lands and Forests.  Halpenny requested that 
eye bolts be affixed to the downstream side of several new barriers being built in various streams 
around the lake.  The eye bolts were designed to hold salmon traps that would be placed on the 
barriers during May and June in order to sample and study migrating fishes.
103
  
After the widespread success of chemical treatments many barriers were removed.  The 
remaining barriers were used as a method of sampling lamprey populations and the overall 
effectiveness of the chemical program.  The electric barriers were expensive to build and 
maintain.  Alternating current barriers were eventually phased out due their mechanical 
instability and ongoing negative impacts on other fishes.  Low head barriers dated to the 1950s 
and by the 1970s became the preferred barrier type.  Low head barriers provide a physical 
impediment that lampreys are unable to pass.  Fish pass the barrier either by jumping over it or 
utilizing a fishway.  A fishway is a passage around barriers for migrating fishes that still impedes 
lampreys.  Various barrier designs incorporated slots for fish passages, lamprey traps or passive 
sorting of fishes and lampreys.  Despite the various modifications, barriers still affect non-target 
species to varying degrees.  Prior to 1975 the Great Lakes Fishery Commission did not use 
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barriers.  In 1975 the Commission officially recognized the utility of barriers as a valuable part 
of an integrated control program and in 1978 allocated the first $250,000 was allocated by the 
commission to support the construction of barrier technology.  In the early 1980s their financial 
commitment to barriers rose into the millions.
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Assessments provided other information as well.  One biological change that occurred in 
sea lampreys appeared particularly ominous.  In the 1960s authorities noted a growing 
preponderance of female sea lampreys over assessment years.  Although sea lamprey populations 
had historically favored male abundance, demographic impacts from TFM and other control 
measures appeared to contribute to a dramatic population shift.  Female sea lampreys 
significantly outnumbered males in sampled populations as control efforts in Lake Huron 
intensified in the 1960s. The highly adaptable populations compensated for losses by favoring 
females.
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Granular Bayer 73 (also known as Bayluscide) is used in locations where TFM is less 
effective.  Like TFM, the chemical affects the gill structure of ammocoetes (lamprey larva).  
Bayer 73 has been found to cause greater damage to the cell structure of lamprey gills than 
TFM.
106
  In areas treated with the granular form of Bayer 73 lamprey larva often emerged from 
the river bottom mud and could then be collected swimming in the water.  Sometimes Bayer 73 
is used in conjunction with TFM.  When used together the combination proved quite deadly on 
lampreys.  Since Bayer 73 increased the effectiveness of treatments it was possible to reduce the 
amount of TFM used when both chemicals were used.  Despite its apparent benefits, Canadian 
officials in the Department of Fisheries and Forestry acknowledged that increased non-target fish 
kills were a problematic side effect of using the granular form of Bayer 73.
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The St. Marys River stretches nearly 75 miles and serves as a border between Ontario and 
Michigan.  Its channel provides an outflow from Lake Superior into Lake Huron.  The 
Department of the Environment at the Sea Lamprey Control Center in Sault Ste. Marie, Canada 
used surface trawling as a way to sample adult lampreys in the St. Marys River in order to gauge 
their abundance.
 108
  The trawling operations began in 1963 and in 1966 the department began 
monitoring the catch rates per hour.  Over the ensuing years they charted a gradual decline in 
overall sea lamprey numbers.  As early as 1968 they surmised the decline might indicate that sea 
lamprey control measures in the North Channel were limiting lamprey access to the St. Marys 
River.  They also assumed that lampreys were not using the St. Marys River as a major spawning 
area.  They concluded the river was primarily a migratory channel lamprey were utilizing to 
move between lakes and to travel to other preferred spawning areas.
109
  In 1973 the Bureau of 
Sport Fisheries and Wildlife cooperated with Canadian officials in the application of Bayer 73 to 
sections of the St. Marys River.
110
  The numbers of spawning lampreys were assumed to be 
relatively low in the river.   
Over the next two decades the numbers of lampreys utilizing the St. Marys River for 
spawning rose dramatically.  Eventually the St. Marys River was recognized as the most prolific 
spawning area for sea lampreys in the entire Great Lakes Basin.  A variety of scenarios were 
considered as to why the St. Marys became a key spawning area.  Some researchers blamed 
stream improvements and contaminant cleanups for unintentionally making the river a more 
lamprey friendly habitat.  Others pointed to correlations between increased stocking of salmon 
and lake trout as well as the prevalence of bloaters, a favored target for smaller lamprey that have 
just entered the parasitic phase of their life cycle.
111
  Sea lampreys demonstrated remarkable 
adaptation in the face of determined control efforts.  Perhaps the lack of secure spawning areas in 
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heavily treated streams led to eventual migrations into previously underutilized regions such as 
the St. Marys River.  Whatever the cause of their heavy incursions into the river, by 1996 sea 
lamprey populations in northern Lake Huron were rivaling the numbers existent prior to the 
development of TFM.
112
  In 1998 heavy, targeted applications of Granular Bayluscide from 
helicopters became a regular cycle at the river as authorities struggled to control lamprey 
numbers in what was by then the largest and most heavily utilized spawning zone in all of the 
Great Lakes.
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 Intentional evolution: bureaucratic efforts to repopulate Lake Huron with 
profitable species 
 
The 1960s and early 1970s fostered optimism for the chemical control program in the 
Great Lakes.  As sea lamprey populations declined to more manageable numbers, concurrent 
restocking programs were underway.  In the Province of Ontario and State of Michigan officials 
worked to rebuild the profitability of Lake Huron through the planting of valuable species.  
Ontario focused substantial time and resources on the production of splakes.  Splakes are a 
hybrid fish. They are the result of breeding brook trout with lake trout.  Splakes grow faster than 
lake trout and their rapid maturity was seen as beneficial if they were to survive and thrive in 
lamprey infested waters.  Splakes were intended to fill the hole in the fishery left by the collapse 
of native lake trout populations. Many hoped splakes would not only rehabilitate the fishery, but 
also play an important role as a predator in controlling the large numbers of smelts and alewives 
in the lakes.   
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In addition to splakes, the Ontario Department of Lands and Forests experimented with 
planting Kokanee salmon.  The species was selected due to its anadromous physiology.  Since 
they spawned in freshwater they were expected to adapt well to the inland lakes.  Kokanee eggs 
were obtained from the states of Montana, Colorado and Washington as well as the Province of 
British Columbia.  Planting of Kokanees in Lake Huron began in 1964.  Hundreds of thousands 
of eggs, fry and fingerlings were planted at sites around Georgian Bay over the next several 
years.  Researchers found that the Kokanees received less attention from lamprey at maturity 
than other species.  This was attributed to the smaller size of Kokanees overall in relation to 
other Great Lakes species.  The incidence of lamprey markings rose steadily as the examined 
specimens went up in size.  For example, Kokanees with lengths of 32 through 35.9 centimeters 
had markings on only 2% of the fish caught and examined.  Fish with lengths of 40 through 43.9 
centimeters had wounds on 3.9% of the fish examined.  However, among the largest specimens 
that measured 44 through 47.9 centimeters 16.7% bore evidence of lamprey predation.  This held 
true for other species as well.  For example, when examining Coho salmons – a much larger 
species introduced by the State of Michigan – 73% were found to have wounding and scars from 
lampreys.  Fishery experts in Ontario‟s Department of Lands and Forests were confident of the 
Kokanee plating program, pointing to the diversity of sources sampled for Kokanees and the lack 
of high numbers of apex predators with which the introduced species would compete.  They 
believed the Kokanees would fill a niche in much the same way sea lampreys and alewifes had.
 
114
  Despite the high hopes, however, Kokanee numbers dwindled after stocking efforts ended in 
the 1970s. 
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By the 1960s Michigan‟s Department of Conservation favored policies supportive of 
sport fishing over the needs of what remained of the commercial industry.  Ralph A. MacMullen 
became director of the department in 1964.  Under his leadership the department charted a new 
course that favored recreational fisheries.  Coho and Chinook salmon became the centerpiece of 
a new push to stock the lakes with species attractive to the lucrative sport fishing industry.  When 
the introduced species became wildly popular with anglers, the Michigan Department of 
Conservation introduced new restrictions to commercial licensing legislation, quota fishing and 
eventually zoning regulations that quickly eroded the number of commercial operators on 
Michigan‟s Great Lakes.  There were over seven hundred commercial fishermen operating in 
Michigan‟s Great Lakes waters in 1967.  By 1970 that total plummeted to less than two 
hundred.
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While the introduced species thrived in Lake Michigan, their numbers were much lower 
in Lake Huron and Superior.  MacMullen blamed Canadian commercial fishermen.  In 1970 he 
wrote to Rene Brunelle, Ontario‟s Minister in the Department of Lands and Forests to complain 
about commercial fishermen in Ontario catching planted salmon.  MacMullen pointed out that 
Michigan commercial fishermen were forbidden from catching the planted salmon.  He 
suggested that Ontario should do the same thing.  Brunelle responded that his department was 
interested in the maintenance of both recreational and commercial fishing.  He pointed out the 
higher incidence of lampreys in Lake Huron as opposed to Michigan as well as the lower 
numbers of prey fishes for the salmon to feed on as likely culprits in the depressed numbers. He 
reported that Canadian fishermen believed the planted salmons were depressing numbers of 
walleyes in the area.  Frustrated by their inability to change Ontario‟s regulations to suite 
Michigan‟s sport fishery, the Michigan Department of Conservation turned to the media.  The 
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Detroit News quoted departmental scientist Dr. Wayne H. Tody‟s harsh words for Ontario.  “I 
don‟t know how we can be expected to keep pouring salmon into Lake Huron to have Ontario 
commercial fishermen make big money off them,” he said.  The paper reported that department 
scientists had penned a new letter for the Ontario Minister, but MacMullen decided to tone it 
down before sending it.
116
  Nearly a century after the first Joint Commission recommended 
cooperative management of the Great Lakes, old suspicions and regional interests continued to 
influence relations between the province and the states.  
 No new Wellands: Saving the Big Chute Marine Railway 
 
The collapse of lake trout and other commercialized fish populations had far reaching 
effects for the Great Lakes Basin.  The alarm engendered by sea lamprey introductions had 
repercussions for a wide variety of industrial and recreational enterprises.  While economics 
continued to guide policies, for some an evolution in thinking occurred.  An excellent example of 
the changed realities of life in the Great Lakes Basin can be seen in plan to modernize the 
popular Trent-Severn Waterway in the 1960s.  The Trent-Severn system provides an aquatic link 
between Lake Ontario and Georgian Bay.  The waterway was used primarily by recreational 
boaters.  Running from Trenton, Ontario East to Port Severn on Georgian Bay, traffic along the 
waterway increased dramatically in the second half of the twentieth century.   
North of Lake Simcoe the waterway passed through two unique marine railways.  At 
those junctures boats would position themselves over top of a submerged carriage.  The carriage 
was then raised out of the water and pulled along a railroad track to the next water body along 
the route.  The railways were originally meant to be temporary structures that would serve 
smaller vessels until permanent locks could be constructed.  One marine railway operated at 
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Swift Rapids and the second one was at Big Chute, East of Glouchester Pool off of Georgian 
Bay.  Big Chute was the railway closest inland from Georgian Bay.  In January of 1962 the 
Canadian Federal Government announced plans to replace the aging and overburdened marine 
railways with modern locks.  The new locks would improve the speed of the canal system and 
allow larger vessels passage.
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In the mid-1960s the Swift Rapids Marine Railway was demolished and replaced with a 
permanent lock.  The aging marine railway at Big Chute was similarly targeted for replacement.  
However, concerns mounted that doing so would provide sea lamprey in Georgian Bay access to 
Lake Simcoe via the waterway.  In April of 1962 Minister of Lands and Forests J.W. Spooner 
contacted Dominion Minister of Transport Leon Balcer asking if there was a danger to the 
profitable sport fisheries of Lake Simcoe.  Spooner pointed out sea lampreys had already 
migrated into Glouchester Pool on the East side of Big Chute.  He highlighted the economic 
importance of Lake Simcoe and said that investments “catering to ice fishermen in one corner of 
the lake alone” amounted to over one million dollars.118  Balcer responded that current 
conditions on the waterway would require two railway hoists instead of one.  “This would leave 
no room for expansion while doubling our operating costs” he argued.  He pointed out that a new 
lock system could handle four times the amount of traffic of a railway hoist system “at much 
lower operating and maintenance charges.”119  Balcer was not alone.  Ontario‟s Chief of the 
Division of Fish and Wildlife Charles H. D. Clarke cautiously expressed skepticism that lamprey 
would enter the lake, though he admitted it was not impossible.  Still, he believed there would 
probably be “no damage” if they did.  He compared Lake Simcoe with inland lakes of the State 
of New York where he said lampreys “seem to live quite happily with members of the trout 
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family,” though he qualified this statement by saying it was impossible to guarantee that no 
damage would occur.
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Critics were not dissuaded.  In an interesting turn of events the Ontario Federation of 
Hunters and Anglers appealed to the Ontario Department of Lands and Forests and found a 
sympathetic ear in W.H.R. Werner, Supervisor of the Commercial Fish Section.  Werner pushed 
for a meeting of experts to discuss the issue.
121
  On October 18
th
, 1962 a group of Canadian 
academics, government officials including Werner as well as Charles Evans from the Ontario 
Hunters and Anglers Association met to discuss the implications of constructing the new lock 
systems.  While on paper it looked like lamprey could enter Lake Simcoe traveling from the 
other end of the waterway, the height of the passage, extensive lock system and other 
environmental factors worked as a natural barrier to lampreys along the opposite end of the 
waterway.  In fact, sea lampreys had only ascended the lower Trent River as far as the first dam.  
Attendees also noted that lampreys had migrated into two lakes in Michigan after navigating lock 
systems on connected rivers.
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The attendees were unanimous in their conclusions.  They believed the new locks would 
likely lead to sea lampreys becoming established in Lake Simcoe via the waterway from 
Georgian Bay.  They also concluded that other nonnative species such as alewives and smelts 
would also migrate inland via the waterway.  They feared that introducing sea lampreys to the 
lake would require “perpetual control,” and expressed skepticism that the control methods then 
being developed would ever completely eradicate lampreys from the Great Lakes or Lake 
Simcoe, should lampreys become established in the latter.
123
  They believed it was theoretically 
possible for a lamprey to be carried into the waterway on one of the marine railway platforms, 
but thought it unlikely.  They recommended the possibility be investigated.
124
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In the meantime, investigations were underway to try to find alternate solutions.  R.W. 
McCauley oversaw experiments for the Ontario Department of Lands and Forests at its Southern 
Research Station in Maple, Ontario.  McCauley investigated the affect of high temperatures on 
sea lampreys.  The idea was to heat water within a lock to a temperature high enough to kill any 
sea lamprey entering a lock with surface canal traffic.  The lock would remain closed while the 
water was heated.  After a period of time the second gate would be opened.  McCauley 
recommended a temperature of 98 degrees be maintained for ten minutes between the closing 
and opening of a lock‟s gates.125   
Despite the desire for increasing the efficiency of the waterway, planners eventually 
decided the existing construction provided an effective deterrent to lamprey migrations.  Since 
there was no lock, there was a complete break in the water system.  Individual boats would be 
out of the water for some time as they traversed over the railway.  The decision was made to 
construct a newer marine railway capable of transporting larger pleasure craft near the site of the 
old railway at Big Chute.  In 1978 construction was completed on the new, modernized marine 
railway.  The older railway served as a back-up whenever there were problems with the new 
system.  As many as two hundred small craft a day began passing over the marine railway on 
their way through the Trent-Severn Waterway.
126
  Ontario officials had learned from the 
oversights at the Welland Canal.  While economic concerns about the impact on fisheries and 
tourism at Lake Simcoe played a significant role in the planning and decision to retain a marine 
railway at Big Chute, the practical effect of the modernized construction protected the integrity 
of the interior ecosystems of the Trent-Severn Waterway.  More recently new problems have 
arisen that threaten the interior waters of the canal system.  Nonindigenous species like zebra 
mussels and contamination from human generated pollutants threaten the waterway.
127
  Despite 
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the preservation victory at Big Chute, the Trent-Severn system continues to reflect the 
environmental stresses prevalent throughout the Great Lakes.   
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Afterword 
The Great Lakes Basin is a huge ecosystem – one might argue an interconnected 
freshwater biome - of interacting communities of plants, water and land based animals including 
human beings, and a huge variety of rich and unique landscapes.  It took millions of years for the 
rich and diverse biota of the region to develop the complex and awe inspiring dance of 
reciprocity that characterized the region.  The first human beings in the area considered much of 
the region and its inhabitants sacred and incorporated them into human origin stories and rituals.  
While there was undoubtedly an occasional waste of resources, Indian technologies were built to 
sustain patterns of subsistence.  Rituals and respect that often recognized a shared 
interdependence guided much of the regional indigenous use of living resources.  With the influx 
of the first European explorers and settlers into the region, a western market system was 
introduced.   
After Independence the United States moved along a fast track of capitalist development 
that shouldered aside older craft trades and replaced them with assembly lines, industry, and 
mass production.  The raw materials of North America, both plant and animal, were intensively 
harvested with an eye toward maximum yields for maximum profits.  These were the economic 
processes that defined the Great Lakes commercial fishing industry.  The rich aquatic 
populations of the lakes fueled the rapid dissemination of fishermen and market outlets. When 
Lake Ontario‟s fisheries collapsed commercial harvesters moved farther inland to Lakes Erie, 
Huron, Michigan and Superior.  While many fishermen operated with limited means, those who 
could afford it embraced mechanization and change.  Steam tugs and gasoline boats began 
traversing the lakes in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.  The replacement of twine gill 
netting with first cotton and later nylon greatly improved catch efficiency.  The 1913 
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development of the Crossley lifter reduced the amount of time required to fish long gangs of 
nets.  Nets and traps were improved, enlarged and set deeper.  As fish catches decreased the 
number of nets and other fishing gear in the lakes increased.  Technologies were further modified 
and fishermen strove to maximize their catch totals in the increasingly competitive and 
precarious fishery. 
Fishermen did not intend to destroy the fishes of the lakes, but made little effectual effort 
to preserve them.  If fish markets became glutted with a given species fishermen often responded 
with even more intensive efforts at still higher yields to improve their profits.  Efforts at 
management and regulation of fishing resources incorporated the same profit motive.  Fish were 
managed for maximum yield, similar to the usage patterns applied to the Northern forests of the 
day.  Just as the woodlands of the Great Lakes region were clear cut with wild abandon, so too 
were the rich biota of the lakes fished to near oblivion.  The living communities within the lakes 
were viewed as either commodities or pests, with no apparent intrinsic value of their own.  
Species that existed outside the market system were almost always viewed as pests because it 
was believed they competed with marketable fish for resources.  The complex ecological 
interconnections of Huron‟s aquatic ecosystem were not understood nor cared for.  Introduced 
species were welcomed only when they proved to have some monetary value for the fisheries.  
Of the numerous nonindigenous species introduced to Lake Huron in the first half of the 
twentieth century; smelts, sea lampreys and alewives generated some of the greatest 
controversies and brought dramatic changes to the ecology of the lakes. 
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In his 1968 essay “The Tragedy of the Commons” Garrett Hardin outlined a model that 
described the problems inherent in sharing environmental resources within a profit based market 
system.  Hardin used the example of herdsmen grazing animals in a shared field.  Individual 
herdsmen experience disproportionate benefit by increasing the number of animals they graze.  
Although overgrazing eventually occurs, the negative effects of overgrazing are shared by all.  
Thus, argued Hardin, a herder experiences a +1 gain with the addition of a single animal, while 
the negative impact of overgrazing is significantly less than -1, as it is divided between all 
herders.  Without controls, the tendency is for each herdsman to add as many animals as they can 
until the pasture is destroyed.  Destruction is not the goal, but it is the result of maximizing 
individual benefit at the expense of the group and the resource.
1
  In a 1998 follow-up to his 
famous thesis Hardin applied his theory to marine fisheries.
2
  He concluded that coercive 
controls were necessary to prevent resource destruction in a shared commons.  Hardin‟s 
conclusions reflect the history of commercial fisheries on the lakes.  Free of legislative oversight 
or consistent enforcement individual fishermen abused the resources they depended on.  When 
resource depletion occurred, fishermen did not attempt to preserve their livelihood over the long 
term.  Instead they strove to maintain their profits in the short term.  Fishing effort (and by 
extension resource destruction), intensified, sometimes spectacularly so. 
In his book The Fisherman’s Problem, Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries, 
1850-1980 (1986) Arthur F. McEvoy argued that Hardin‟s model did not accurately reflect the 
West Coast marine fisheries.  McEvoy believed fishermen, fisheries and government bodies 
evolved together.  He believed the California fisheries operated as communities and legislative 
controls grew from cooperation between government and industry.  At the time of his writing 
McEvoy was upbeat regarding the future of California‟s fisheries and pointed to the Fishery 
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Conservation and Management Act of 1976 as charting a bold new course in fisheries 
management.
3
  So too did Great Lakes fishermen contribute to, support or forestall state, 
provincial, national and international legislation.  The various regional and international 
commissions faced tremendous political obstacles when they failed to mollify the concerns of 
commercial fishermen.  However, these facts do not disprove Hardin‟s central argument.  
Individual fishermen went to great lengths to ensure their personal profits at the expense of any 
commitment to the greater community.  Edward Landry and Lawrence Trombley‟s Saginaw Bay 
seining operations are an obvious example among many.  Hardin‟s belief that resource extractors 
must be coerced through legislative controls is not somehow negated because government 
responses were historically ineffective and often beholden to industry.  It simply illustrates the 
failure to administer sufficient controls to avert the destruction of the commons.  McEvoy‟s own 
example of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 might just as easily be 
incorporated into Hardin‟s model as a form of coercive legislation.  The history of the Great 
Lakes commercial fisheries was a tragedy of the commons writ large. 
This is not meant to suggest the rush for resources and the profits they entail are 
unavoidable.  While McEvoy‟s challenge did not invalidate Hardin, his optimism regarding the 
ultimate possibilities of increased environmental education are well founded, even if in practice 
they often fail to generate truly altruistic controls.  The Great Lakes experienced a series of its 
own forward thinking managerial decisions, sometimes coming in what seemed to be its darkest 
ecological hours.  The decision to retain the marine railway at Big Chute contrasted sharply with 
much of the decision making in the Great Lakes‟ industrial past.  In retrospect the history of 
Lake Huron‟s commercial fisheries has the appearance of an unfortunate march to economic self 
destruction at the expense of a unique and inestimable ecosystem.  While the aquatic ecosystems 
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of the lakes themselves often paid the heaviest initial toll in the name of human progress, the 
ramifications of rapid development bore consequences for the human populations who were 
dependent on the lakes.  Sometimes those consequences were direct and immediate.  Many 
fishermen paid the ultimate price fishing the dangerous and unpredictable waters of the Great 
Lakes.  The lakes are famous for their hazardous waters.  The desire for maximum profits in a 
dangerous profession that demanded work in the worst navigation seasons was a treacherous 
mix.   
Nor was the rush for resources limited to the fisheries.  The history of the Great Lakes is 
littered with the sunken hulls of numerous shipping disasters.  Just as fishermen worked their 
nets into the winter months, so too did cargo ships haul valuable loads late into the dangerous 
winter months.  There are abundant examples of rushed, overburdened or aged ships and crews 
pushed beyond their limits in the name of Great Lakes commerce.  Many people have heard of 
the SS Edmund Fitzgerald, the huge cargo ship that sank with all hands on Lake Superior in 
November of 1975.  However, no event better personified the dangers of Great Lakes shipping 
than the staggering losses that occurred during the November Storm of 1913.  The brand new 
529 foot long James C. Carruthers, then Canada‟s newest and largest vessel on the lakes, was 
among eight large freighters that were swallowed whole by Lake Huron during a fierce 
November gale.
 4
  Construction on the modernized Welland Ship Canal began the same year the 
Carruthers took twenty-two of her crew to the bottom of Lake Huron.  The canal would allow 
even larger international ships and their cargos access to the interior lakes and their ports.  It 
further fueled the scale and pace of the waterborne market networks of the interior lakes.  Little 
thought was given to the possible environmental ramifications of that structure.   
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More shipping meant more foreign ballast water.  More shipping meant increased surface 
traffic, pollution and greater pressure on the ecology of the interior lakes.  A large, modern canal 
with minimal lock obstructions meant a virtual freeway for nonindigenous species migrations.  
Two of the most influential new species to enter the interior lakes through the Welland Canal 
were alewives and sea lampreys.  While it is not certain which exact factors in the modernization 
process opened the proverbial door to those two early emigrant species, numerous factors 
eventually made the waterway an easier passage for both ships and aquatic life.  The canal was 
widened and deepened.  Much of its flow was redirected into different channels.  The number of 
locks was greatly reduced.   
The rush for profit eventually proved quite costly in its own right.  The door human 
engineering opened unleashed unforeseen ecological consequences that eventually cost billions 
in lost revenues and control efforts.  Once the first signs of damage appeared, the introduced 
species were referred to as “invaders” and “invasive species” – terms that removed human 
complicity and instead blamed the species for the changes they caused.  When the staggering 
economic ramifications of sea lamprey introductions became clear the United States and Canada 
finally came together to try to orchestrate cooperative control measures.  The Great Lakes 
Fisheries Commission was the result.  Despite its creation, the commission still lacked the long 
coveted power to legislate.  Individual local, state and regional interests still carried the day.  The 
commission was charged with implementing a program of lamprey control.  Beyond that, it 
served only as an advisory body.  The commission recommended procedures for maximizing the 
productivity of fishes important to the fisheries of both nations.  The population disaster visited 
upon lake trout and other species through the combined pressures of heavy commercial fishing 
and the arrival of sea lampreys finally forced substantial cooperation across borders.  
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Nonetheless, old tensions remained.  Canadian and American authorities soon disagreed on what 
constituted the best methods for restoring the lake fisheries. 
Throughout the legislative processes of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries Great 
Lakes Indian peoples were left out.  Despite their own unique historical and cultural experiences 
their opinions were not considered by the fisheries biologists, conservationists and government 
bureaucrats who designed regulatory policies for the commercial fisheries.  Treaties meant to 
protect retained fishing rights went unenforced.  Most indigenous fishermen lacked the capital 
necessary to compete in the commercial fisheries.  Individual indigenous fishermen were usually 
among the poorest commercial operators in Michigan.  Often Native fishermen worked as 
laborers for some of the larger fishing enterprises.
5
  Indian laborers competed for jobs with 
growing numbers of whites.  Native peoples of the Great Lakes fought to reestablish their treaty 
fishing rights in the late twentieth century.  In the case People v. LeBlanc in 1976 the Michigan 
Supreme Court ruled that Ojibwes and Odawas retained fishing rights guaranteed by the 1836 
Treaty of Washington.  In the case United States v. Michigan in 1979 Federal District Judge Noel 
P. Fox again ruled in favor of Indian peoples and against the State of Michigan and the cadre of 
conservation officials who testified on the state‟s behalf.6   
Despite the court victories, exercising their treaty rights proved a challenging and 
sometimes dangerous affair.  Sport fishermen, often with the support of officers from the 
Michigan State Department of Conservation organized protests and sued to halt indigenous 
fishing.  Sport fishing and hunting publications such as Outdoor Life and Michigan Out-of-Doors 
printed misleading and sensationalized stories to fuel resistance to Indian fishing.  Northwoods 
Call, a publication out of Charlevoix, Michigan was especially virulent.  Writer Glenn Sheppard 
went so far as to publish a fictionalized account of the murder of Federal Judge Noel Fox by 
271 
  
enraged sportsmen.  Vigilantes shot at Indian fishermen, destroyed indigenous fishing gear and 
dubbed Indian peoples the enemies of conservation.
7
  Decades after the rulings in 1976 and 
1979, hostility toward Indian fishing continues to simmer. 
In 2002 the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission published a reassessment of the collapse 
of Great Lakes lake trout during World War II.  Randy L. Eshenroder and Kathryn L. 
Amatangelo examined both the influx of sea lampreys and the effects of the commercial fishing 
industry on lake trout populations.  Drawing on reports and data from the 1940s and early 1950s, 
including a largely overlooked research article by John Van Oosten, they concluded that lake 
trout populations in Lake Michigan were already failing to adequately reproduce prior to the 
establishment of large populations of sea lampreys.  Juvenile lake trout were being overharvested 
by the fishery.  In addition, the chub fishery on Lake Michigan was sometimes catching more 
lake trout in its bycatch than the lake trout fishery itself.  Thus the commercial fisheries were 
taking a deleterious toll on lake trout prior to widespread sea lamprey abundance in the lake.
8
  
The perilous condition of lake trout populations left them open to demographic disintegration 
with the added pressures of sea lampreys. 
Recent trawling experiments charted drastic declines in numerous species of fishes in the 
lake.  According to the results, between 1994 and 2006 seven species of fishes, including 
whitefishes, alewives and sculpins declined over ninety percent.  Lake trout declined by over 
eighty-five percent.  Numerous endemic factors may be to blame including competition from 
increasing numbers of exotic species, climate change, predation by competitors and increased 
rates of diseases.
9
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Ecological challenges in the Lake Huron Basin continue.  In the final years of the 
twentieth century zebra mussels, round gobies, spiny water fleas and a host of other exotic 
species were introduced to the lake.  Each of these new species brought with it a new set of 
environmental challenges.  For example, zebra mussels are blamed for driving some species of 
native bi-valves to the brink of extinction.  Furthermore, the mussels are believed to be a 
contributing factor in the growth of toxic algae blooms.  Zebra Mussels avoid blue-green algae, a 
form of potentially toxic bacteria, and consume competing species instead.  This reduces 
beneficial algaes in favor of the toxic type.
10
  Zebra Mussels and other introduced species were 
transported into the interior Great Lakes by international shipping.  The most problematic vector 
for transmission is ship ballast water.
29 
Environmental changes continue to affect the basin in other ways.  Double-crested 
cormorants were nearly driven extinct from toxic contamination between the 1950s and 1970s.  
However, over the subsequent decades their numbers surged bringing with them their own set of 
environmental issues.  Since cormorants feed on fishes, sport fishermen usually view the birds as 
competitors for resources.  Increased knowledge of pesticides and other contaminants led to 
further changes in the fishery in the 1970s.  Fish were contaminated with various toxins.  
Increased limitations were placed on commercial operators.  Sport fishing enthusiasts and all fish 
consumers were warned to limit their consumption of Great Lakes fishes.  And around the lake 
the byproducts of human industrialization continue to pose challenges for the aquatic 
communities that endure today.  Enmeshed in a virtual net of ecological issues, Lake Huron 
remains an entangled Eden. 
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